A critical analysis of the legal construction of the presidency in post 1995 Uganda by Sekindi, Fred
  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE PRESIDENCY IN POST-1995 UGANDA 
            
           A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy   
by  
 
Fredrick Derek Sekindi* 
Department of Politics, History and Law, Brunel University London  
 
Prepared at the University of Pretoria under the supervision of Professors 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo and Ben Chigara of Brunel University, and Koos Malan of the 
University of Pretoria 
 
 
27 May 2015 
 
* LLB; LLM (Human Rights).
 
 
 
 
i  
 
Declaration 
 
I, Fredrick Derek Sekindi declare that this thesis is my work. Where I have quoted the work of 
other people in this thesis, they have been acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted for 
the purpose of an award of a degree at any other university. 
 
Signed: Fred Sekindi 
Fred Sekindi 
Date: 27 May 2015 
Place:  London, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
i i  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
My gratitude goes to my supervisors, ProfessorsManisuli Ssenyonjo, Ben Chigara and Koos 
Malan for their guidance and patience with me. I am also grateful to Professors Joe Oloka-
Onyago and Christopher Mbazira of Makerere University for their insight on this topic. I am 
thankful to Professors Charles Fombad, Michelo Hansungule of the University of Pretoria for 
directing my thoughts in this study. I am indebted to my brothers Robert Muyanga and Kenneth 
Ngobi, and my son Sidney Lule for supporting me during the period of this study. I am also 
grateful to my sister Innocent Ndiko, my friends Siraje Kakembo, Rose Atim, Herbert Mugerwa 
and Ronald Kayondo for their support. I am indebted to my fiancée Brenda Bisasso for her 
patience with me. The support I have received from my friends Justin Wanki and Carol Ngang 
who are both doctoral candidates at the University of Pretoria has shaped the direction of my 
work.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i i i  
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Fundamental laws in Uganda have demonstrated that the presidency must be granted command 
of the armed forces, as well as immunity from legal proceedings among other presidential 
privileges and powers. However, very few attempts have been made to question the origins of 
presidential authority and to circumscribe it exercise, in order to avoid the possibility of its 
misuse. As a result, the control of presidential authority in Uganda and in many other countries 
in Africa remains one of the most challenging issues in constitutional frameworks.  
 
This thesis argues that since its boundaries were drawn up by the British in 1894, up until 1995 
when the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 was adopted, Uganda has been ruled 
under fundamental laws authored under the leadership or the influence of heads of state and 
governments. Such laws were designed to permanently grant state powers to the heads of state 
and governments under whose leadership or influence they were created, and it is from those laws 
that presidential authority as commonly conceived in Uganda has emerged.  Therefore, because 
of the purpose for which those laws were designed, they have not provided sufficient constraints 
on heads of state and governments.  This thesis seeks to answer the principal question as to 
whether the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which was written under the leadership of President 
Museveni and his NRM government is another such fundamental law. 
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Chapter One 
 
General Introduction 
 
1.  Background to the study   
 
 Before 1995 when the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 was adopted, fundamental 
laws1 commonly granted the presidency the command of the armed forces as well as immunity 
from legal proceedings, among other presidential privileges and powers. Some of their 
provisions stated as follows: 
There shall be a Supreme Head and Commander in Chief of Uganda who shall be known as the President of 
Uganda and who is referred to in this Constitution as the President.2 
 
The President shall take precedence over all persons in Uganda and shall not be liable to any legal 
proceedings whatsoever in any court.3 
 
The President acting in accordance to the advice of the Cabinet may at any time dissolve Parliament.4 
 
The President may remit any punishment imposed on any person for any offence or any penalty.5 
                                                                 
1 I use the term fundamental law to refer to a either a constitution or a legal instrument that has been declared to 
have the status of supreme law. This is because in Uganda, it is not only Constitutions that have been the supreme 
law of the land. Decrees, Orders and other legal agreements have been declared as the supreme law of the land. 
 
2 Uganda (Independence) Order-in-Council 1962 (The Independence Constitution), art 34 (1). 
 
3 ibid art 34(2). 
 
4 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1967 (The Republic Constitution), art 73. 
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The exercise of power by the President under this Constitution shall not be inquired into by any court.6 
 
            By this Decree, the President of Uganda His Excellence Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada suspends Chapters I, 
IV and VI of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1967 and declares that the said Constitution shall 
be modified by ordinances issued by the President and all legislative and executive powers of Uganda shall 
be vested in the President.7 
 
There are four main problems with this model of presidential designation with untrammeled 
powers, which this study will demonstrate is also common in many countries in Africa. First, it 
conflicts with the principles of constitutionalism which are founded on minimising opportunities 
for any public office-bearer who exercises state powers, such as a head of state; 8 or a 
government to harm the citizens.9 In this context, constitutionalism demands that the functions of 
a constitution negotiated among the people should include limiting any exercise of state powers, 
determining which state powers should be vested in a head of state, and directing ahead of state 
on how to exercise such powers. Constitutionalism also permits the governed to recall the state 
powers when they have been misused or abused, or the public office-bearer. Therefore, 
constitutions serve to grant heads of state and governments, powers that should be exercised for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 ibid art 86(1)(d). 
 
6 ibid art 39(2). 
 
7 Republic of Uganda, Legal Notice No. 1 of 1971, para1.2. 
 
8 I use the term ‘head of state’ to refer to a natural person holding the highest-ranking official position in a country, 
who also acts as the chief public representative of a country. In Uganda, not every holder of the highest-raking office 
has had the title of the president. 
 
9 Stephen Elkin and Karol Soltan (eds), A New Constitutionalism; Designing Political Institutions for a Good 
Society (University of Chicago Press, 1993) 21. 
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the betterment of the people, and as envisioned by the people, but not as instruments for 
entrenching power and subjugating citizens.  
 
However, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Violations of Human Rights in 
Uganda from 1962 when the country had independence from the British, until 1986 when 
President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized power, estimates that two 
million extra-judicial killings of Ugandans occurred at the hands of the state, and between seven 
hundred and fifty and one million people were exiled by the successive oppressive 
governments.10 The Report notes that in an effort to hold on to power governments wantonly 
exercised unrestrained state powers which lead to human rights abuses and extrajudicial 
killings.11 It may therefore be stated that vesting unrestrained state powers in public office-
bearers not only departs from the accepted constitutional norms which impart ‘legal legitimacy’12 
on a fundamental law, but also the absence of legal legitimacy in the fundamental laws has had a 
devastating impact on the Ugandan society. 
 
Second, presidential authority as established by fundamental laws in post-colonial Uganda has 
not differed from that exercised by some of the rulers in the pre-independence period, whose 
authority did not emerge out of the citizenry and, therefore, it could not be questioned.13 In this 
                                                                 
10 Republic of Uganda, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations (Ministry of Justice and Constitution Affairs 1994) (Oder’s Report) 465. 
  
11 ibid 588. 
 
12 The concept of legal legitimacy is defined in chapter 3 of this study. 
 
13  For example, the power of the kabaka of Buganda had its authority in a source higher than kabaka’s subject 
therefore, it was absolute or never questioned, see Edward Wamala, ‘The Social-Political Philosophy of Traditional 
Buganda Society in George Maclean (ed), The Foundation of Social Life: Uganda Philosophical Studies  (Council 
for Research in Values and Philosophy 1992) 37, 37; Samwiri Karugire, ‘Roots of Instability in Uganda’ (Fountain 
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context, the introduction of fundamental laws perceived as  documents in which the citizenry 
determine how they are governed and control how public office-bearers exercise state power, has 
not been able to yield mechanisms for circumscribing presidential authority.  It may therefore be 
stated that the authoritarian design of the head of state as established by post-colonial 
constitutional structures in Uganda, has it is roots in some of the pre-independence governance 
systems.  
 
Third, granting unlimited state powers to any person offends regional standards for democracy 
and good governance found in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(ACDEG) 2007.14 ACDEG urges member states of the African Union to promote adherence to 
universal principles of democracy15 and to implement separation of powers in their 
Constitutions.16 Therefore, Member States of the African Union are encouraged to adopt norms 
of democracy and constitutionalism, which, for the protection of the citizenry, are aimed at 
limiting the exercise of state powers. 
 
Fourth, the exercise and acquisition of state powers in Uganda have been fraught with 
controversy before 1995 when the new constitution was adopted. During the pre-independence 
period from 1300 to 1962, some traditional governance systems and colonial constitutional 
arrangements did not provide any constraints on the leaders and in many parts of the country the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Publishers 2003) 9. While the authority of the colonial governor was not subject  to any legal scrutiny see R v 
Besweri Kiwanuka High Court Criminal Appeal No.38of 1937. 
 
14African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (adopted 30 January 2007 Assembly/AU/Dec.147 
(VIII)). 
 
15 ibid art 2(1). 
 
16 ibid art 3(5). 
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citizenry could not choose their leaders.17 During the period from 1962 when the country gained 
independence, up to 1995 when the new constitution was adopted, Uganda had seven heads of 
state of which six came to power by overthrowing the previous government. In the same period, 
it adopted three Constitutions18 which were either written under the influence or the leadership of 
a president and his government. The involvement of the majority of Ugandans in the adoption of 
these Constitutions was ignored. Also, nearly every head of state that came to power through 
violence and unconstitutional means took charge of creating a fundamental law that would 
validate their exercise of power. As this study will demonstrate, such laws were designed to 
entrench in power the leadership under which they were written. Moreover, all fundamental laws 
which were adopted before 1995 failed to allow for the direct involvement of Ugandans in the 
election of the president. Before 1995, with the exception of the general elections administered 
by the British colonial government in 1962 to usher in the first native government following the 
granting of independence, Uganda only held elections in 1980. These, however, have been 
widely discredited as fraudulent.19All other transfers of state power were achieved through 
violent and unconstitutional means. Therefore, before 1995 Ugandans did not participate in 
electing their head of state and in the making of the fundamental laws that ruled over them and, 
                                                                 
 
17 Seen (n 3); also see Prosser Gifford and Roger Louis (eds), Decolonization and African Independence: The 
Transfers of Power, 1960-1980 (Yale University Press 1988) 36.  
 
18 These are the Independence Constitution (n 2); the Interim Constitution of Uganda 1966, also known as the 
pigeonhole Constitution; the Republic Constitution (n 4). 
 
19 It has been widely claimed that the 1980 general elections were rigged in favour of Milton Obote’s Uganda 
People’s Congress (UPC). See generally Dan Mudola, ‘Political Transitions since Idi Amin: A Study in Political 
Pathology’ in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds), Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development 
(Oxford University Press 1988) 280-298; Francis Bwengye, The Agony of Uganda: From Idi Amin to Obote  
(Regency Press 1986); Holger Bernt and Michael Twaddle (eds), Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural 
Adjustment and Revolutionary Change (Oxford University Press 1991); Olive Kobusingye, The Correct Line? 
Uganda Under Museveni (Author House 2010); Sabiti Makara, The Management of Elections in Uganda  (Chr. 
Michelsen Institute 2012); Yoweri Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed; The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy 
In Uganda (Macmillan Education 1997). 
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therefore, the position and the laws were not rooted in ‘popular legitimacy’,20 The  position was 
also not open to be contested for by all Ugandans because fundamental laws did not allow it. 
 
It may therefore be stated that from 1894 to 1995, Uganda has been ruled through fundamental 
laws authored under the influence or the leadership of a head of state and his government. It is 
from such laws that the powers and privileges as commonly conceptualised in Uganda have 
emerged. Because of the purposes for which the laws were designed, they did not provide 
sufficient constraints on the head of state and government, and they did facilitate the smooth 
transfer of political power. For the same reasons, fundamental laws in Uganda before 1995 
lacked the necessary legal legitimacy to conform to the basic principles of constitutionalism 
which recognise limits of presidential authority and governments. They have also lacked popular 
legitimacy21. 
 
In 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA) stormed the capital city of the country Kampala 
after a five-year armed conflict. By Legal Notice No.1 of 1986, President Museveni and his 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) installed themselves as interim President and 
government, and promised to adopt a new constitution that would oversee a new democratic 
transition. These events marked three significant factors that have become too familiar in post-
independence Uganda. First, for the seventh time, state power was transferred through violence 
and unconstitutional means. Second, for the fourth time, a president and his government who 
come to power through violence and unconstitutional means suspended the fundamental law that 
was in force and issued a new one that validated their exercise of state powers. Third, seemingly 
                                                                 
20 The concept of popular legitimacy is  defined in chapter 3 of this study. 
 
21 The concept of legal legitimacy is  defined in chapter 3 of this study. 
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unrelated at that time, for the third time, a president and his government took charge of the 
process of adopting a new fundamental law with the aim of imbedding themselves in power 
permanently. On 8 October 1995, the Constitution of the Republic ofUganda1995 was 
promulgated.22 The Constitution is still in force. 
 
2.  Significance of the study  
 
I have been motivated to carry out this research because of the constitutional history of Uganda 
which illustrates that the country has been ruled under fundamentals created under the influence 
or the leadership of heads of state and governments. The designs of these laws demonstrate that 
they were intended to entrench in power, heads of state and governments under whose leadership 
or influence they were written. Therefore, they did not provide sufficient mechanisms for 
limiting the exercise of state powers. The constitutional history of Uganda also indicates that the 
involvement of majority of Uganda was excluded from the making of the fundamental laws and, 
therefore, the authority of governments did not have its roots in the wishes of the people. During 
the deliberations on the new constitution adopted in 1995, one of Uganda’s constitutional law 
experts Joe Oloka-Onyago counseled as follows: 
As Ugandans debate the draft constitution, it is important to remember that it is not only the Executive that 
needs to be harnessed to democratic mechanisms of supervision and sanctions but also other organs of 
government which are under its directions (such as the Cabinet and the Inspectorate of Government) as well 
as those which interact, such as the Legislature, the Judiciary and the population at large.23 
 
                                                                 
22 Here after referred to as the 1995 Constitution. 
 
23 Joe Oloka–Onyago, ‘Taming the President: Some Critical Reflections on the Executive and the Separation of 
Powers in Uganda’ [1995] 2 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 189, 192. 
 
 
 
8 
 
In this context, what has been described as the first fully consultative and participatory 
constitution-making process in Uganda,24 which yielded the 1995 Constitution, was actually 
intended among other aims, to reconstruct the institution of the presidency in order to ensure that 
its powers and privileges are effectively circumscribed in order to avoid their misuse and to 
ensure that future presidents enjoy the mandate of the people. This is because the problem in 
Uganda before 1995 has been that fundamental laws did not provide parameters of presidential 
authority. 
 
However, the old practices of ignoring the views of the majority of Uganda in the making of the 
fundamental laws, adopting fundamental laws under the leadership or the influence of the head 
of state and government, and of not building sufficient constitutional constraints against the 
presidency re-emerged in the manner in which the 1995 Constitution was adopted and its 
provisions. Therefore, the pre-1995 problems of excessive presidential authority and incumbency 
perpetuation have continued unabated in what was hoped to be a new democratic era, founded on 
a Constitution that has been misrepresented as having been debated and adopted by the people.25 
 
I take these claims based on four main factors. First, the undemocratic nature of the laws that 
were established to adopt the 1995 Constitution and the manner in which it was adopted 
indicates an intention by NRM government to commandeer the constitution-making process in 
order to adopt a fundamental law which would grant them power permanently. Second, the 
                                                                 
24 According to George Kanyeihamba, the 1995 Constitution was effectively discussed throughout the length and 
breadth of the country and eventually adopted and promulgated by a largely directly and freely elected Constituent 
Assembly to a great credit to the leadership of President Museveni and the work of the NRM. See George 
Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda; From 1894 to the Present  (Centenary Publishing 
House Limited 2002) 240. 
 
25 ibid. 
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design of the presidency as provided for by the 1995 Constitution demonstrates an intention by 
the framers of the Constitution to create an unlimited presidency. Third, the manner in which the 
1995 Constitution has been amended to repeal the presidential term limits indicates disregard of 
the principles of constitutionalism and the wishes of Ugandans. Fourth, presidential electoral 
laws have been constructed and construed to favour the incumbent president and, consequently, 
they have failed to facilitate fair competition for the presidency.  I aim to substantiate these 
claims in this study. 
 
Given that the majority of Ugandans were participating in the first ever consultative and 
participatory constitution-making process, did they intend to design the presidency with similarly 
uncircumscribed powers and privileges that had been misused by former heads of state? Also, 
recent studies have indicated that the majority of Ugandans would like to see the end of President 
Museveni’s twenty-nine year-long government,26  which is longer than all Uganda’s seven post-
colonial heads of state put together have served. This notwithstanding, the President continues to 
emerge victorious in presidential elections despite popular discontent with the laws governing 
presidential elections.27 Could it be that like the previous heads of state before him, although his 
methods differ, President Museveni has remained in power because of a legal framework which 
was designed to perpetuate his incumbency?    
 
                                                                 
26 See Research World International, Ugandans Tired of Museveni (Research World International Publications 2012) 
3; Jeremy Liebowitz, Robert Sentamu and Francis Kibirige, Citizen Perception of Democracy in Uganda: The 
Growing Gap between Expectations and Reality  (Afrobarometer, Briefing Paper No. 1115, 2013); Peter Girke and 
Mathias Kamp, Museveni’s Uganda: Eternal Subscription for Power?  (Kas International Report No. 7, 2010). 
 
27 Peter Girke and Mathias Kamp have argued that constitutional and domestic legal framework has been structured 
so as to hinder the transfer of political power from the incumbent.  See Peter Girke and Mathias Kamp, Museveni’s 
Uganda: Eternal Subscription for Power?  (Kas International Report No.70, 2010).  
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This study critically analyses the legal construction of the presidency under the 1995 
Constitution. The main aim is to investigate whether the design of the office of the president in 
the 1995 Constitution emerged out of another fundamental law, this time authored under the 
leadership of President Museveni, for the purposes of granting the President permanent 
ownership of power. The study also assesses Uganda’s efforts towards building constitutional 
safeguards against the misuse or abuse of presidential authority. It also analyses the legal 
instrumentalities that were established for the purpose of adopting the 1995 Constitution and the 
manner in which the Constitution was adopted in order to determine the popular and legal 
legitimacy of the presidency therein. This study further investigates the purposes of granting the 
presidency the power and privileges as provided by the 1995 Constitution. It also analyses how 
presidential authority has been exercised by President Museveni. Furthermore, it proposes how 
the power and privileges of the presidency may be exercised in a constitutional manner. Another 
objective is to explore the efficacy of post-1995 constitutional and domestic legal framework for 
electing a president in promoting fair political contestation. 
 
3. Thesis statement and research questions  
 
The main research question in this thesis is:  
Is the presidency as provided under the 1995 Constitution a result of another fundamental law, 
this time authored under the leadership and influence of President Museveni and his NRM 
government, for the purpose of entrenching their government in power? 
 
In responding to the main research question, the following ancillary questions have been 
addressed for the purpose of greater clarity:  
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1. What are the origins of the presidential authority in Uganda?  
 
2. Does the 1995 Constitution create an office of the president rooted in popular and legal 
legitimacy? 
 
3. How does the 1995 Constitution ensure essential checks and balances against the exercise 
of the powers and privileges of the presidency to avoid their abuse and misuse? 
 
4. How has presidential authority been exercised following the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution? 
 
5. How should a president exercise the powers and privileges conferred by a constitution? 
 
6.  Do the post-1995 presidential electoral laws facilitate fair political competition? 
 
4. Effectiveness and significance of post-conflict constitutional reforms 
 
The two most important steps towards establishing a new democratic dispensation through 
constitutionalism in a country emerging from conflict and misrule are to meaningfully involve 
the citizenry in contributing to the constitutional reforms and to establish appropriate structures 
or institutions designed to remedy wrongs of the past. Some African countries have taken various 
steps towards realising these aims. For example, in South Africa, building a new democratic 
 
 
12 
 
dispensation required an inclusive and consultative constitution-making process and it 
necessitated replacing apartheid structures. Many of the old structures were transformed as a 
result of ideological and jurisprudential shifts. One of the ideological shifts was to implement 
affirmative action programs in order to repair the social fabric of a society damaged by racism 
and colonialism.28 In Benin, after a long period of political instability in which the country 
witnessed constitution abrogation, unconstitutional seizures of power and absolute one-man 
regimes, the country agreed to an idea emerging out of the desire of the populace, to create a new 
constitution in order to eradicate the political instability.29 The ‘never again’ approach to 
constitution-building sought to identify and address the causes of political instability. 
Constitutionalism and the protection of human rights were at the heart of this new era of 
democratic revival which the country went through.30 With regards to eradicating the possibility 
of returning to one-man rule regimes, the new constitution-making process in Benin focused on 
addressing the problems of excess powers and privileges exercised by previous presidents. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Benin 1990 also emerged out of a meaningful consultative and 
participatory constitution-making exercise which aimed at eradicating the ills of the past. Thus, it 
emphasises a strong rejection of dictatorship, one-man leadership and disrespect for the 
Constitution, and disregard of the rule of law, which were the main features of the previous 
                                                                 
 
28 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, art 9 (2) allows for legislative and others measures designed to 
protect and advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
29 Charles Fombad and Nathaniel Inegbedion, ‘Presidential Term Limits and their Impact on Constit utionalism in 
Africa’ in Charles Fombad and Christian Murray (eds), Fostering Constitutionalism in Africa (Pretoria University 
Law Publication 2010) 1, 7. 
 
30 Bruce Magnusson, ‘Testing Democracy in Benin’ in Richard Joseph(ed), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa 
(LynneRienner Publishers 1999) 208. 
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regimes.31 Benin’s and South Africa’s experiences illustrate that post-conflict constitutional 
reforms are more likely to be meaningful if they emerge out of a genuine participatory and 
consultative process and they are only effective if they seek to remedy the ills of the past. 
 
5. Methodology    
 
The study reviewed the existing literature on which the discourse on presidentialism has been 
developed and the subject matter has been explored extensively. Particular focus was given to 
fundamental laws as the source of presidential authority and the manner in which presidential 
authority has been acquired and exercised. Information sources included case law, constitutions, 
legislations, academic literature, newspapers articles, databases and website blogs. The study 
surveyed designs of the head of state in Uganda as established under pre-colonial governance 
systems, constitutional arrangements during the colonial era and by fundamental laws in the 
post-colonial period. It also analysed how fundamental laws in Uganda were adopted. 
Comparable parameters of presidential authority as defined by constitutional frameworks in 
various countries and by the courts, with a particular focus on Benin were examined. The study 
also analysed the constitutional and domestic legal framework for conducting presidential 
elections in Uganda and the international standards for adjudicating electoral complaints. 
Furthermore, it examined African standards for democracy, elections and governance. Academic 
publications, newspaper articles and web blogs were also consulted to provide the foundation for 
the arguments advanced in this study. The research also benefited from engagement, discussion 
and dialogue with academics in Uganda, the United Kingdom and in South Africa. Opinions of 
                                                                 
31 John Heilbrunn, ‘Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo’ [1993] 31 Journal of Modern 
African Studies 110, 112. 
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legal practitioners, politicians, civil society activists and judges whose evaluation and 
understanding of constitutionalism and politics in Uganda contributed to shaping some of the 
issues that are discussed in this study. Journalists and a host of other members of the Ugandan 
society also directed my attention towards the political realities in the country. I also attended 
conferences, workshops and training sessions in Uganda, the United Kingdom and in South 
Africa where I gathered sufficient knowledge from the views shared by research students and 
academic staff with expertise on the topics relating to the issues under discussion. 
 
Through these interactions, the study gained considerable insights on the problems associated 
with excess presidential authority and the deficiencies in presidential models, constitutional 
frameworks and presidential electoral laws, from which suggestions for a suitable presidential 
model and fair presidential electoral laws have been developed.  
 
Descriptive, analytical and historical approaches were applied to analyse and critique the 
presidential model as established by the Constitution of Republic of Uganda 1995, to answer the 
main research question of this study and itsancillary questions. 
 
6. Limitations 
 
One of the main obstacles that this study faced is the dearth of academic literature and sources of 
reliable information on governance and constitutionalism in Uganda. Most of the documentation 
relating to the colonial era and to the period before 1995, are not available in Uganda because 
they were destroyed during the various wars that the country has experienced. The common 
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source of the history of Uganda is fundamentally oral. This has been handed down over 
generations and it is often distorted with tribal and religious bias. However, there are a few 
Ugandan academics who have engaged with issues pertaining to this research and, therefore, 
their work has been frequently cited to support the arguments that I make and to question some 
common assumptions. It may also be stated that there is a fear among Ugandans of criticizing the 
ruling government because of the level of intolerance towards alternative views. This made it 
difficult for this study to elicit the free opinions of Ugandans which would have enhanced this 
study. For these reasons, the purview of this thesis has been limited to exploring a the few 
available local sources supplemented by newspaper articles, web blogs and the work of 
international and regional academics for the purposes of sketching and probing the conclusions 
made by this study. 
 
Newspaper articles and website blogs have been used to the supplement academic literature.  
While these sources may not be found to be authoritative, they have been drawn on in an attempt 
to highlight both the realities in Uganda and the opinions formed on the issues concerning this 
research. In order to address the challenges posed by the dearth of a variety of sources, I relied 
extensively on informal interviews with judges, lawyers, journalists, members of civil society 
and with the academic community in order to challenge common perceptions and to supplement 
the available information.  
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7.  Breakdown of chapters  
 
This thesis consists of this introductory chapter, four substantive chapters and a concluding 
chapter. The contents of each chapter are discussed at the beginning of every chapter therefore, 
only an outline of the issues dealt in this study is provided under this section. Chapter two 
provides a background to this study. The main aim is to provide a comprehensive platform for a 
critical analysis of the legal construction of the institution of the presidency in post-1995 
Uganda. Starting with pre-colonial governance systems, the chapter traces the origins of the 
powers and privilege of the head of state in Uganda. It provides a history of fundamental laws 
that Uganda adopted before 1995, and it analyses designs of presidencies found these laws.  A 
discussion of the history of transfers of the office of the head of state and an analysis of how 
presidential authority was exercised before the1995 Constitution was adopted are carried out. 
The chapter also illustrates how fundamental laws were adopted before 1995 in an effort to 
explain how heads of state acquired and exercised state powers.  
 
In chapter three, the study investigate the constitution-making process which yielded the 1995 
Constitution in an effort to engage with issues that motivated the design of the office of the 
executive president therein. The chapter also aims to gauge the efforts of the NRM towards 
adopting a truly first home-grown constitution that reflects the aspirations of the people of 
Uganda, and which is cast in the principles of constitutionalism. It also examines attempts to 
reconstruct the presidency in the 1995 Constitution. The chapter further defines two concepts 
namely, popular and legal legitimacy, which are commonly known as popular sovereignty and 
constitutionalism respectively.  The two concepts are employed to measure the legitimacy of the 
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model of executive president as provided under the 1995 Constitution and the Constitutions as a 
whole. 
 
Chapter four analyses some of the powers and privileges of the presidency established by the 
1995 Constitution. It also questions the basis of granting these powers and privileges to the 
presidency.  The chapter examines how the 1995 Constitution attempts to impose checks and 
balances in order to safeguard against abuse of presidential authority, and it explores how 
President Museveni has exercised the powers and enjoyed the privileges granted by the 1995 
Constitution. It also proposes how presidential authority should be exercised in a constitutional 
manner. Furthermore, it explores how Constitution and Courts in various jurisdictions have 
defined the scope of presidential authority. Lastly, the chapter illustrates that the designation of 
the executive president as established by the 1995 Constitution is not particular to Uganda only, 
but it is a common phenomenon in African Constitutions. Thus, the chapter discusses the 
implications of such presidential models on constitutionalism and good governance across the 
continent. It further demonstrates that the Constitution of the Republic of Benin1990marks an 
exception in Africa in the way it conceptualises the office of the president and how it establishes 
organs for checking and balancing presidential authority.  
 
Chapter five explores the post-1995 constitutional and domestic legal framework established for 
electing the president of Uganda. Focusing on the challenges in presidential elections, it explores 
the efficacy of the laws under which the president of Uganda is elected in facilitating fair 
political competition. The chapter also discusses how the Supreme Court has interpreted 
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presidential electoral laws and it examines the constitutionality of the 2005 constitutional 
amendment to repeal the presidential term limits from the 1995 Constitution. 
 
The final chapter of this study provides concluding observations, findings and recommendations. 
 
8. Mini-conclusion 
 
The focus, objectives and structure of this study have been set out in this introduction in order to 
provide a preliminary understanding of the issues that are dealt with in the rest of the study. A 
comprehensive historical background to the office of the head of state in Uganda before 1995 is 
essential for launching a platform for this study. This follows in chapter two. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The head of state in Uganda (1300-1995) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
It would be impossible to critically analyse the post-1995 legal construction of the presidency in 
Uganda without understanding how the powers and privileges of the head of state were acquired 
and exercised in Uganda before 1995. This is because, as this study will demonstrate, no single 
institution of government in Uganda required more reconstructing than the head of state because 
of the way it dominated and acquired state power through undemocratic and unconstitutional 
processes before 1995. In this regard, the post-1995 constitutional reforms emerged out of efforts 
to circumscribe the presidency, among other things. To achieve this aim, Ugandans sought to 
develop rules in the new constitution for minimising the power excesses of leaders and for 
allowing smooth transfers of power in order to eradicate the plagues of unconstitutional change 
of power and its abuse which afflicted the country since independence. In this regard, this 
chapter focuses on the manner in which heads of state acquired, retained and exercised power 
from 1300 to 1995 in order to provide the foundation for this study. 
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This chapter is made up of eight sections, of which section 1 is this introduction.  Section 2 
provides a brief background to how the leaders of kingdoms and tribes acquired and exercised 
power in pre-colonial Uganda from 1300 up to 1894 when Uganda was declared a British 
Protectorate. Section 3 discusses the constitutional arrangements under which the colonial 
governor and native leaders exercised power during the colonial era from 1894 up to 1962. 
Section 4 provides a history of the transfer of the office of the head of state from 1962 when 
Uganda acquired independence up to 1995 when the new constitution was adopted. Section 
5analyses the designs of fundamental laws created under the leaderships of successive heads of 
state from the period since independence until 1995. Section 6 provides an account of how heads 
of state and governments have used state powers to abuse human rights, carry out extra-judicial 
killings and to undermine constitutionalism in the period under discussion. Section 7 discusses 
role of the army as a brutal instrument for unconstitutional change of power and a final arbiter of 
political disagreements.  Section 8 is the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
2.  Pre-colonial governance systems and the exercise of power by the kings 
and the leaders of tribes (1300-1894) 
 
Uganda1 is a territorial unit consisting of ninety three thousand and nine hundred and eighty one 
square mile of land and water in the heart of Africa, commencing in a north-easterly point of 
Mount Sabyinyo, running in the easterly direction to the summit of Kyeshero Hill, its most 
                                                                 
1  It has been claimed that when the first Europeans and Asians came to Uganda, they misspelt and mispronounced 
Bugandahence earlier referring to it as Uganda when it was brought under the British colonial rule. See Timothy 
Amerit ‘Contextualising a Jurisprudence Cliché that Buganda was nothing but a ‘Protected State’ in the Uganda 
Protectorate’ (Timothy Amerit Legal Wheels, 5 September 2014) 
http://timothyamerit.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/contextualizing-jurisprudential-cliche.html accessed 22 April 2015. 
 
 
 
21 
 
easternly  point is at the Wagagai summit of Mount Elgon and it most southern boundary at 
Sumba Island, its south-western boundaries are along the Rwenzori Mountains, while its western 
boundaries are at Lake Albert and it most northern point is at Nimule National Park.2 Before 
being declared as the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 by the British colonial government; the 
country now known as Uganda was made up of the five main Kingdoms of the Ankole, Buganda, 
Busoga, Bunyoro and Toro in the southern and western parts of the country; of which Buganda 
was the largest both in size and population; and other tribes including the Acholi, Langi. 
Lugbara, of the north and Iteso, Bagwere and Bagisu of the east; to mention some of the 
indigenous populations of Uganda that were placed under one territory- Uganda.3 According to 
Samwiri Karugire there were two main governance systems in pre-colonial Uganda, namely 
segmentary and non-segmenatry.4 Under the non-segmentary governance system as was 
practiced in the southern and western Kingdoms such Buganda, the Kingdom had a centralised 
system of governance with the king (kabaka) as its titular head with absolute powers.5In contrast, 
Edward Wamala argues thata kabaka was believed to be a semi-divine being, his power and 
authority though never absolute, was never questioned.6 
 
John Mbiti makes the following observations of the source of the authority of the institution of 
the kabaka and how the rulers were conceived by their subjects: 
                                                                 
2 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, (The 1995 Constitution), 2nd  sch, art 5. 
 
3 Timothy Amerit (n 1). 
 
4 Samwiri Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda (Fountain Publishers 2003) 9. 
 
5 ibid 26. 
 
6 Edward Wamala, ‘The Social-Political Philosophy of Traditional Buganda Society in George Maclean (ed), The 
Foundation of Social Life: Uganda Philosophical Studies (Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 1992) 37, 
37. 
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            Where these rulers are found, they are not simply political heads: they are the mystical and religious heads, 
the divine symbol of their people's health and welfare. The individual as such may not have outstanding 
talents or abilities but their office is the link between human rule and spiritual government. They are 
therefore, divine or sacral rulers, the shadow or reflection of God's rule in the universe. People regard them as 
God's earthly viceroys.7 
 
It may therefore be stated that the authority of the institution of the kakaba was not subject to 
earthly constraint or scrutiny because the rulers derived the right to rule from a greater source 
than their subjects. 
 
A kabaka did not perform his duties solely but was assisted by a committee of senior people 
(Lukiiko) who were responsible for collecting revenues and enforcing the kings’ orders and as 
such, they took positions of both political and social significance. These included a prime 
minister (katikiro), a royal sister (nalya), a queen mother (namasole), a naval commander 
(gabunga) and a commander of the armed ground forces (mujasi).8 In modern political terms, we 
may refer to lukiko as the cabinet of a kabaka.  
 
The Kingdom of Buganda was partitioned into administrative units headed by chiefs, the biggest 
of which were the Counties (Amasaza). Counties were sub-divided into Sub-Counties 
(Amagombolola) which were also sub-divided into Parishes (Emiruka). Parishes were also sub-
divided into Sub-Parishes (Bakungu) which were the smallest village unit.9 
 
                                                                 
7 John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (Heinemann 1969) 182. 
 
8 Buganda Kingdomhttp://www.buganda.or.ug/index.php/ekitiibwa-kya-buganda-bugandas-glory/cultural-
administration accessed 20 April 2015. 
 
9 ibid. 
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Apart from the queen mother and the royal sister who owed their positions to their family 
relationship with the kabaka, members of the Lukiiko and the chiefs were appointed by a kabaka 
and were directly responsible to him.10A kabaka could assign or dismiss any chief at any time. 11 
However, by the end of 1750, chieftainship was taken to be open for anyone to qualify.12 It was 
awarded by the kabaka on a clan basis but only to men of merit with notable services.13 The 
manner in which the institution of the kabaka of Buganda exercised authority over its subjects 
illustrates their absolutism. The kingdom of Buganda was founded by Kabaka Kato Kintu in 
1300.14 Abdu Kasozi notes that by 1404, Kabaka Tembo had acquired the right to kill his 
subjects.15 Subsequently, rulers of the Kingdom of Buganda used dehumanising violence 
towards their subjects. Kabaka Namugala (1734-1764) massacred a group of his subjects and 
buried two hundred of them in a mass grave.16 Kabaka Kyambade executed hundreds of his 
subjects on the Ssese islands because they complained that they were not given meat during a 
ceremony.17 Kabaka Suuna II (1824-1854) executed three hundred subjects because he suspected 
one of them of stealing from him.18 Kabaka Walugembe Mutesa I (1854-1884) was nicknamed 
                                                                 
 
10Abdu Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda 1962-1985 (McGill Queens University Press 1994) 12; 
also see Karugire (n 4) 11. 
 
11 ibid. 
 
12 Buganda Kingdom (n 8). 
 
13 ibid. 
 
14  The Royal Ark, ‘Buganda Brief History’ http://www.royalark.net/Uganda/buganda.htm accessed 28 April 2015. 
 
15 Kasozi  (n 10) 13. 
 
16 ibid. 
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Mukabya (he who makes people cry) because of how easily he took life.19 Buganda was littered 
with the kings’ execution sites in Busanji, Nakinziro, Kubamitwe, Kitinda, Kijabi and many 
others.20 No other leaders in what was to become the Uganda Protectorate and later Uganda had 
absolute power over their subjects and misused their powers as the rulers of Buganda. The 
people of Buganda (Baganda) also seemed to accept the right of rulers to use violence against 
them and many of their proverbs seems to show their acceptance or at least resignation. These 
include, kabaka nyondo ekusabuzito (The king is a heavy hammer that kills by its weight) 
kabakanyanja eta natavuba (The king is an ocean that not only kills fishermen but also anyone 
else he wishes). 
 
In sum, the power of the institution of the kabaka of Buganda had its source in an authority 
higher than the kabaka’s subjects. Therefore, the actions of a kabaka were not questionable by 
the subjects. Consequently, the rulers exercised absolute power. This allowed them to kill their 
subjects needlessly. The Baganda also accepted that their rulers had the right to kill and that their 
authority was unquestionable. 
 
In contrast, under the segmentary governance system as was practised by the northern tribes of 
Uganda such the Acholi, a chief governed according to wishes of the people.21 Each family was 
independent. For example, every Acholi man was held to be a king of his own house (arwot ki 
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oda).22 Such independence limited the powers of the traditional chiefs (rwot) to that of ruling by 
consent and decisions of the chief tended to be final summaries of the consensus view of the 
elders and advisers to which any man may contribute openly. 23 
 
Rwots were selected by the elders of the village from royal families on the basis of their ability 
to listen to people and to resolve disputes peacefully.24 Clan leaders (ladit kaka) who formed the 
body of advisers for the rwot were appointed by elders of the clan.25 To qualify as a ladit kaka, a 
person was expected to know a lot about the clans, to assist in dispute settlement and they were 
often asked to act as a messenger (lakwena) for the rwot in conflict resolution.26 It has been 
claimed that the strong anti-violence values in traditional Acholi society are reflected in the fact 
that a person who kills cannot be respected as a leader.27 He or she must go through cleaning of 
the body (yubo kum) to purify them before being allowed into the society.28 The principle of 
conflict resolution (mato oput) was used to bring together the two sides in a disagreement in 
order to investigate the conflict, with the aims of establishing responsibility for the wrong, and to 
allow the wrongdoer to seek repentance.29 A rwot had no means of coercion, although all adult 
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male habitats were required to lender tributes to the rwots, there were always villages that 
refused to pay and moved away to set up chiefdoms of their own.30 
 
 The segmentary governance system constituted a social form of governance that shared power 
and decision-making among members of the community thereby leading to a social order and a 
non-violent political culture. Unlike a non-segmentary system, leaders owed their authority to the 
citizenry who elected them. The governance structures in segementary societies provided 
sufficient constraints on powers of the leaders in order to avoid their misuse by ensuring that 
decisions of the leaders are reached by consensus and they cannot be imposed on the people that 
objected to them. There was also an acceptance by the leaders to operate within the governance 
constraints. This led to a better system of governance under which the populace were ruled by 
consent and the authority of the leaders could not be used to subjugate them. 
 
In conclusion, pre-colonial governance systems in Uganda were diverse allowing for both 
democratic governance and autocracy. Segmentary systems allowed for sufficient checks and 
balances on the powers of the leaders in order to avoid the abuse or misuse of power. This was 
possible because the authority of the leaders was granted by the populace who would select their 
leaders and who also developed mechanisms for checking and balancing their powers. For 
example, the selection process which provided that advisers to the rwots, the ladit kakas, were 
not elected by the rwots but by the elders of the clan appears to be designed to ensure that in 
making decisions, the rwots consults the ladit kakas who are the representatives of the people. 
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While in non-segmentary such as the Kingdom of Buganda, the institution of the kabaka derived 
its power from an authority higher than the subjects. Therefore, the ruler’s power could not be 
questioned or constrained by subjects who were not the source of the power. This system of 
governance moored autocracy. 
 
3. Legal foundations of the powers and the privileges of the head of state  
(1894-1962) 
 
 In 1894, the kingdom of Buganda was declared a British Protectorate on the basis of the 
Buganda Treaty 1894 that was negotiated between the British and Kabaka Mawanga II of 
Buganda which was negotiated the year before it came into force, and which was confirmed by a 
notification in the London Gazette.31 It should be noted that the Buganda Treaty 1894 was first 
constitutional document in Uganda that put the powers that were previously exercised by the 
native leaders through traditional practices, into what we may refer to as a legal document. In 
this regard, it represents the first constitutional framework that defined how the powers of the 
state would be exercised. It is not known if Kabaka Mwanga and his successors fully understood 
how the Treaties that they negotiated with British were to impact on the exercise of the power by 
the institution of the kabaka. Events that were to unfold before independence suggest that they 
did not.The main effect of Buganda Treaty 1894 was that the Protectorate came under the ambit 
of theAfrican Order- in-Council 1889, which authorised the British government to establish local 
jurisdiction and under which it was to exercise executive, judicial and administrative powers.32 
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The Buganda Protectorate was gradually expanded to incorporate other territories however, apart 
from the Treaties negotiated between the rulers of Tororo and Ankole in 1900 and 1901 
respectively, which were important in their owns ways but they did not achieve prominence 
because the British carried out their main political and economic activities within the Kingdom 
of Buganda,33 there were no arrangements with any of the other kingdoms and tribes accepting 
Britain’s protection.34 It should be noted the expansion of the Protectorate of Uganda began on 
4th December 1893 with the military campaign launched against the Kingdom of Bunyoro by the 
British, which was led by Colonel Coleville and supported by the army of the Kingdom of 
Buganda.35After suffering a series of defeats, King Kabalega of Bunyoro was driven from his 
Kingdom and forced to take refuge in Lango in the northern part of Uganda in 1894.36 As a 
reward for his assistance in the war against the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Colonel Colville promised 
the Kabaka of Buganda that the Kingdom of Bunyoro would be incorporated into Buganda.37 
This roughly was the area comprised of Buyaga and Bugangazi, northern Singo, Buruli, and the 
formerly semi-independent area of northern Bugerere, which were part of the Bunyoro 
territory.38 The areas are commonly referred to as the ‘Lost Counties’. 
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 On 10 March 1900, Kabaka Daudi Chawa II of Buganda who at the time was three years old, 
was assisted by his Lukiiko in negotiating with British government, the Buganda Agreement 
1900 which was signed by Governor Harry Johnson who represented the British.39 William 
Johnston writes that when the Buganda Agreement was made, the legal advisers for the British 
Foreign Office, which was responsible for the administration of the Buganda Protectorate, were 
convinced that by a new the Treaty, the British colonial governments’ authority would be 
extended to cover all the aspects of government in the Uganda Protectorate.40 It may therefore be 
stated that it was following the advice from the Foreign Office that the New Uganda Order-in-
Council 1902 was made with the Kabaka Daudi Chwa II of Buganda and the aim was to ensure 
that British government controls all aspects of governance in the Protectorate.  
 
As John Mugambwa aptly notes, the Buganda Agreement 1900 and the New Uganda Order-in –
Council1902 gave the Crown extensive powers for the purposes of administration, raising 
revenue and granting land titles.41 This may be deduced from some of their provisions. For 
example in relation to the aspect of administration namely, legislation, the Buganda Agreement 
provided that the laws, customs and regulations that were in place before its adoption were to 
apply to the Protectorate except in so far as they were inconsistent with the Agreement and in 
which case the Agreement will prevail.42 Thus, pre-colonial systems of governance became 
subordinate to the Buganda Agreement and to a greater extent were replaced by it. It should be 
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noted that the kakaba remained the head of the state of the native population of Buganda. He and 
his Lukiiko retained the constitutional right to pass laws for the natives provided that such laws 
were consistent with the Treaties. This position was confirmed by Court of Appeal of Eastern 
Africa in the case of Nasanairi Kibuka v Bertie Smith.43 The Buganda Agreement defined the 
Kingdom of Uganda as a territory within the Uganda Protectorate which comprised of twenty 
administrative units or Counties (Amagombolola).44 It provided for the appointment of three 
native officers; that is a prime minister (katikiro), a chief justice (omulamuzi) and a treasurer 
(omuwanika) or controller of the kabaka’s revenue; to assist the kabaka in the governance of his 
people.45 It further created a Native Legislature (Lukiiko) whose members were to be appointed 
by the kabaka from the Magombolola, and it provide that the legislative functions of the Lukiiko 
were to make resolutions in matters concerning the administration of Buganda subject to the 
consent of the kabaka and the colonial governor.46 
 
The New Uganda Order-in-Council gave the colonial governor the power to make ordinances for 
the administration of justice, raising of revenues and generally for the peace, order and good 
governance for all persons in Uganda.47 Such legal construction of the colonial governor was 
intended to create the supreme authority vested with all powers for the sole administration over 
the Protectorate –the head of state. The effect of these provisions was that there was nothing that 
could not be done in the Protectorate by the colonial governor issuing legislation. The other 
                                                                 
43 Original Civil of 11 December 1908. 
 
44 The Buganda Agreement 1900 (n 42), art 9. 
 
45 ibid art 10. 
 
46 ibid art11 
 
47 New Uganda Order-in-Council 1902 (The New Oder-in Council), art 16. 
 
 
 
31 
 
notable constitutional introduction by the colonial government included the establishment of the 
High Court of Uganda,48 which was vested with original and unlimited jurisdiction on both civil 
and criminal matters over all persons and matters;49 and the creation of the 
Legislative Council for the Protectorate, consisting of the governor and such persons as His 
Majesty would direct by any instructions under His sign; 50 and which was bound to observe 
royal instructions in the discharge of its functions.51 In 1919, the Native Authority Ordinance 
Uganda was enacted. It established native courts with powers to hear all criminal and civil 
matters relating to the Africans in the Protectorate.52 Appeals from the native courts lay before 
the High Court,53 which was established under the New Uganda Order-in-Council.54Also, the 
Eastern African Court of Appeal Order-in-Council 1921 established the Eastern Africa Court of 
Appeal for the Protectorates of Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland and Zanzibar.55 The Court of Appeal 
had jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals including reserved questions of law from the four 
Protectorates.56 Appeals from it were heard by the Privy Council of the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom.57 Judgements, decrees or orders of the Court of Appeal had the full force and 
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effect in every Protectorate.58 It should be noted under section 7 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 
1890, His Majesty’s government had the power to legislate for foreign territories and, therefore, 
the Eastern African Court of Appeal Order-in-Council was passed under this provision. 
 
 In relation to the position of the kabaka of Buganda before the colonial era, Buganda was an 
autonomous kingdom socially, economically and politically with a kabaka who was vested with 
absolute power. However, upon the signing of the Buganda Agreement, the institution of the 
kakaba lost some its absoluteness. For example, revenues were to be collected by the General 
Revenue of the Protectorate.59Also, under article 11 of Buganda Agreement, the kabaka had to 
share his powers of decision making with his chiefs pursuant to the Native Authority 
Ordinance.60 Therefore, the exercise of power by the institution of kabaka was now supervised 
by constitutional arrangements negotiated by the rulers of Buganda and the British government. 
In the case of Rex v Crewe Ex. P. Sekgome,61 the British Court of Appeal held that by virtue of 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, the Crown’s powers in any of its Protectorates could not be legally 
challenged because it was an Act of the state. This decision served to confirm that the superior 
authority vested with the administration of the Protectorate was no longer in the hands of the 
native rulers but the colonial governor. In their entirety, the constitutional arrangements 
introduced at the beginning of colonialism weakened the powers that were exercised under the 
position of the kabaka and by other native rulers, not only because they were no longer the direct 
rulers of their people, but also because they could no longer exercise unconstrained powers. The 
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absoluteness enjoyed by the institution of kabaka before the colonial era was effectively 
transferred by the constitutional arrangements to the new head of state of the Protectorate- the 
colonial governor. It may well be that the weakened position of the kabaka and the exploitation 
of the natural resources by the British colonial government, among others things aroused 
political conscious among the natives.   
 
 The quest for political inclusion in Uganda started in earnest in the 1940s. According to David 
Apter, demands for the native population’s participation in formulating and implementing 
government policy increased around 1944.62 Native political parties were formed; between1946 
and 1951, the Bataka (Indigenous) Party was formed, followed by the African Farmers Union 
Party and the Baganda Abakopi (Peasant) Party.63 James Miti and Ignatius Musazi, the founders 
of the Indigenous party and the Peasant Part respectively, called for an end to colonial dominance 
and for the involvement of the natives in political and economic affairs of their country.64 In 
1949, protests in Buganda against colonial rule cumulated into full-on confrontation between the 
natives and the colonialists.65As the native population struggled for political involvement in their 
country, the British answered their pursuit of political inclusion with violence, albeit more 
tempered than that they had seen under the institution of the kabaka66 and that which was to 
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follow under post- independence leaders. The British also embarked on enacting oppressive laws 
as a method of suppressing the native calls for independence. The colonial governor declared a 
state of emergency in March 195067and enacted the Penal Code Act of 1950 Chapter 120 which 
established offences intended to criminalise any opposition to colonial rule.68 These offences 
were used to silence calls for political change. In the early 1950s, political activities among the 
native population reached a new level.69 Leaders of the native parties called for an end to colonial 
dominance and for the involvement of the native population in the governance of Uganda.70 The 
native political parties were proscribed as unlawful societies,71 and the Deportation Ordinance of 
1908 was used to avert demands of the political rights for the natives.72 Many Baganda Chiefs73 
including the Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa I were deported because they demanded more 
involvement in the governance of their country.74 All of this was possible because the colonial 
governor was vested with unlimited authority to pass laws and to clamp down on all those who 
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challenged the colonial government.75 The native population had no right to participate in the 
governance of their country. 
 
The British also created a police force for the purpose of sustaining its colonial power. Joe Oloka-
Onyago describes the role of the police during the colonial period as follows: 
Rather than playing the role of the neutral arbiter over actions of a criminal nature, the Police under 
colonialism was a central element in the struggle over resources, power and authority. Its primary 
responsibility was the suppression of political opposition while the prevention of crime was regarded only as a 
supplementary function.76 
 
Prosser Gifford and Roger Louis posit that: 
 European colonial regimes could continue to exist only so long as three requirements were fulfilled. First, 
that their colonial subjects  acquiesced to their authority; second, that the politicians and electorates of the 
metropolitan countries accepted colonial commitments as not entirely unethical and, on the whole, 
worthwhile; and third, that these empires received international recognition.77 
 
 Despite efforts by the British to stifle the demands for political involvement by the native 
population, Samwiri Karugire notes that in the last decade before independence, pressure 
continued to mount for self-governance in the Protectorate mainly from Buganda and owing to 
this pressure, by 1945, membership of the Legislative Council had risen to twenty-eight 
including seven Africans, seven Asians and fourteen British.78 
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In 1944, the Democratic Party (DP) was created while the Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC) and 
the Kabaka Yeka (KY) parties were both formed much later in 1961.79 By the early 1950s, native 
political parties were no longer proscribed as the British government begun to prepare the 
country for independence. Abdu Kasozi notes that political parties in Uganda were founded on 
religious and tribal roots. He writes that the DP’s leadership and supporters were mainly 
Baganda, who were against the leadership style of the institution of kabaka and were catholic; 
while the UPC’s support base was the Acholi and Langi and the other tribes of northern Uganda, 
and were also protestants; and the KY supporters were Baganda who wished for the 
reinstatement of the institution of the kabaka as the head of state, and they were protestants.80 
 
In 1952, following the appointment of Sir Andrew Cohen as the Governor, the pace of the 
demands from the native population altered the British colonial government policy. Its emphasis 
was first placed upon the rapid expansion of the social services (especially education) and then 
on constitutional reforms with the prospect of independence in the foreseeable future.81 In 1955, 
as the moment towards independence gained momentum among the Protectorates of Kenya, 
Uganda and Nyasaland that were under the protections of His Majesty’s government, Kabaka 
Mutesa II in an effort to secure the autonomy of his Kingdom of Buganda, signed the Buganda 
Agreement 1955 with Sir Andrew Cohen. Under this agreement, the British government made 
an undertaking that the Kingdom of Buganda will not become part of a unitary East African 
Federation State following independence.82 The Buganda Agreement 1955 represents one of the 
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constitutional arrangements negotiated between the British government and the rulers of 
Buganda that favoured the rulers of Buganda over other native leaders that Protectorate of 
Uganda comprised. No other tribes or kingdoms were given such assurances by the British. It is 
important to note that the Buganda Agreement 1955 did not repeal the agreements between 
Buganda and British government of 1894 and 1900 or the New Uganda Order-in-Council 
1902.83 Thus, the powers of the colonial governor under these constitutional arrangements 
remained the same.  Appended to the Buganda agreement 1955 was the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Buganda which provided a new design of the office of the kabaka. It provided that 
the governor of the Uganda Protectorate shall be the representative of Her Majesty in 
Buganda.84 The kabaka enjoyed all the titles, dignities and pre-eminence that attach to the office 
of the kabaka under the law and custom of Buganda.85 Before assuming the functions of his 
office; the kabaka was required to enter into a solemn undertaking in the presence of the 
governor; to be loyal to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II whose protection Buganda enjoys, Her 
Heirs and successors; to well and truly govern Buganda according to the law; and to abide by 
the terms of the Agreements made with Her Majesty and by the Constitution of Buganda.86 If at 
the time of taking the position, a kabaka was a minor, then until he attains majority, he, except 
where customs require, was not to perform the duties of the position of the kabaka and was not 
be required to enter into the solemn undertaking.87 If the kabaka was a minor or was unable to 
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perform his constitutional duties, the Buganda Agreement 1955 provided that the Lukiiko would 
elect three persons to be regents.88 It also created the kabaka’s council of minister appointed by 
the kabaka and headed by the prime minister (katikiro) and approved by the governor.89 The 
council of ministers was charged with the administration of kabaka’s government.90 The kabaka 
in consultation with the governor would terminate the appointment of a minister, if the minister 
was convicted of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.91 If in the 
opinion of the kabaka, a  minister become incapable of performing his functions by reason of 
physical or mental infirmity, the kabaka  was authorised to appoint a committee consisting of 
such persons he considered suitable to enquire into the matter; and the committee, if  satisfied 
that a minister has become incapable of performing his functions by reason of physical or 
mental infirmity, would inform the kabaka accordingly and thereupon the kabaka in consultation 
with the governor  would terminate the appointment of the minister.92 
 
The kabaka was empowered to pass laws for the Africans in Buganda with the advice of the 
Lukiiko and the approval of the governor.93 Laws made for the general governance of the 
Uganda Protectorate were equally applicable to Buganda except in so far as they did not conflict 
with the terms of the Buganda Agreements in which case, terms of the Buganda Agreements 
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constituted a special exception in regard to Buganda.94 The revenues and expenditure of the 
kabaka’s government were approved by the governor.95 
 
The Buganda Agreement 1955represents an attempt to circumscribe the powers of the institution 
of the kabaka and build into them mechanisms that ensure that the powers are not misused. For 
example, the kabaka’s powers to appoint and dismiss a minister were supervised by the colonial 
governor.96 Also, the reasons for dismissing a minister were provided by the Buganda 
Agreement.97 However, the powers of the colonial governor who wielded ‘actual power’ and 
who had the overall authority of over the Protectorate and was therefore the head of state, were 
not subject on any constitutional constraints. 
 
In 1959, a committee commissioned by the colonial government recommended for elections to 
be organised in preparation for independence.98 Apart from the Uganda (Independence) Order-in-
Council 1962,99 the Buganda Agreement 1955 marked the end of treaty negotiations between the 
British and the native rulers within the Protectorate of Uganda. 
 
With regards to the acquisition and exercise of the powers of the colonial governor who became 
the first head of state of the Protectorate of Uganda, it may be stated that the authority of the 
colonial governor had no legal constraints, neither was it rooted in the wishes of the native 
                                                                 
94 ibid art 26(4). 
 
95 ibid art 27(1).   
 
96  See (n 90). 
 
97  See (n 93). 
 
98 Wild Committee, Report of the Constitutional Committee (Government Printers 1945) (The Wild Report) 45. 
 
99 Uganda (Independence) Order-in-Council 1962 (The Independence Constitution). 
 
 
40 
 
population. The main constitutional arrangements namely, the Buganda Agreement 1900 and the 
New Order-in-Council 1902 which created the basis for the colonial rule over the Uganda 
Protectorate and thereby established the legal authority of the colonial governor were negotiated 
by the rulers of Buganda and the colonial government and imposed on Ugandans.100 The New 
Uganda Order-in-Council also gave the colonial governor extensive powers to pass laws for the 
administration of the Protectorate,101 thereby vesting all legislative powers in one person. 
Although the governor shared his legislative role with the Legislative Council, he was a member 
of this Council, and he had powers to suspend its members and to revoke the appointments to 
it.102 Thus, members of the Legislative Council owed their positions to the governor. Also, 
pursuant to article 7(4) of the Uganda New Order-in-Council 1902 all mineral resources in the 
Protectorate were placed under the sole custody and jurisdiction of the governor.  
 
It therefore suffices to conclude that the governor’s powers were not sufficiently constrained by 
the constitutional arrangements that were in place during the colonial era. In addition, the 
arrangements posed a challenge to the notion of separation of powers, which I will discuss in 
chapter three, in as so far as they allowed the governor to encroach on the role of the Legislative 
Council and also because the Council was not constitutionally empowered to provide checks and 
balances on the governor. This domineering legal construction of the office of the governor 
created a passage to a dictatorial rule and a benchmark for the design of the office of the head of 
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state, which was to be reproduced in fundamental laws that Uganda would adopted after 
independence. 
 
 The British government also confirmed the legally uncontainable nature of the power of the 
colonial governor. In the case of R v Besweri Kiwanuka,103 the High Court of Buganda sought 
directions from the British Secretary of State for Colonies104 on the jurisdiction of His Majesty 
over the Kingdom of Buganda. In response, the Secretary of State for Colonies asserted that: 
By the Uganda Ordinance-in-Council, His Majesty had made manifest the extent of His jurisdict ion in 
Uganda. Such may be referred to as an act of state unchallengeable in any Court or may be attributed to state 
power given under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.105 
 
 All doubts over which institution of state was the supreme authority with unlimited powers were 
erased. As Joe Oloka-Onyango notes, such interpretation of the law was deliberate and necessary 
to preserve the authority of the British for the domination of the colonised.106 The courts also 
served to emphasise that the authority of the colonial governor was supreme and that the native 
population would not enjoy any political rights. In the case of Nyali Ltd v Attorney General,107 
which originated from the Protectorate of Kenya, the most liberal of British judges, Lord 
Denning, made it clear that the British government and its power exercised through the colonial 
governor was unchallengeable and could not be subjected to review by the courts.  
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Colonial laws also augmented the legally unfettered nature of the powers of the governor. A 
clear example of this can be found in the Deportation Ordnance Act 1908. The Act permitted the 
colonial governor to deport any person, who conducted himself so as to be dangerous to peace 
and good order, or any person who endeavoured to excite enmity between the people of the 
Protectorate and His Majesty, or any person who plotted against His Majesty’s power and 
authority.108 It also provided that the decision of the colonial governor was not subject to appeal 
in any court of law.109 The Penal Code Act 1950, Chapter 120 also served to insulate the colonial 
governor110 and his chiefs111 from any criticism. It prohibited political mobilisation against the 
colonial government112 and it created an offence of treason which could be committed by an 
attempt to cause the death of the governor.113 These draconian laws helped to secure the 
existence of an illegitimate and repressive colonial government. 
 
The designations of the head of state as provide for under the colonial constitutional 
arrangements represented a negation of the basic principles of constitutionalism which I will 
discuss in the next chapter. It was through these agreements that the parameters for the 
exercising and acquiring the powers of the state were defined in Uganda, although the 
absoluteness of the kabaka of Buganda before colonialism did not differ from that of the colonial 
governor. 
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In the remaining sections of this chapter, I focus on the period after independence in 1962 and 
before 1995 when the new constitution was adopted. 
 
4. Transfers of the office of head of state (1962-1995) 
 
On 9 October 1962, Uganda acquired independence from the British. Three preliminary points 
that I briefly made in chapter one section 2, about the manner in which heads of state acquired 
and exercised state powers after independence and before 1995, need to be expounded further in 
order to set a comprehensive background to this study. First, in the period under discussion, six 
out of the seven heads of state came to power by overthrowing the previous government. 
Therefore, for the first thirty-three years after independence, state power in Uganda was mainly 
transferred through violence and unconstitutional means. As a result, Uganda has not witnessed a 
single smooth and democratic transfer of power from one government to another, save for the 
handover of government from the Military Commission headed by Paulo Muwanga to President 
Obote’s, following the highly disputed elections of 1980. Second, Uganda has promulgated three 
Constitutions in 1962, 1966 and 1967 which were all sponsored by the ruling governments 
without the involvement of the majority of Ugandans.114 Thus, similar to the powers and 
privileges exercised and enjoyed by the institutions of the kabaka and the colonial governors, the 
authority of the heads of state under the three Constitutions following independence was not 
founded on the popular authority of Ugandans. Third, on acquiring power through violent and 
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unconstitutional means, nearly every head of state suspended the existing fundamental law and 
replaced it with that sponsored by his government which allowed them to legitimise their rule. 
Therefore, governmental powers and by implication those of the head of state, have been 
emerged out of fundamental laws sponsored and designed under the influence of the government 
in power.  
 
The Independence Constitution was adopted for the purpose of defining the manner in which 
independent Uganda was to be governed. It was supplemented by the National Assembly 
Elections Act 1957 for the purposes of conducting the first general elections in 1962 to prepare 
the country for self-rule. The elections were contested by the DP, KY and the UPC. Although the 
DP got the majority in the National Assembly, KY and the UPC merged to become KY-UPC, 
and became the majority that formed the government under President Edward Mutesa II, the 
leader of KY, while Milton Obote of the UPC became the Prime Minister.115 It is important to 
note that the transfer of power from the Colonial Governor, Sir Walter Coutts, to President 
Mutesa II and Prime Minister Milton Obote, following the 1962 general elections was the only 
non-violent and undisputed transfer of political power in the country’s history before 1995. 
 
The Independence Constitution was negotiated between the native agitators for independence 
and the British Government at Lancaster House in London.116 It was therefore based on the 
principles and philosophy of the United Kingdom.117 It is important to recall that under section 7 
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of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890, His Majesty’s government had the powers to legislate for 
foreign territories and, therefore; the Independence Constitution was adopted under these 
powers. In this context, the process of constitutional promulgation resembled in many ways the 
‘amiable farce’ of treaty-negotiation that took place between the rulers of Buganda and the 
British during colonialism. The British government sought to negotiate political settlements that 
were favourable to them in order to maintain their influence in Uganda, while Kabaka Mutesa II 
was posturing for political dominance in the new independent Uganda in order to restore the 
powers that the position of the kabaka had lost during the colonial period. No consideration was 
given to the wishes of the indigenous population. 
 
 Similar to the colonial constitutional arrangements, the Independence Constitution represented a 
vague attempt at constraining the powers of the head of state and at demarcating the parameters 
of state power between the executive, judiciary and legislature. Evidence of this may be detected 
from the powers it bestowed on the presidency. It created the first president of Uganda – 
President Mutesa II118 and, therefore, the role of the colonial governor as the head of state was 
transferred to the presidency. The Independence Constitution provided that the president was to 
take precedence over all persons in Uganda and was not liable to any legal proceedings 
whatsoever in any court.119  A president was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces120 and 
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was not to pay taxes.121 The president was to appoint the head of the judiciary in consultation 
with the prime minister.122  She or he was vested with the sole powers of clemency.123 The High 
Court of Buganda administered justice in the name of a president.124  The Independence 
Constitution also recognised the supremacy of the Constitution125 and it repealed the 
constitutional arrangements negotiated between the native rulers and the British government, and 
those that were issued under Crowns’ powers to legislate for the Protectorate.126A president was 
eligible for re-election for as many terms of office127 provided she or he met the eligibility 
conditions.128 In relation to the exercise of legislative powers, the Independence Constitution 
empowered the National Parliament to make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
Uganda.129 At the same time, the legislature of the Kingdom of Buganda (Lukiiko), at the 
exclusion of the National Parliament had the powers to make laws for Buganda and Uganda. The 
Lukiiko was constitutionally empowered to make laws for the peace, order and good government 
of  Buganda; in relation to the institution of the kabaka: for  the powers, obligations and duties of 
the institution of the kabaka, the status of Buganda’s  ministers and their powers, obligations and 
duties (other than those conferred by or under a law enacted by the National Parliament); for the 
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public service of Buganda; for matters incidental to the Lukiiko and other authorities in 
Buganda,  taxation and matters relating thereto as may be agreed between the kabaka's 
government and the government of Uganda, and  the public debt of Buganda.130 Bills originating 
from the Lukiiko and from the National Parliament required the approval of the president to 
become law.131 The executive authority of the Kingdom of Buganda was entrusted to the 
institution of the kabaka 132 while the executive authority over Uganda was vested in the 
National Parliament 133 and the presidency.134 Cabinet ministers were appointed by the president 
in consultation with the prime minister,135 and could be dismissed by the president on either the 
recommendation of the prime minister, or after consultation with the prime minister,136 while 
ministers for the Kingdom of Buganda were appointed by the kabaka after consultation with the 
Lukiko.137 
 
Apart from the provisions vesting shared executive powers between presidency and the National 
Assembly,  and those that relate to the appointment and dismissal of  cabinet ministers,  the  
other significant changes in the Independence Constitution from the design of the head of state in 
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the pre-independence Uganda was that the president was to be elected by the National Assembly 
for a term of five years,138 and could be removed from office by a resolution originating from 
either the prime minister or the National Assembly,  and supported by not less than two-thirds of 
all members of the Assembly.139 The group from which a president could be elected was 
restricted to the native rulers of the Kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro and Butoro and heads of 
Districts.140 In this regard, the majority of Ugandans were excluded from contesting for the 
presidency and they were not allowed to participate in the election of their president. The 
president was also a member of the National Assembly.141 He or she could resign at any time 
from office by writing to the prime minister.142 The Independence Constitution also created the 
Electoral Commission whose members were to be appointed by the president on the advice of 
the prime minister.143 Such was the constitutional design of the first presidency in independent 
Uganda. 
 
The Independence Constitution reflected the bargaining powers and the wishes of the Kabaka 
Mutesa II of Buganda, the darling of the colonialist, who was to become the first president of 
Uganda. As discussed above in this chapter, throughout the colonial era, the British established 
constitutional arrangements that favoured the rulers of Buganda and the Baganda over other 
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rulers, tribes and kingdoms in the Protectorate.144 In a similar manner, many of the complex 
provisions of the Independence Constitution favoured Kabaka Mutesa II and his tribe the 
Baganda, over other rulers and tribes which comprised independent Uganda.145 It has also been 
claimed that during the negotiations on the Independence Constitution, Kabaka Mutesa II and his 
tribe the Baganda were against joining a unitary state as they would forfeit their autonomy and 
de facto end their monarchy and, therefore, they demanded that unless they were granted a 
degree of autonomy, they would not join a free Uganda.146 Joe Oloka-Onyango traces the 
historical role of Buganda and its implication within the broader context of Uganda. He notes 
that the imperialist policy of indirect rule guaranteed that the Kingdom of Buganda remained 
dominant virtually throughout the colonial epoch and after it.147 Anthony Low also provides an 
insight into the root of the cordial relations between the Kingdom of Buganda and the British.  
He writes that although Buganda is one of the many Kingdoms of the south of Uganda, it owes 
its present size and preponderance to the fairly permanent abode which, it alone of the 
Kingdoms, provided for the Europeans who began to move into the area from 1875.148 He 
contends that the rulers of Buganda seem to have been impressed by the assistance given by Sir 
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Samuel Baker and Colonel Gordon to the Egyptian in their quest to acquire more territories and 
they believed that they could call on the assistance of the British to acquire neighbouring 
kingdoms.149 Unlike the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Butoro who kept the Europeans out, the 
rulers of Buganda welcomed their assistance in providing them with arms that were used to 
conquer the other kingdoms and tribes and take over their territories.150 Further evidence of the 
genial relations between the Kabakas of Buganda and the British which also indicates that the 
British were grooming Kabaka Mutesa II to take over power after they departed is provided by 
Alan Forward. He writes that among all the native leaders in the Protectorate of Uganda, only 
Kabaka Mutesa II was chosen to attend Magdalene College, Cambridge in England where he 
was commissioned as a Captain in the Grenadier Guards.151Also, leading up to independence, 
Mutesa II was knighted as Commander of the British Empire on the New Year’s honour list in 
1962 by the Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom.152 The relationship between the British 
government and the rulers of Buganda is important for understating the powers and privileges 
granted to presidency which were exercised and enjoyed by Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, who 
became the first president of Uganda under the Independence Constitution. It may therefore be 
stated that the design of the presidency found in the Independence Constitution and many of its 
provisions, were written under the overriding influence of the Kabaka of Buganda Mutesa II. The 
presidency was the compromise Mutesa II enjoyed in exchange for agreeing to allow his 
Kingdom of Buganda to join the unitary state of Uganda. It may well be that during the 
negotiations on the Independence Constitution, Mutesa II could not accept for the presidency to 
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be bestowed with less power than that which was exercised by the rulers of Buganda or the 
colonial governor. In sum, the outcome of the independence constitutional reforms in relation to 
the presidency is that it did not differ much from the structures of the institution of the kabaka or 
the colonial governor whose authority was unlimited. The presidential authority bestowed by the 
Independence Constitution indicated an intention to create a supreme authority whose power 
over the administration of Uganda would be close to unquestionable. It should be noted that the 
majority of Ugandans were ignored in the making of the Independence Constitution. Therefore, 
they were unable to formulate ideas on how state powers should be exercised.  
 
The domineering nature of the presidency and the provisions that favoured the Baganda sowed 
the seeds of division which were to form the root for abrogating the Independence Constitution. 
Having brought together many tribes and kingdoms that had nothing in common by defining the 
boundaries of Uganda; the British had the moral, if not legal responsibility to ensure that the 
constitution which would provide how they were to be governed would not be the basis for tribal 
conflicts. James Paul observes that: 
Independence Constitutions were like negotiated treaties. They were often more the product of ad hoc 
bargaining in London than the reflection of popular demands and manifestations of indigenous political 
culture. They were also often extraordinarily complex. But by accepting a constitutional document worked out 
in London on the eve of independence, regimes in Africa could hasten the attainment of national sovereignty 
and the entrenchment of their own power. Once independent, the regime could change the cons titution to suit 
local needs, and not surprisingly, to tighten its own control over the political system.153 
 
It may well be that the native political actors of that time felt undermined by British and the 
Kabaka of Buganda during the ‘constitution-bargaining process’, accepted the Independence 
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Constitution as part of an opportunity for self-rule but knew it had to be changed to reflect the 
new independent Uganda.  
 
On 22 February 1966, a year before the general elections were meant to be held as provided for 
under the Independence Constitution,154 a struggle for political power between President Mutesa 
II, local leaders and Prime Minister Obote came to a breaking point over the controversy of the 
so-called ‘Lost Counties’.155 It is important to record here that Hansard notes that during the 
negotiations on the Independence Constitution, Kabaka Mutesa II rejected the proposal to return 
the Lost Counties to the Kingdom of Bunyoro claiming that they had become part of Buganda 
after sixty years.156  Thus, the Independence Constitution provided that a referendum would be 
held in the areas to allow residents to make a decision as to whether the Counties should remain 
as part of Buganda or return to Bunyoro.157 The residents voted for the return of the Lost 
Counties to Bunyoro.158 The Kabaka of Buganda and the President of Uganda refused.159 Prime 
Minister Milton Obote decided to stage a coup d’état. He sent the army which was headed by Idi 
Amin to depose President Mutesa II.160 Although the Independence Constitution put the armed 
forces at the command of the presidency,161 as will be discussed in the last section of this 
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chapter, the colonial foundations on which the armed forces in Uganda were built meant that it 
was mainly made up of soldiers from northern Uganda who were loyal to Obote who was also 
from northern Uganda. Obote abrogated portions of the Independence Constitution, abolished the 
federal states, and imposed on the country the Interim Constitution 1966162 while the parliament 
building was surrounded by armed soldiers in commanded by Idi Amin.163 The Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights since Independence and before 1986 
notes that: 
The abrogation of the Independence Constitution was a unilateral action taken without consulting either 
Parliament or the people of Uganda. For a couple of months , Uganda was literally governed without a 
constitution. Then the 1966 Constitution was put in the pigeonholes of the members of Parliament and they 
were asked to approve it even before reading it, and they did. In other words, Parliament suddenly, and 
without consulting anybody, constituted themselves into a Constituent Assembly. They enacted and 
promulgated a Constitution whose contents they did not even know.164 
 
The legitimacy of Obote’s government, his unconstitutional and violent seizure of power, and the 
validity of his imposed Interim Constitution were subjected to legal scrutiny in the case of 
Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons Ex-parte Matovu.165 The petitioner was served with a 
detention order under provisions of the Interim Constitution.166 He filed a habeas corpus 
application, arguing that the detention order violated article 28 of the Independence 
Constitution,167which remained the supreme law of the land. The case presented the High Court 
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of Uganda with the opportunity to examine the validity of the Interim Constitution and the 
legitimacy of Obote’s government. 
 
In a unanimous decision, the Court rejected the government’s plea that the new oath of allegiance 
to the Interim Constitution that had been taken by Parliament precluded the Court from inquiring 
into the validity of the Constitution. It also dismissed the argument that the Court had no 
jurisdiction to enquire into the validity of the Constitution because the making of a constitution is 
a political act and outside the scope of the functions of the Court. This landmark decision marked 
the first attempt to limit the actions of the head of state by a Ugandan court and a departure from 
the colonial jurisprudence which indicated that the exercise and acquisition of the powers of the 
head of state were not amenable to judicial scrutiny.168 Obote’s government appealed to the 
Eastern Africa Court of Appeal. Justice Odoma quoted extensively from the case of State 
v Dosso,169 which he found ‘irresistible and unassailable.’ He declared as follows: 
The events from 22 February to 14 April 1966 “are a law creating facts” appropriately described in law as a 
“revolution” because there was an abrupt political change, not contemplated by the existing Constitution 
that destroyed the entire legal order and was superseded by a new Constitution. The revolution is victorious in 
the sense that the person assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the 
country to conform to the new regime, and then the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact. The 
Constitution of 1966 is a legally valid constitution and the supreme law of Uganda. The Independence 
Constitution of 1962 was abolished as a result of a victorious revolution in law, it no longer exists nor does it 
form part of the laws of Uganda, having been deprived of its de facto and de jure validity. The 
1966 Constitution is the new legal order and which has been effective since 15 April 1966, when it first came 
into force.170 
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According to Joe Oloka-Onyango, the Court clothed the patently illegal actions of Obote in a 
shroud of legitimacy and thus aided the erosion of its own power and authority.171 Indeed, having 
endorsed the violent and unconstitutional seizure of political power, the Court accepted that it is 
possible to undermine the authority of competent institutions such as the courts and Parliament to 
create and amend legal order and to resolve political conflicts. The Court’s decision aided the 
abrogation of the Independence Constitution. It also set two precedents that were to dominate the 
political and constitutional histories of post-independence Uganda.  First, that political power can 
be transferred through violent and unconstitutional means.  Second, that a head of state and a 
government can impose a fundamental law on the country.  
 
It should be noted that despite the multifaceted provisions of Independence Constitution, it 
provided a procedure for impeaching a president.172 It is not known if Obote explored this option 
before he opted to remove President Mutesa II through a method not authorised by the 
Independence Constitution. 
 
Obote’s government later introduced the Constitution of Republic Uganda of 1967173 in June 
1966.174 Following the seizure of power by Obote, a significant number of the members of KY 
and DP in the then National Assembly joined the UPC which allowed the UPC to have a 
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majority in the legislature.175 This act highlights the willingness of Uganda’s politicians to 
change allegiances swiftly in order to acquire or retain power. It also transformed the reputation 
of the institution of Parliament from its envisaged role as a regulator of the powers of the 
presidency and the bastion of constitutional rights, to one that is subservient to the presidency. 
The UPC’s majority in the National Assembly was to become significant in the process of 
debating and adopting the Republic Constitution. 
 
It should be recalled the Independence Constitution prohibited amendments to any of its 
provisions relating to its supremacy, the federal states and the districts;176 and many of its 
provisions nurtured inequalities among the various tribes and kingdoms in independent 
Uganda.177 Therefore, having ousted President Mutesa II and assumed power in a manner not 
authorised by it, and having also abolished the federal states, Obote had to introduce a new 
fundamental law that would not only legitimise his powers but that would also normalise the 
inequalities in the Independence Constitution. 
 
The Republic Constitution can be conceived as Uganda’s first attempt at developing a home-
grown constitution. Although it came as a result of the ‘constitutional crisis of 1966’, it was 
debated and passed by a Ugandan Parliament. However, its popular legitimacy is shrouded in 
controversy for several reasons.  
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First, the term of the Parliament which transformed itself into a Constitution Assembly and 
adopted the Republic Constitution had expired.178 Therefore, it had no mandate to adopt the 
Republic Constitution. It was an illegitimate forum both for governing Uganda and for adopting 
a new constitution. Obote’s government had the option of calling for new elections. The National 
Assembly emerging out of the new elections would have been dressed in some level of popular 
legitimacy to adopt a new constitution. Second, the popular legitimacy of the Republic 
Constitution would have benefited from a consultative and participatory constitution-making 
process, marking a departure from the exclusive method of constitution-making through which 
the Independence Constitution was adopted. Obote could have pointed at the inequalities in the 
Independence Constitution which allowed the other tribes of Uganda to be dominated by 
Kingdom of Buganda as forming the basis for its abrogation and for adopting a more inclusive 
constitution. He could also have argued that the Independence Constitution was imposed on the 
country by the erstwhile colonial authorities and the Kabaka of Buganda. These issues would 
have given him sound grounds for proposing a new constitution. However, the mode of adoption 
of the Republic Constitution employed by Obote suggests that his intentions were to make use of 
an easily manipulable, illegitimate and limited forum that had exhibited its acquiescence to him 
by adopting the Interim Constitution; to adopt a constitution that would fortify his power and 
government. 
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Although the Republic Constitution was actually adopted on 8 September 1968, it had come into 
force on 15 April 1966179 the day after Obote deposed President Mutesa II. It declared the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land.180 The Republic Constitution mirrored the 
provisions in the Independence Constitution relating to the election of a president in that 
presidential election was to continue in the previous indirect manner.181 It also continued to 
sanction multiparty political competition.182 It provided four possible routes to the presidency. 
First, the leader in the National Assembly of the party having a numerical strength which 
consists of a majority of all members of the Assembly returned to the Assembly after a general 
election would become the president.183 Second, where no party acquired a majority in the 
Assembly, the leader of the party with the greatest numerical strength following a general 
election would become president.184 Third, in the event that the leader of the party which 
acquires the greatest numerical strength following a general election fails to form a government 
which commands the support of the Assembly, the leader of the party having the next numerical 
strength in the Assembly would become president.185 Last, where a person who has become 
president under the immediately preceding provision186fails to form a government which 
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commands the support of the Assembly, then the Assembly would proceed to elect one of its 
members as president.187 
 
The National Assembly was empowered to prescribe a procedure for electing a president.188 A 
motion of no confidence in the government passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of 
the total membership of the National Assembly could force the resignation of the president.189 
With regards to the immediate occupancy of the office of the president, the Republic 
Constitution provided that the person holding office as the prime minister before the 
commencement of the Constitution was deemed to have been elected as president.190 Therefore, 
Milton Obote, the instigator of the coup d’état against President Mutesa II, the sponsor and 
arguably the architect of the Republic Constitution became the second president of Uganda. 
 
The Republic Constitution also abolished the position of prime minister and created the first full 
executive president191 who was also a member the National Assembly.192 In relation to holding 
elections and the tenures of the then serving leaders, it provided that general elections would be 
held after five years.193 Like President Obote, members of the serving National Assembly were 
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deemed elected until the next elections.194 With regard to the presidency, it had powers to appoint 
and dismiss top civil servant officials.195A president was the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces.196 The president had powers to dissolve Parliament.197 The presidency had the sole power 
of clemency.198 A president was not liable to any legal proceedings199 and would not pay taxes.200 
The Republic Constitution also prohibited the courts from inquiring into actions carried about a 
president in the exercise of constitution powers.201 
 
John Wapakhabulo argues that apart from the election of the president, the provisions for the 
presidency in the Republic Constitution had some democratic semblance.202 The facts are that the 
significance of these provisions includes the increment of powers to the presidency. Courts were 
barred from scrutinising the exercise of the presidency’s constitutional authority. Also, Ugandans 
who expected to hold elections in 1967, as was envisioned by the Independence Constitution had 
to wait for another four years. Moreover, Prime Minister Obote was to serve as the president for 
a term without being elected. Members of the National Assembly would also serve another term 
without being subjected to the ballot. The manner of adoption of the Republic Constitution and 
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the design of the institution of the presidency therein suggests that Obote’s government took 
charge of creating a fundamental law with the aims of granting more powers to the presidency 
and to legitimise its powers acquired through violent and unconstitutional means. There was no 
democratic tone to the Republic Constitution. 
 
Christopher Mbazira observes that the militaristic way in which Obote ousted President Mutesa 
II, imposed on the country the Interim Constitution and later adopted the Republic Constitution 
meant that he would depend on the military for his stay in power.203 Indeed, it was the army that 
ousted Obote. On 25 January 1971, the year in which elections were to be held as provided for 
under the Republic Constitution,204 Idi Amin took power by coup d’état in  continuation of the 
method of acquiring power through violence and unconstitutional means set by Obote,, and 
which was endorsed by the Eastern Africa Court of Appeal.205 Amin’s assault on Mutesa, as 
Obote’s Chief of Staff of the armed forces had given him an invaluable lesson on how to acquire 
political power through the barrel of a gun.206 For the second time since independence, state 
power was transferred through violence and by unconstitutional means. Amin declared himself 
president-for–life.207 He also suspended; by decree, parts of the Republic Constitution including 
those that relate to its supremacy, provisions for elections, the presidency and for the legislative 
powers of Parliament; and he declared the Republic Constitution subordinate to the decrees he 
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issued.208 In this regard, like Obote before him, President Amin’s government established its 
fundamental law that validated its exercise of power. By declaring himself president-for-life and 
by repealing the constitutional right to vote, Amin also excluded any other Ugandan from 
contesting for the presidency. The presidency was not to change hands. Amin was president for 
eight years. 
 
When Amin’s forces invaded Tanzania, Tanzania mobilised her army under the umbrella of 
Ugandan dissidents- the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), which overthrew Amin on 
11 April 1979. For the third time after independence, state power was transferred through the use 
of force. By Decree, the UNLF transferred the powers that were vested in Amin to the new 
President Yusufu Lule, its leader.209 The UNLF also set up the National Consultative Council 
(NCC) as an interim legislature and suspended Chapters IV and V of the Republic Constitution 
which provisions dealt with elections and legislative powers of Parliament.210 This fundamental 
law served to validate the exercise of state power by the UNLF government and the new- 
President Lule. Lule was to serve for a nineteen-month interim period to prepare the country for 
the first general election since 1962. However, he did not have the backing of the army and the 
NCC removed him after two months accusing him of attempting to centralise power.211 
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 In the case of Andrew Lutakome Kayira v Edward Rugumayo & 2 Ors,212 a constitutional 
petition was brought to challenge the removal of Lule. Justice Odoki who delivered the Court’s 
judgment declared that the matter was not justiciable, being ‘a political question’ and that the 
Court would not issue a declaration to reinstate the head of state.213 
 
On the issue of whether the NCC had powers to remove Lule from office, the Court issued a 
modified declaration that the NCC acting in its capacity as the legislature had no powers to 
remove the President from office.214 It is important to recall that the constitutional provisions 
providing for the impeachment of a president under the Republic Constitution were suspended 
by Amin,215 and subsequent to that by Lule’s UNLF.216 Under the fundamental law created by 
the UNLF, 217 the NCC as a legislative council had no powers to remove President Lule. On the 
question of whether the Court had powers to issue a declaration to reinstate President Lule, it 
appears the Court did not stray from the confines set by Justice Odoma in the case of Uganda v 
Commissioner of Prisons Ex-parte Matovu218 as discussed above. 
 
 The NCC installed Godfrey Binaisa as President.  Lule’s successor-Binaisa, was removed in 
May 1980 by the Military Commission led by Paulo Muwanga.219 In December 1980, the 
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Military Commission organised the first general elections since independence. The elections 
were contested between the Conservative Party (CP), the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda 
Patriotic Movement (UPM) and the Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC).220 It was a common 
occurrence during the 1980 election campaigns for the army to harass, torture and to kill Obote’s 
political opponents, and also to disperse political rallies organised by Obote’s political 
opponents.221 By this time, Obote’s henchmen led by Army Commander General Ojok had 
swelled the army with soldiers from Obote’s tribe.222 Events before, during and after the 
elections suggest that the elections were neither free nor fair. Also, during the elections, the 
Chairman of the Military Commission-Paulo Muwanga, usurped the powers of the Electoral 
Commission by a Proclamation223 and he took over the responsibility of announcing the results 
when it became apparent that the DP, was on the verge of winning the majority of seats in the 
National Assembly to form a government.224 The DP’s victory was reversed by the Military 
Commission. The Proclamation also ousted the powers of the courts to adjudicate any disputes 
arising out the elections.225 These factors form some of the reasons why the credibility of the 
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1980 elections has been widely contested.226 The UPC under Obote took power and the DP that 
commanded the most support but lacked the military might, formed the opposition. Yoweri 
Museveni, then the UPM party leader, declared that the elections were fraudulent and 
unacceptable.227 Museveni formed apolitical organisation- the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM), which embarked on contesting the elections through a popular and bloody armed 
conflict.228 
 
While Museveni’s NRM was engaged in an armed struggle with Obote’s government, on 27 July 
1985, heightened tensions between soldiers led to another military coup d’état.229 Soldiers 
stormed the capital city- Kampala, and Obote was overthrown. Lieutenant General Tito Okello 
was sworn in two days later as president. Okello’s government was toppled by a war led by 
Museveni in January 1986.  Museveni and his NRM were installed as interim president and 
government respectively, while the country embarked on the process of adopting a new 
constitution. 
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5.  Fundamental laws created under leaderships of heads of state (1962-
1995) 
 
It is important to outline the designs of fundamental laws from which presidential authority has 
emerged and which anchored authoritarian governments, since independence and before the 
1995 Constitution was adopted. This provides an understanding of how heads of state and 
governments, by taking charge of processes of creating fundamental laws, have bestowed on 
themselves excessive powers which allowed them to entrench their rule without the possibility of 
change through constitutional processes, ravage Uganda and to abuse human rights. 
 
Starting with the Independence Constitution, fundamental laws In Uganda have moulded a 
president in the images of the kabaka and a colonial governor who exercised unrestricted powers 
and who did not required the mandate of the people to hold power. George Kanyeihamba 
observes as follows: 
The Independence Constitution created a president who required no mandate from Ugand a as a whole; all he 
needed was to be a ruler of a Kingdom or District, and also only one Kingdom or District could determine the 
qualification of this high office.230 
 
It should be recalled that before the adoption of the Independence Constitution, the authority of 
the institution of the kabaka was based on the divine-right theory of kingship which asserts that it 
is not subject to earthly authority because the kabaka derives its right to rule from a greater 
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source than their subjects; while that of the colonial governor was founded on constitutional 
arrangements designed with the aims of granting the governor unlimited powers in order for the 
British to exploit Ugandans. With the introduction of the Independence Constitution, there was a 
shift in the basis for acquiring power and in the authority to exercise state power. State power 
was no longer based on the divine-right theory or the colonial mode of governance, but on a 
constitution negotiated on behalf of the populace, through which they granted state powers to the 
governments. Therefore, the basis and authority of the government were now vested in the 
people who would elect their leaders, decide which state powers to grant them and regulate the 
way this power is exercised through the Independence Constitution. Under the ‘post-
independence constitutionalism dispensation’, presidents and governments owed their powers to 
the citizenry who were the new source of state power. However, the framers of the Independence 
Constitution did not allow the majority of Ugandans to participate in the making of the 
Independence Constitution. Therefore, most Ugandans were unable to formulate their views on 
which powers should be exercised by governments and on the limits of those powers. 
 
The failure to recognise the shift in the basis for acquiring and the authority to exercise state 
powers and Kabaka Mutessa II’s quest to exercised unlimited power, led to the aggregation of all 
most all state powers in the presidency under the Independence Constitution. It may well be that 
had the Independence Constitution emerged out of a more consultative and participatory 
constitution-making process, Ugandans could have sought a different design for the office of the 
president. In this context, the Independence Constitution may be viewed as a fundamental law 
negotiated and authored with the primary aim of providing for the wishes of Kabaka Mutesa II.  
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The Independence Constitution was the supreme law of Uganda until the developments regarding 
the ‘Lost Counties’ which led to the ‘constitutional crisis of 1966’. On adoption, the Republic 
Constitution declared Prime Minister Obote as the president.231 The designation of president 
enshrined in the Republic Constitution yielded incremental powers to President Obote in several 
ways that further laid the foundations of an untrammelled president. First, it abolished the 
position of prime minister,232 thereby ending the constitutional role of the prime minister in 
scrutinising the presidential authority.233 Second, it permitted the president to promulgate such 
ordinances as he required.234 In this regard, the powers of the presidency were expanded at the 
expense of the legislative role of the National Parliament and the Lukiiko.235 The Republic 
Constitution also provided that the exercise of the powers of the presidency would not be subject 
to legal scrutiny.236 The creation of a presidency to which all instruments of power are beholden, 
which enjoyed all state privileges and that exercised almost all state powers without limits was 
complete. 
 
When the Republic Constitution was debated in Parliament, several political figures criticised the 
proposals on which the design of the presidency therein was based. Abu Mayanja decried that: 
The keynote of the proposals is the concentration of all powers of government – legislative, executive, 
administrative, and judiciary – into central Government institutions and the subjection of those institutions to 
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the control of one man – the President. The result is the creation – not of a republic, but of a one-man 
dictatorship.237 
 
Adoko Nekyon argued that the powers accorded to the office of the president provided for an 
autocracy or an African type of democracy which prevailed and would depend on the person who 
held the presidency.238 Luyimbazi Zake also criticised that: 
This was the biggest indication of autocracy. Members have given the president powers to appoint everybody 
and dismiss everybody, nominate one-third of Parliament and detain them in the bargain……239 
 
Although Obote designed the presidency under the Republic Constitution with the intention to 
serve him, presidential authority therein has been acquired by successive heads of state in Uganda 
before 1995. At the same time, provisions of the Republic Constitution that attempted to limit the 
powers and tenure of the presidency, such as those that allowed for elections and that provided 
for legislative powers of Parliament, were suspended in order to foster incumbency perpetuity, 
dictatorship, and also to provide incremental powers to the presidency. 
 
 For example, when Amin seized power in 1971; he issued by decree Legal Notice No. 1 1971 
which suspended provisions of the Republic Constitution including those relating to the 
supremacy of the Republic Constitution, which ceased to be the supreme law, and also suspended 
the constitutional right to vote and the legislative powers of Parliament. The Republic 
Constitution was, therefore subordinated to the decreeing authority of the sole supreme law-
maker- President Amin.  
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 President Amin also issued the Constitution Modification Decree No. 5 1971 which had the 
effect of vesting all privileges, prerogatives, powers and functions enjoyed by all arms of 
government in the Chairman of the Defence Council, a position that was also occupied by Amin. 
Decrees No.1 and No. 5 effectively became part of and superior to the Republic Constitution for 
as long as the issuing authority- President Amin was in power. Christopher Mbazira notes that 
the suspension of parts of the Republic Constitution including the supremacy clause meant that 
the Constitution could be overridden by decrees passed by President Amin. This led the country 
to quickly degenerate into a dictatorship.240 
 
In the case of Andrew Lutakome Kayira v Edward Rugumayo & 2 Ors,241 Justice Odoki 
described the fundamental laws that existed when Amin was dethroned in 1979 by Yusufu Lule’s 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), up to 1986 when Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) seized power as follows:  
Yusufu Lule made a Proclamation under Legal Notice No. 1 of 1979 published on 8th May 1979 but deemed 
to have come into force on the 11th April 1979. The proclamation suspended Chapters  IV and V of the 
Constitution which provisions dealt with the executive and the legislature. All titles, privileges , prerogatives, 
powers and functions and exemptions formerly enjoyed or exercised by the former President of the Republic 
of Uganda under the Constitution were vested in the new President. There was to be a cabinet of Ministers 
appointed by the President to advise him in the exercise of his executive functions. All legislative powers 
referred to in the Constitution were vested in the National Consultative Council (NCC) until such a time as a 
Legislative Assembly was elected. The Legislative powers were to be exercised by the NCC through the 
passing of Statutes assented to by the President and published in the Gazette. Subject to the above provisions 
of the Proclamation, the operation of the Constitution and the existing laws were not to be affected by the 
Proclamation except that such laws were to be construed with such modifications, qualifications and 
adaptations as are necessary to bring them into conformity with the Proclamation. This Proclamation revoked 
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Decree No. 1 of 1971 by Idi Amin on his assumption of power. The overthrow of Idi Amin’s regime by the 
UNLF and forces of its allies amounted in law to a revolution. A revolution in law is the nullification of the 
legal order and its replacement by a new order in an illegitimate way.242 
 
The UNLF also issued Legal Notice No.5 on Constitution Modification 1980. It provided that:  
Where any conflict arises between the provisions of this Proclamation and the provisions of the Constitution 
of Uganda or any other written law, the provisions of this Proclamation shall prevail.243 
 
Hence, the Republic Constitution was again subordinated to another fundamental issued by a 
government that acquired power through violence and unconstitutional means.  
 
From April 1979 when Yusufu Lule’s UNLF seized power, up to January 1986 when President 
Yoweri Museveni’s NRM took power, the supreme law of Uganda was the Republic Constitution 
as modified by Legal Notice No.5 on Constitutional Modification1980, and Legal Notice No. 
1979. 
 
On seizing power, the NRM issued Legal Notice No.1 1986.  Legal Notice No.1 1986 repealed 
Legal Notice No.1 1979 and transferred all powers enjoyed by Yusufu Lule to Yoweri Museveni- 
the new President. 
 
In the case of Rwanyarare & 2 Others v. Attorney General,244 a constitution petition challenged 
the provisions of  Legal Notice No. 1 1986,  arguing that they adversely affected the right to free 
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expression as protected under the Republic Constitution245 because,  campaigns on the basis of 
political parties or on sectarian grounds were outlawed and criminalised.246 The Constitutional 
Court ruled that Legal Notice No.1 1986, which was issued by NRM after it seized power was 
superior to the Republic Constitution and that rules made by the NRM government to adopt a 
new constitution were valid. This decision further reinforced the superiority of fundamental laws 
created following acquisitions of power by unconstitutional means over the existing 
constitutional order in line with Justice Odoma’s judgement.247 
 
Although the Republic Constitution was the main superior legal document in post-colonial 
Uganda before 1995, successive leaders of Uganda have transferred and monopolised power by 
creating fundamental laws that modified, amended and were superior to it. Such laws were 
created for the purposes of legitimising power acquired through means not authorised by the 
Independence Constitution, and to allow governments fasten their grip on power. Nearly every 
head of state and his government created their fundamental law which allowed them to exercise 
state powers and to entrench themselves in it. Therefore, no fundamental law, not even those 
referred to as Constitutions, survived following the end of the government that created it. 
Acquiring power through violence and unconstitutional means allowed heads of state and their 
governments to abrogate the prevailing fundamental law and impose on the country laws which 
were designed to grant unlimited powers to the presidency and the government. The issuance of 
presidential decrees as a method of passing fundamental laws coupled with the ousting of judicial 
                                                                 
245 The Republic Constitution (n 174), art 22. 
 
246 Republic of Uganda, Legal Notice No.1 1986, para 4.3. 
 
247 See (n 171). 
 
 
 
73 
 
competence in inquiring into acts of the heads of state moored authoritarian rule. By the 
fundamental laws authored under their leadership, heads of state bestowed on themselves all the 
power of the state. Their powers were unlimited and their authority was unquestionable. Also, 
this mode of creating fundamental laws was endorsed by the courts.248 
 
6. Implications of the fundamental laws on the Ugandan society 
 
 As discussed in section 3 of this chapter, the Independence Constitution was negotiated under 
the overwhelming influence of the Kabaka of Buganda and the British Government. The 
implications of such a ‘constitution-bargaining process’ include the establishment of a 
presidency that did not require the mandate of the majority to hold power249 and  the majority of 
the Ugandans did not participate in process of determining how state power should be exercised. 
It may therefore be stated that similar to the power exercised by the institutions of kabaka and 
the colonial governor before independence, the presidential authority under the Independence 
Constitution did not have its source in the people 
 
Phares Mukasa notes that the powers conferred to the presidency by the Republic Constitution 
were used by President Obote against those he considered to be political opponents and 
civilians.250 He points to the state of emergency that was declared by the President in Buganda in 
1966 and later extended to other regions in 1969 following an assassination attempt on President 
                                                                 
248 ibid; also see (n 242). 
 
249 See (n 171): (n 245). 
 
250 Mukasa (n 164) 79. 
 
 
74 
 
Obote, and the banning of all political parties except the UPC by the President, as evidence of 
excessive grants of power to the presidency by the Republic Constitution.251 
 
 An early indication of how the excessive powers of the presidency were to be used to suppress 
political opponents in post-independence Uganda and to frustrate the rule of law, is portrayed by 
the events that unfolded in the aftermath of Obote’s coup d’état. On 22 February 1996, five 
Ministers who served under the first government following independence were arrested.252 They 
wielded great political influence and commanded a lot of respect from Ugandans.253 No charges 
were proffered against them. However, warrants were executed for their arrest under the 
Deportation Act of 1962 Chapter 308 with a view of deporting them. The law required for an 
intended deportee to be brought before a court to contend why the order of deportation should 
not be issued.254 None of these procedures seems to have been followed by the government, 
necessitating an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, in the case of Grace Stuart 
Ibingira and others v Uganda,255 the Ministers challenged their arrest and detention on the 
grounds that their arrest was unlawful and the Deportation Act 1962 Chapter 308 was inconsistent 
with articles 1,256 9257 and 28258 of the Interim Constitution. The Ministers were moved to the 
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capital city-Kampala, in order for the government to continue their detention without trial.259 
Kampala was under a state of emergency that had been declared by President Obote.260 The 
contention was that the government did not have the power to detain a citizen of Uganda without 
a court order. This could only be done by an executive order in a state of public emergency.261 
 
The Eastern Africa Court of Appeal declared the Deportation void, held that a deportation order 
could not be made against a citizen of Uganda and it ordered the release of the Ministers. 
Following the decision of the Court, the Ministers were served with detention orders made under 
Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations 1966 as provided under Emergency Powers Act 
1963. President Obote, by decree,262 passed the Public Order Act and Security 1967. The effect 
of the legislation was to give the government the powers that it did not have in the terms of the 
Courts’ decision. Section 2 of the Public Order Act and Security 1967, allowed the presidency to 
order for detainees to be held without charging them with any offence or when the public state of 
emergency elapsed. Thus, by exercising the presidential power to decree under the Republic 
Constitution, President Obote was able to override the prevailing laws in order to detain the 
Ministers without trial. It is estimated that between one hundred thousand Ugandans were 
victims of extrajudicial killings at the hands of the state during Obote’s first four years as 
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president,263 while approximately fifty thousand political prisoners were held without trial264 and 
at least another one hundred thousand people were forced into exile.265 
 
During Amin’s regime between 1971 and 1979, Uganda moved from civilian authoritarian rule 
to military rule by decree.266 President Amin issued a decree banning all political parties.267 His 
regime was characterised by violence inflicted by his army on suspected political opponents.268 It 
has been estimated that up to five hundred thousand Ugandans were exiled and between seven 
hundred and fifty and one million people lost their lives at the hands of the state without the 
sanctions of judicial proceedings.269 On 25 June 1973, President Amin enacted the Trial by 
Military Decree No.12 1973. In September 1977, sixteen people were tried before the Military 
Tribunal for treason under the Trial by Military Decree.270 Twelve were sentenced to death and 
executed by firing squad.271 It has been claimed that the evidence used to convict the suspects 
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was acquired through torture and that the Military Tribunal did not observe the rules of natural 
justice.272 
 
 Abdu Kasozi describes the use of decrees during Amin’s regime to oppress political opponents 
and to strengthen his grip on power. He writes that:   
Amin passed a Decree that allowed soldiers and prison officers to arrest, detain and search civilians without 
an order from a court or a warrant, and another which provided immunity from litigation to state security 
agencies in exercise of state duties. After the expiry of the Soldiers and Prison Officers Power of Arrest 
Decree, it was replaced by another Decree which was a verbatim reproduction of the previous Decree except 
that no restriction on the time for its life span was prescribed. The powers of arrest were later restricted to 
military police officers only in uniform without affecting the police powers under the Police Act Cap 303. The 
exercise and abuse of these powers resulted into mass disappearances of those that were believed to oppose 
Amin’s government and it silenced political opposition to Amin.273 
 
It should be noted that despite the grant of these powers to the security agencies, the law required 
that a person arrested for offences that could not be tried by the Military Tribunal be brought 
before a court of law within 24 hours of arrest.274 However, because many of the people were 
arrested for alleged politically motivated charges, they were either dumped in prisons where they 
were tortured and killed or put before the Military Tribunal.275 Thus by suspending the 
legislative powers of Parliament under the Republic Constitution and by bestowing on himself 
all the powers of the state through Legal Notice No.1 1971, President Amin was able to pass 
decrees without any legal constraints. The powers vested in the presidency were used by the 
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Amin’s government and security forces to carry out extrajudicial killings and human rights 
abuses.  
 
Following another transfer of power through violence and unconstitutional means in 1979, the 
presidency’s monopoly of state power was effectively transferred to President Yusufu Lule.276 
State organs such as Parliament and the courts which are competent to create and amend the legal 
order were ignored. The use of the Public Order and Security Act 1967 to detain political 
opponents and persons associated with the previous regime also re-occurred after the fall of 
Amin. 
 
Many people connected to Amin’s regime were held in Luzira and other prisons.277 In the case of 
Professor Yoweri Kyesimira v Attorney General,278 the petitioner challenged his detention under 
the Public and Security Order Act 1967. The High Court held that a detention order must provide 
information on oath regarding the matters alleged against the detainee and ordered that the 
detainee be set free. The government refused to release Professor Kyesimira.279 
 
 During his second government from December 1980 to July 1985, President Obote held on to 
power by force and patronage. His army and persons connected to his government committed 
extensive human rights abuses.280 Ugandans from the southern part of the country and members 
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of the opposition and of other political parties were linked to Museveni’s NRA which was 
embroiled in armed conflict with Obote’s government. Government security agents carried out 
mass murder, arrests and rape.281 The contempt for the rule of law, the torture of civilians and the 
suppression of alternative political views was not dissimilar to that which the country witnessed 
under Amin’s regime.282 
 
In sum, since independence in 1962 up to 1995, the uncircumscribed nature of state powers has 
led to undermining the rule of law and constitutional order, allowed for extrajudicial killings and 
obstructed transfer of state power through democratic and constitutional processes. In this 
context, although following the attainment of independence the powers of the state were meant to 
emerge out fundamental laws negotiated among the citizenry and they were meant to be used as 
directed by the citizenry for their benefit, there was no actual change in their authoritarian use 
from what was witnessed under the kabaka and the colonial governor, whose powers emerged 
from sources other than the citizenry.  
 
7. The armed forces and the heads of state 
 
A study about presidentialism in Uganda would be incomplete without the consideration of the 
role the institution of the armed forces has played as the main tool for unconstitutional and 
violent transfer of political power. This is because heads of state have used the armed forces as an 
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instrument for political change and a final arbiter of political disputes. In this regard, the head of 
state’s command and ownership of the armed forces, among other powers and privileges, has 
posed a major challenge to the smooth transfer of power and the enjoyment of fundamental 
rights.  Amii Omara-Otunu aptly describes the role of the armed forces in Uganda’s politics as 
follows: 
The usurpation of state power by the army dealt a series of devastating blows to the democratic process in the 
country. The distinctive features of the system of government and administration which became established 
were the devaluation of human lives, the use of force in social interactions, the presentation by the power élite 
of political problems as being essentially military in nature, and the domination of civilian institutions by the 
armed forces.283 
 
On its creation at the advent of colonialism, the army in Uganda was meant to assist the colonial 
government to maintain its rule and thus was suitably named the ‘Kings African Rifles’.  The 
British dismantled the formidable armies of the southern kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro and 
Ankole. Southerners would grow cash crops or acquire education, and would become minor civil 
servants, while the northerners would be recruited into the army, police and prisons services, and 
also provide labour in factories and plantations located in the south.284 Grace Ibingira describes 
the Kings African Rifles as an army that did not reflect the ethnic diversity of the country.285 He 
depicts the armed forces as an occupation for illiterate, prospect-less northerners, formed on the 
principle of divide-and-rule that sustained the colonial policy.286 Its role was the protection of the 
colonial enterprise power.287 
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 The Independence Constitution also subjected the armed forces to the supreme commandership 
of the presidency 288 in a continuation of its envisioned colonial role as the protector of the head 
of state and government in power and as a tool for political repression. These structural problems 
at the heart of the armed forces would eventually be inherited by Uganda’s leaders after 
independence. Nearly all Uganda’s  heads of state before 1995 from northern Uganda were either 
army officers with no basic education, had the support of the army and came to power through 
the barrel of the gun,289 while the southerners were highly educated, had no association with the 
army and were therefore removed from power by it.290 It is important to record here that 
President Amin is a product of the colonial recruitment policy which aimed staffing the army 
with personnel from northern Uganda. He served in Kings African Rifle in which he rose to the 
rank of a sergeant, and he progressed to major general and army commander in 1964.291 
 
James Tumusime observes that early in their careers, Obote and Amin who were both from 
northern Uganda, realised the importance of the army as the final arbiter of political 
disagreements.292 It is therefore not surprising that the Republic Constitution also attached the 
armed forces to the command of the presidency.293 Its architect knew the value of the army. 
When he seized power, Obote continued with the colonial policy that favoured northern tribes for 
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army recruitment. He created an ethnic imbalance in the army by recruiting predominantly from 
his tribe. On 1 April 1966, Obote passed out eight hundred new recruits at Moroto, of whom 
seventy percent were from the northern region.294 
 
Amin also continued with Obote’s policy of bloating the armed forces with soldiers from his 
home area. By 1977, the composition of the army was radically changed; three-quarters of the 
military leadership were either Moslems or spoke Sudanic languages from Amin’s home area, 
and many owed their appointments to Amin.295 Also, cabinet ministers that spoke Sudanic 
languages increased from one in six in 1971 to over a half in 1978.296 
 
When the UNLF stormed Kampala and Professor Yusuf Lule was installed as President, his 
tenure of office was short-lived because he lacked strong ties with the army. His tribe- the 
Baganda, did not view the armed forces as an occupation for southerners, a belief established by 
the colonialists. He, therefore, had no tribal allies in the armed forces to call on when his 
presidency was challenged. President Godfrey Binaisa, another southerner and a British-trained 
lawyer who replaced Lule, was deposed by the Military Commission headed by Paulo Muwanga. 
Binaisa’s mistake was to appoint General Oyite Ojok, then the Army Commander and a 
northerner, as a diplomat.297 In doing so, he removed General Ojok from the lucrative northern 
occupation and a vehicle to power namely, the armed forces. This resulted in the end of Binaisa’s 
tenure. Soon after Binaisa was removed, the Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission, Yoweri 
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Museveni, complained that there was a deliberate strategy of bloating the armed forces with 
northerners.298 Museveni’s fears were vindicated when during the 1980 elections organised by the 
Militay Commission, one of the presidential candidates-Milton Obote, questioned whether his 
competitors had the instrument of power namely, the army, to allow them to take and control 
state power.299 As discussed in section 4 of this chapter, during the 1980 elections campaigns the 
army to harassed, tortured and killed Obote’s political opponents and it dispersed political rallies 
organised by his political opponents. These factors may well have galvanised the support for the 
armed conflict waged by Museveni’s NRM that toppled Obote’s successor.  
 
8. Mini-conclusion 
 
There were two main governance systems in pre-colonial Uganda, namely segementary and non-
segmentary that allowed for democratic governance and autocracy respectively. It however may 
be stated that foundations for what we may describe as presidentialism were laid on then on-
segmentary mode of governance as was practiced in the Kingdom of Buganda. The constitutional 
arrangements negotiated between the rulers of Buganda and the British government may be 
conceived as providing the first legally notable framework in Uganda for exercising state power.  
These pre-independence systems of governance were not rooted in the wishes of the citizenry and 
they did not provide effective restraints against a head of state. This mode of constructing a head 
of state has been reproduced by fundamental laws adopted in Uganda after independence. The 
head of state acquired and exercised inordinate powers to the disadvantage of constitutionalism 
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and the populace. This establishment of a head of state did not allow for questioning the purposes 
for allocating powers and privileges to the head of state and for defining how they should be 
exercised. The colonial ideology of exclusively adopting fundamental laws which in principle 
served only them, to the exclusion of Ugandans has also continued into post-colonial Uganda. 
Fundamental laws which Uganda has adopted after independence were adopted for the purpose of 
legitimising power that was often acquired through violence and unconstitutional means and to 
entrenching in power the governments under whose influence or leadership they were written. 
They also created all-powerful heads of state that subjugated rather than served citizens. 
 
Although the Republic Constitution remained the supreme law of the land and the main legal 
reference point, its suspensions, disregard and amendments to it by successive governments 
allowed them to hold on to power and to eroded any possibility of transferring it through 
constitutional processes. The issuance of decrees as fundamental laws and the excessive grants 
and use of powers emerging from such laws conflicts the principles of constitutionalism which 
seeks to minimise abuse or misuse of state powers. It is from these fundamental laws that 
presidential authority has emerged in Uganda and, therefore, heads of state have had no limits to 
their powers. The army has been employed by heads of state as a brutal tool for accessing and 
controlling political power and for suppressing political dissent. Because of its historical role, the 
army has constitutionally been attached to a head of state. Therefore, Uganda failed to develop 
armed forces into an institution of the state and which is purposed to serve all the people of 
Uganda. The ethnic structures of the armed forces were purposely distorted and deliberately 
designed by Uganda’s heads of state to allow them access and control state power. The use of 
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violence, alterations and deferments of fundamental laws prevailed over the ballot box as a way 
of transferring political power. Courts also endorsed this mode of transferring power. 
 
Arguably, the two most contentious issues in Uganda before 1995 have been the way heads of 
state and governments acquired and exercised state powers. In the following chapter, I 
interrogate efforts to reconstruct the institution of the head state through the constitution-making 
process that yielded the 1995 Constitution. 
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                                         Chapter Three 
 
Taming the Presidency? Interrogating Efforts to Crafting a Limited 
Presidency through the 1995 Constitution-Making Process  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
On 8 October 1995, the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 came into force. The day 
marked the beginning of what has been described as a ‘new democratic dispensation’ for 
Ugandans, following a participatory and consultative constitution-making process.1 In this 
regard, the process through which the Constitution was adopted marked a departure from the 
exclusive constitution-making processes which blighted the defunct Constitutions2 which were 
imposed on Ugandans. For the purposes of this study, the coming into force of the 1995 
Constitution also represented three significant factors. First, a new belief was sown that future 
leaders would be elected through free and fair elections to replace past authoritarian leaders most 
of whom came to power through violence and unconstitutional means. Second, Ugandans made a 
concerted effort to create a new constitution to which all leaders would be subordinated, thus 
departing from previous fundamental laws that engendered the excesses of presidentialism and 
governments. Third, the day marked the formal transition of the National Resistance Movement 
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(NRM) from an interim government to the permanent wielder of political power with its leader 
President Museveni at the apex.  
 
This chapter investigates through the lenses of the constitution-making process, the creation of 
the institution of presidency found in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. The main aims are to 
investigate the factors that inspired the design of the presidency, and to evaluate efforts to 
reconstruct the presidency. It will be argued that the design of the presidency established by the 
1995 Constitution is not rooted in the wishes of the people of Uganda and it is not founded on 
the tenets of constitutionalism. This study will also contend that by taking charge of the 
constitution-making process, President Museveni and his government manipulated the process. 
In this context, like previous fundamental laws, the 1995 Constitution is another fundamental 
law authored under the leadership of a head of state and government with the aims of granting 
them unlimited powers in order to perpetuate their incumbency. To prove this, this study will 
delve into the constitution- making process to illustrate that the process cannot be described as 
participatory or consultative; on the contrary it was bent in favour of President Museveni’s NRM 
government. In this regard, the 1995 Constitution has erroneously been hailed as the first truly 
home grown Constitution.3 Therefore, the design of the presidency in the Constitution can be 
explained through understanding the constitution-making process which did not acquire popular 
and legal legitimacy.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2 that follows makes the case for the need to 
reconstruct a limited president in post-1995 Uganda. Section 3 sets out the background to the 
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making of the 1995 Constitution. Section 4 interrogates the legal instrumentalities that were 
designated to propagate the 1995 Constitution. It also examines occurrences during the 
constitution-making process which favoured President Museveni’s NRM. Section 5 defines the 
concepts of popular and legal legitimacy. Section 6 is the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
2.  Necessity for constructing a limited presidency for Uganda 
 
The executive powers of the state are vested in the executive organ which is comprised of the 
head of state and the ministers or, in common parlance, the government. Generally, there are two 
main forms in which executive powers are exercised. In some countries, such as the United 
Kingdom,4 the head of state may be a monarch ora president who is entrusted with selected 
ceremonial functions, while the substantive executive powers of running the day to day business 
of government is vested in a prime minister and a cabinet of ministers. In such a system, the head 
of state is a symbol of the state and his or her powers vary from constitution to constitution. The 
common feature is that the non-executive head of state carries out his functions on the advice of 
the holder of executive powers such as the prime minister and a cabinet. In the second system, 
such as the one introduced in Uganda under the Republic Constitution, all the executive powers 
of the state are vested in a head of state who is the executive president. This system is more 
prevalent in African countries as this study will discuss in chapter four. The executive president 
can exercise powers directly or through his or her cabinet ministers and other organs of the state 
which are subordinate to and often appointed by the presidency. 
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On acquiring independence, Uganda was governed under the Independence Constitution by the 
first and only semi-executive head of state in the country’s history, in the person of President 
Fredrick Edward Mutesa II, with Prime Minister Milton Obote. Following Milton Obote’s coup 
d’état in 1966 which deposed President Mutesa II, the semi-executive presidential system was 
abandoned in favour of a full executive presidential system introduced by the Republic 
Constitution. Since then, executive power has been the basis upon which heads of state in 
Uganda have asserted their hegemonic and illegitimate control over the country. However, the 
acquisition of executive powers by Uganda’s heads of state has principally been through extra-
legal and unconstitutional means, and was later validated through fundamental laws designed to 
maintain the incumbents in power as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
The Republic Constitution which created the first full executive presidential system with 
untrammelled powers was adopted by an illegitimate government that had no mandate to rule, 
and to adopt the Constitution. Starting with Amin, whose coup d’état overthrew Obote’s 
government, successive heads of state acquired executive powers by over-throwing previous 
governments. This was followed by the issuances of decrees published as legal notices which 
purported to amend and suspend the Republic Constitution, allowing the leaders to seize power 
and to legitimise their exercise of state power through means not provided for under the Republic 
Constitution. The decrees allowed heads of state to exercise executive powers almost without 
limits.5 Thus, the exercise of executive powers by successive heads of state has been illegitimate 
because of their mode of acquiring power through unconstitutional means.  
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Executive powers have also been founded on fundamental laws created at the initiative of heads 
of state and governments for their own benefit without the involvement of populace. Nearly 
every head of state and their government established their legal order which overrode or replaced 
that which was created by the government before them. This has meant that no fundamental law 
survived alteration with each change of government. The decrees also became part of the 
Republic Constitution for as long as the issuing authority remained in power. They legitimised 
unlawful and unconstrained exercise of executive powers by successive heads of state. The 
creation of fundamental laws at the initiative of the president and their government in post-
independence Uganda began with the model of the semi-executive presidential system in the 
Independence Constitution, followed by the domineering full executive presidential system in the 
Republic Constitution, trailed by Amin’s Rule by Military Decree Legal Notice No.1 of 1971 
and ended with Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986following the seizure of power by President 
Museveni’s NRM. Executive and state power has derived from the 1995 Constitution since its 
promulgation.   
 
Executive powers as tailored for and often by previous heads of state have been employed as a 
tool for abusing human rights and for impeding the smooth transfer of political power. This was 
achieved through creating fundamental laws which bestowed on heads of state unlimited state 
powers, who also did not require the mandate of the people to rule. Almost every head of state 
and his government could unmake the fundamental law that was created under his leadership and 
those created by the governments before him. They also could abrogate or usurp any 
fundamental laws at will. Thus from1966 when Obote seized power, up to 1995 when the present 
constitution was promulgated, Uganda’s heads of state validated their exercise of power by 
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commandeering constitutional orders through military might, rather than subjecting themselves 
to the pre-existing constitutional order. Executive power in Uganda has also been exercised by 
leaders who do not surrender to constitutional limitations. A paradox in Uganda has been that 
instead of building into fundamental laws mechanism aimed at minimising the misuse and abuse 
of state powers, and at facilitating smooth transfer of state power, laws were designed to grant 
heads of state and governments unlimited powers and to entrench power. 
 
To this end successive heads of state have been unwilling to subject themselves to laws that 
advance conditions of plural political competition and democratic institutions which are 
insulated from executive tampering and thus promote and protect constitutionalism, democracy 
and human rights. As a result, post-independence Uganda has never had a peaceful and 
democratic transfer of power from one government to another. Only violent political 
competition, rigged elections and fundamental laws created to serve leaders have determined 
who governs the country and the manner in which it is governed. For the same reasons, heads of 
state have exercised presidential authority without restraint.  
 
Uganda’s post-colonial heads of state have also exhibited a culture of disregarding constitutional 
and other legal orders which limit their tenures.6 The unbounded exercise of executive authority 
explains the institutionalisation of political violence as an instrument for the sustenance of 
political power and the disdain of constitutional order by leaders. Institutions of power such the 
armed forces were personalised, while institutions of governments such as Parliament were 
subordinated to the presidency by fundamental laws. Also, fundamentals laws did not provide 
                                                                 
6 During Obote’s first tenure, he extended the term of his government for 5 years; Amin abolished provisions 
relating to elections in the Republic Constitution and declared hims elf President-for-life; Museveni extended the 
tenure of his interim government for 5 years. 
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sufficient mechanisms that allow the citizenry and other constitutional organs to restrain actions 
of heads of state. Such misallocation and personalisation of state power was aimed at retain 
power at all cost. As a result, the over-arching need to acquire and retain power whatever the 
cost took precedence and made the populace victims of military coups, armed conflicts, human 
rights abuses and bad governance which was unleashed in 1966 and beyond.  
 
It is against this backdrop that Ugandans made a concerted effort through the constitution-
making process that yielded the 1995 Constitution, to transform to a first fully-fledged 
democratic system of government since the attainment of independence. To achieve this aim, the 
country had to reconstruct the institution of the head of state, amongst others constitutional 
institutions, in order to overcome its beleaguered history. Therefore, the constitution-making 
process became a focal turning point through which the country had to consider the challenges 
presented by the illegitimate conduct of past leaders in order to produce a constitution that would 
embody values and mechanisms which are conducive to political stability and which would 
ensure the durability of a viable constitutional order which were important for the political 
stability of the country.  
 
The much needed post-1995 constitutional reforms were an important forum in the country’s 
democratic transition. The 1995 Constitution had to be adopted through a more inclusive and 
participatory constitution-making process that would yield both legal and popular consensus in 
order to provide a platform for a stable and plural political life. The violent struggles for political 
power of the first twenty-four years after independence had to be remedied by introducing 
constitutional principles which promote peaceful political transition and which minimise the 
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risks of abusing state power. The past excessive self-grants of powers by previous leaders 
through fundamental laws and the subsequent misuse of those powers, were to guide the country 
in its quest for crafting a limited presidency in the new Constitution. 
 
3. Background to the making of the 1995 Constitution 
 
After the NRM seized power in January 1986, its leadership felt the need to break from the 
methods used by past governments of adopting exclusive fundamental laws, by adopting a 
popular constitution as the basis for the future exercise of state power. However, the manner in 
which the NRM government legitimised itself as an interim government was not dissimilar from 
that of its predecessors. By decree, it enacted Legal Notice No.1 of 1986 which formed the basis 
of legitimising its exercise of state power during ‘the interim period’.7 This decree suspended 
article 3,8  part of chapter IV,9 chapter V10 and article 6311 of the Republic Constitution. Section 
3.1 of Legal Notice No.1 of 1986 vested executive powers of the state in President Museveni, 
while under section 3.3 legislative powers were vested in the President and National Resistance 
Council (NRC), which was made up of members of the NRM and its armed wing the National 
Resistance Army (NRA).Also, under section 4.1 of Legal Notice No.1 of 1986 political activities 
were outlawed and criminalised. 
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The parameters of the 1995Constitution were drawn before the NRM came to power. This is 
evidenced by the NRM’s political programme which was written before it seized power in which 
its leadership set out its policies for rehabilitating the country, which included adopting a new 
constitution.12 Writing at the time when the 1995 Constitution was being debated, interim 
President Museveni declared that: 
The NRM believes that it is the inalienable right of all peoples to freely choose their government, and 
determine the manner of that government. Constitutions imposed on the people by guise while or force 
cannot be a basis of stable and peaceful governance of men.13 
 
President Museveni promised a new constitution for Uganda which would emerge out of 
consultative and participatory constitution-making processes, in line with the promise the NRM 
had made while it was still engaged in armed struggle for power.  It promised as follows: 
As part of laying the groundwork for returning Uganda to democratic government, the Interim 
Administration shall see to it that a new constitution based on the popular will, is drafted and promulgated by 
a Constituent Assembly elected by the people themselves. The present Constitution (1967) was drafted by 
Obote to answer the needs of establishing a despotic state. It contains many provisions that are anti-
democracy, and returning the country to democratic rule under such constitution would lead to a quick 
demise of democracy once more.14 
 
 It may be stated that President Museveni and his NRM’s aspirations to democracy and desire for 
a first truly home-grown constitution were also shared by the majority of Ugandans, who wished 
to prevent a return of one-man regimes, armed struggles for political power and craved to usher 
in democracy after long periods of dictatorship and unelected but powerful leaders. The 
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problems of coup d’états, rigged elections, extrajudicial killings and one-man regimes, originated 
as a result of two main reasons. First, the Independence Constitution was imposed on the 
majority of Ugandans and its provisions created imbalances of power among tribes of the newly 
founded Uganda. Its unfair provisions triggered the confrontation between Prime Minister Obote 
and President Mutesa II which led to the first coup d’état and its abrogation. Second, the manner 
in which President Obote seized power in 1966 and issued the Interim Constitution and later his 
government adopted the Republic Constitution set several precedents. These include that the 
powers of the state can be acquired through violence and unconstitutional means; a head of state 
and a government can dictate the contents of a fundamental law and grant themselves unlimited 
state powers; and they can abrogate any constitutional order and suspend it provisions that limit 
their exercise of state power. 
 
The disdain with which the Republic Constitution was treated through the suspensions of its 
provisions made it lose its sanctity, rendering it unworthy of being the supreme law of the land. 
At the same time, the powerful presidency provided for by the Republic Constitution and 
subsequent amendments to it by the various legal notices had to be replaced by a limited 
presidency, which is also subordinate to the populace under the provisions of the new 
constitution. James Wapakhabulo posits that to the NRM, the country’s political problems were 
traceable to the unilateral abrogation by Obote of the Independence Constitution and his 
imposition of the Republic Constitution that were not acceptable to a large section of the 
population.15 Also, as I have argued in section 4 of the last chapter, Obote’s government and the 
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National Assembly had no mandate to adopt the Republic Constitution since their tenures had 
expired.  
 
These factors justified the country’s desire to promulgate a new popular constitution that would 
represent a new democratic dispensation. Moreover, since the creation of Uganda, the populace 
had not contributed to the making of a fundamental law. For these reasons, Uganda needed a new 
constitution. The hope was that the new constitution would guarantee a free society; subject the 
leaders to credible elections, constitutionalism and democratic processes; and that it would be 
accepted and revered by all Ugandans. It was equally important that the need to replace the 
Republic Constitution, did not give President Museveni and the NRM an opportunity to 
manipulate the constitution-making process with a view of adopting a new constitution that 
would serve to maintain their hold on power. This being the lesson learnt from the manner in 
which previous fundamental laws were adopted and how they allocated state powers to heads of 
state and governments under whose leadership or influence they were written. 
 
To adopt a constitution that would allow for the stable and peaceful governance of Uganda as 
envisioned by Museveni then16 and as desired by Ugandans, called for the meaningful popular 
participation of Ugandans during the constitution- making exercise and a constitution which is 
cast in constitutionalism.17 It is on the basis of these two indispensable elements that this study 
appraises the design of presidency as established by the 1995 Constitution and the Constitution 
as a whole. 
                                                                 
16 See (n 12). 
 
17This study will argue that popular participation and constitutionalism are essential for the legitimacy of any 
constitution and must be built into a constitution during the constitution-making stage.  
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The constitution-making process was to be achieved through three main stages.18 At the first 
stage, the people were to be consulted on contents of the new constitution by the Constitution 
Commission, which would after draw up a draft Constitution based on the views of the people. 
The second stage was to be national debates on the draft Constitution and the adoption of the 
final version draft Constitution. At the last stage, the draft Constitution was to be debated, 
modified, finalised and then adopted by the interim legislature- the National Resistance Council 
(NRC), working together with the armed forces-the National Resistance Army (NRA), which 
were arms of the ruling interim NRM government.19 It is important to note that this mode of 
adopting the new constitution was contrary to promises made before the NRM seized power.20 
 
When the process of making the new constitution started taking shape, the method of its adoption 
planned by the NRM aroused suspicion that the NRM had drafted a constitution during the 
armed conflict and they were simply going through the necessary, but meaningless ritual, to 
dress it with legitimacy. One of the old political parties, the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC), 
argued that it did not recognise or accept the legitimacy of the NRA and the NRC, as impartial 
organs capable of adopting a new constitution for the people of Uganda. It stated that it would 
only recognise a constitution deliberated, adopted and promulgated by a Constituent Assembly, 
composed of representatives who had been freely elected from all parts of Uganda, under 
elections conducted in accordance with the universally accepted principles of universal adult 
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suffrage, involving all political parties.21 The press also reported a public onslaught against the 
unrepresentative nature of the NRM’s proposals for promulgating a new constitution and the 
lingering association of this process with military coercion and domination.22 The contention was 
that only the mandate of the people could bestow popular legitimacy on the new constitution. 
 
On 21 December 1988, the NRC enacted the Uganda Constitutional Committee Statute No.5 
1988 which established the Constitution Commission and gave it the responsibility to start the 
process of developing a new constitution. The NRM also extended its tenure as an interim 
government, citing the need to oversee the adoption of a new constitution. General elections 
were to be held following the adoption of the new constitution. The Constitution Commission 
was headed by Benjamin Odoki, reportedly a former schoolmate of the then Interim President 
Museveni.23 
 
 From the outset, the constitution-making process was beset by discontent with the NRM’s 
proposals for making a new constitution. The history of past governments commandeering 
constitution-making process with the aim of creating fundamental laws to maintain their exercise 
of state power had not escaped the minds some of Ugandans.  
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‘The Composition and Election of the Constituent Assembly’ (Centre for Basic Research 1991), app 1. 
 
22 Peter Serumaga, ‘Constitutional Assembly Bill Blasted’ New Vision (Kampala, 23 November 1992) 2. 
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 I will now investigate the context in which the 1995 Constitution was formulated, debated, 
drafted and promulgated in an effort to investigate the issues that influenced the design of the 
presidency therein. 
 
4.  An enquiry into the constitution-making process  
 
The constitution-making process which yielded the 1995 Constitution may be divided into three 
main stages: 
1. Establishment and operations of the Constitution Commission. 
2. Constitution-making environment. 
3. From the establishment and operation of the Constituent Assembly up to the point of 
promulgation of the 1995 Constitution. 
 
4.1  Establishment and operations of the Constitution Commission 
 
4.1.1 Appointment of members of the Constitutional Commission  
 
 The Uganda Constitution Commission Statute No.5 1988, which established the Constitution 
Commission provided that the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary and the eleven members of 
the Commission other than the ex-officio members were to be appointed by President Museveni 
in consultation with the Minister of Constitutional Affairs.24 It also provided that the Director of 
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Legal Affairs of the NRM25 and the Chief Political Commissioner of the NRM shall be ex-officio 
members of the Commission.26 Statute No.5 did not provide for the nominations process to allow 
anyone else to suggest a name for the membership of the Commission. Only two out of the 
twenty-one members of the Commission appointed by the President were not known 
sympathisers of the NRM,27while eleven members of the Commission have served in the NRM 
government or have been appointed by President Museveni to various lucrative positions 
following the adoption of the Constitution.28 Therefore, the manner in which the Statute provided 
for the appointments of members of the Commission allowed the NRM to stake its pledge from 
the outset. As Joe Oloka-Onyago observes, although the Commission was regionally balanced, 
only one of its members was a known supporter of another party and it was made up of strong 
NRM supporters.29 In their memorandum to the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, the UPC 
protested that: 
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commander in President Museveni’s government from 1989 until 1998. He however fell out with the NRM and he is 
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The current process of constitution- making has been shrouded in political bad faith. The selection of the 
members of the Constitution Committee was done without any regard to alternative political views of the 
people of Uganda. Most of the Commissioners are avid sympathisers of the NRM and have made the process 
of making a national constitution look like ideas are being gathered for making an NRM constitution.30 
 
The selection of the members of the Commission was not carried out in an open and democratic 
fashion. The NRM government, however, vigorously claimed the Commission’s independence 
and integrity arguing that it mirrored the national characteristics of Uganda in that its 
membership included religious affiliations and special interest groups such as women, the armed 
forces and academics.31 The truth is that the interest group diversity was not insulated from 
political partisanship. There was no consultation process leading to the establishment of the 
Constitution Commission. The selection of its members was provided for by a Statute that was 
designed to give the NRM advantages during the constitution-making process. It may therefore 
be stated that Statute No.5 allowed President Museveni to appoint persons to the Commission 
that would safeguard and advance the NRM’s interest during the consultation stage. This fuels 
the contention that the motive was to silence the expression of alternative political opinions. 
 
4.1.2 Mandate and activities of the Constitution Commission 
 
The functions of the Constitution Commission were set out in article 4 of the Uganda 
Constitutional Commission Statute No.51988. The Commission was to consult with the people 
of Uganda; solicit their proposals, study and review them; with a view to making 
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recommendations for the enactment of the national constitution which would inter alia32 
guarantee the national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Uganda.33 The new 
constitution was to establish a free democratic system of government that would guarantee the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda,34 create viable political institutions 
that would ensure maximum consensus and orderly succession of government,35 and recognise 
and demarcate divisions of responsibility among the state organs of the executive, legislature and 
the judiciary, by creating viable checks and balances between them.36 In addition, the 
Commission was to endeavour to develop a system of government that would ensure people’s 
participation in the governance of their country37 and to develop a democratic free and fair 
electoral system that would ensure their proper representation in the legislature and other organs 
of the state.38 It was also to establish and formulate a constitutional system that would uphold the 
principle of public accountability by the holders of public offices and political posts,39 and 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary.40 Also, the Commission was to formulate and 
structure a draft Constitution that would form the basis of the country’s new constitution.41 The 
task of the Commission may therefore be summed up as to draw a draft Constitution founded on 
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popular consensus, following a consultative and participatory process and that was built on the 
pillars of constitutionalism. 
 
The Commission’s Report does not state when the Commission began its work. It however notes 
that the Commission invited submission on the draft Constitution in June 1999 and it received 
twenty-five thousand four hundred and fifty-seven submissions during the consultation and 
participatory stage.42 One of the Commission’s members claims that about three hundred 
thousand communities were engaged in the seminars regarding the new constitution.43 He writes 
that seminars were held in eight hundred and seventy Sub-Counties around the country, in which 
members of the Commission introduced and explained the constitution-making process, allowed 
people to contribute and memoranda were solicited at the end of each seminar.44 However, it has 
also been claimed that during the meetings and seminars, the agenda was fixed and the direction 
of the discussions were controlled by the Commissioners, especially in relation to the guidelines 
they issued;45 occasioning suspicions that a new constitution had already been drafted and the 
process was a sham. A total of twelve thousand four hundred and fifty-nine of the submissions, 
are reported to having been received by the Commission from Resistance Councils (RCs).46 RC’s 
constitute elected bodies of the local government institutions from the village to district levels. 
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They were initially established as rebel support structures in the areas controlled by the NRM 
during the armed conflict, and they proved effective in funnelling food and supplies to the 
NRA.47 Therefore, they were affiliated to the NRM government. This created a serious problem 
of relying on submissions that toed the NRM political line. 
 
On 31 December 1992, the Commission produced its final Report 48 and a draft Constitution.49 
The Commission noted that the majority of Ugandans preferred a Constituent Assembly directly 
elected by the people in order to be as fully representative as possible and to provide greater 
legitimacy for the new constitution.50 The government accepted to establish a Constituent 
Assembly consisting of delegates elected by universal suffrage.51Although the NRM’s 
concession to constitute a directly elected Constituent Assembly is laudable, it is clear that it was 
persuaded into embarking on a popular promulgation exercise for the new constitution.  
 
The Constitution Commission’s Report states that the Commission sought the views of 
Ugandans, it visited other countries to seek views and learn from constitutional innovations 
outside Uganda, and it also consulted legal experts within and outside Uganda.52 Thus it claimed 
that the draft Constitution it produced was based on the people’s views and legally accepted 
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principles.53 However, it was accused of ducking contentious constitutional issues in particular, 
on the federal question, the restoration of political parties which were banned when the NRM 
seized power, and the system of government most suited to Uganda.54 It is also claimed that the 
memoranda submitted at the sub-county level were vetted by NRM leaders before submitting 
them to the Commission.55 Critics also argue that the Commission was part of NRM’s designs to 
persuade the public to support its agenda.56 Martin Doornobs and Fredrick Mwesigye stated as 
follows about the popularity of the draft Constitution: 
Of course, it cannot be claimed that the results necessary reflected the views of the people with complete 
accuracy. Apart from anything else, because of the high level of illiteracy in Uganda (probably about 50 
percent or more). It can be assumed that there were some preponderances of elite  participation. The 
Commission made use of its own analysis of Uganda’s problems, an analysis which was however influenced 
by people’s views….. in its approach, it also exercised its judgement in determining the best way to give 
form and, effect to the consensus of the majority view. Hence, it cannot claim to have based its draft on 
popular views.57 
 
 In relation to the presidency, the work of the Constitution Commission is best measured by 
evaluating its draft Constitution against its task of producing a draft Constitution that provides 
efficient mechanisms that would minimise the abuse and misuse of presidential authority and 
                                                                 
 
53 ibid 7. 
 
54 L Katoboro, E Brett and J Munene, Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation  (Fountain Publishers 1997) 76. 
 
55 Furley (n 31)5. 
 
56 John-Jean Barya, ‘The Making of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution: Achieving Consensus by Law’ (Centre for Basic 
Research 2000) 46; see also Aili Mali Tripp, ‘The Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda’ in Laurel Miller (ed), 
Framing State in the Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making  (United States Institute for Peace 
2010)  158, 159.  
 
57 Martin Doornobs and Fredrick Mwesigye, ‘The New Politics of King -making’ in Holger Hansen and Michael 
Twaddle (eds),  From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda (Fountain Publishers 1995) 
68, 73. 
 
 
 
106 
 
which is based on the popular liberal view of Ugandans.58 It is the absence of constitutionalism 
and the failure to adopt the popular liberal views of Ugandans in the draft Constitution which 
serves as a basis for condemning the Commission’s work and renders it susceptible to  the 
accusation of indulging in a bogus constitution-consultation process with a view of aiding in the 
adoption of a constitution under which the NRM would exercise unlimited and permanent power. 
It is on this basis that this study assesses provisions of the draft Constitution relating to the 
presidency. 
 
4.1.3 The Constitutional Committee’s contribution towards creating a popular and 
constitutionally restrained presidency 
 
The constitution-making exercise occurred against a background of improper allocation and 
abuse of state power that the country suffered since its borders were defined. The presidency had 
too much power concentrated within the executive branch of government vis-à-vis the other 
branches of government such as the legislature and judiciary. It may therefore be stated that the 
task for the Commission in relation to the office of the president, was to rethink its powers and 
privileges, given that the previous designs had emerged out of fundamental laws designed to 
serve governments under whose leadership or influence they were created. It also required 
shackling presidential authority in such a way as to minimise possibilities of its abuse.  
 
 The Commission’s Report states that the majority of Ugandans that commented on the issue of 
the presidency wished to see the continuation of an executive presidency with more distinctive 
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separation of powers than was provided by the Republic Constitution provided.59 Thus, it 
recommended that executive powers of the state should be vested in a president.60 It noted that 
Ugandans emphatically wished for a democratically elected president.61 There was also a 
majority view that emphasised that the president should be subject to the law.62 There was a 
general consensus that the exercise of executive powers in the areas of constitutional 
appointments, prerogative mercy and command of armed forces should be subject to checks and 
balances.63 Accordingly, the Commission recommended the establishment of a National Council 
of State whose functions would include providing advice to a president on the exercise of 
executive powers, acting as the link between the presidency and Parliament and approving 
presidential appointments.64 Similarly, there was a general consensus that Parliament should be 
strong and efficient so that it could provide checks and balances on the presidency, and 
efficiently represent and safeguard the people’s interests. 65 
 
The Commission’s Report states that the majority of Ugandans were against providing a 
president with immunity from prosecution66 as was provided under the Independence and 
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Republic Constitutions.67 The Commission members however resolved that to preserve ‘the 
dignity of the office of the president’ a president should not be subject to any court proceedings 
whatsoever during his tenure.68 They reasoned that: 
It would be absurd if the President who takes precedence over other all people in the country is liable to 
court proceedings. However, the President who has committed serious mistakes could be removed from 
office by either a vote of no confidence or impeachment by Parliament. He could be taken to court when he 
is no longer President.69 
 
Subsequently, the draft Constitution provided that a president may be impeached on the grounds 
of abuse of office, or the wilful violation of the presidential oath or oath of allegiance, or any 
other provisions of the Constitution;70 misconduct or misbehaviour which brings or is likely to 
bring the office of the president into ridicule or contempt or disrepute;71 or which is prejudicial 
or inimical to the economy or inimical to the security of the state.72 
 
The Commission observed that opinions differed as to the length of the term of office for the 
presidency and that a substantial number of Ugandans suggested that it should be four years.73 
The overwhelming majority view was to limit the term of office to prevent a president from 
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being re-elected indefinitely.74 Thus, the Commission’s draft Constitution provided that a 
president should hold office for five years and should be restricted to serving two terms only.75 
 
 Regarding the judiciary, it was proposed that the independence of the judiciary should be 
guaranteed by the new constitution against the other two arms of the government, namely the 
executive and the legislature, and most importantly against the executive.76 The judiciary should 
be the guardian of basic human rights and constitutionalism and it should have powers of judicial 
review over the new constitution and administrative actions.77 The Commission’s draft 
Constitution provides that the chief justice and the deputy chief justice should be appointed by 
the president subject to the approval of the National Council of State, while justices of the 
Supreme Court and judges of the High Court should be appointed by a president on the advice of 
the Judicial Services Commission and subject to the approval of the National Council of State.78 
 
In relation to separation of powers, the general consensus was that the powers of the executive, 
legislature and judiciary should be separated and the provisions of checks and balances between 
these branches of government should be recognised in the new constitution as a means of 
preventing dictatorship, while ensuring that the government functions smoothly.79 Controls on 
the presidency, first by ensuring direct elections by the people, who should have control over a 
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president, and second by putting effective checks and balances on executive powers, were 
deemed as necessary tools of ensuring constitutionalism in the new constitution.80 Evidence of 
the Commission’s attempt to separate the three arms of the government is seen in the provision 
of the draft Constitution which stipulates that a president should not be a member of 
Parliament,81 which is an innovation in Uganda’s constitutional history. Regarding the armed 
forces, the Commission noted that they were concerns among Ugandans who desired that it 
should be a national army that is insulated from the influence of a president and any government 
or any political party. However, the majority approved of the presidency being the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces.82 The Commission observed that while appreciating the concerns of 
the minority, military operations involve military secrets known only by the commander-in-chief 
and those pertaining to the operations. It thus proposed that a president should be the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and should appoint the commander of the armed forces 
subject to the approval of the National Council of State, who could also advise a president on 
operational command of the armed forces, but the president should not be bound by the advice.83 
 
The Commission proposed that operations of the armed forces should be authorised by 
Parliament, it should defend the constitution and democratic institutions and that its main 
responsibility should be to defend the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Uganda.84 The 
Commission also noted the desirability and importance of constitutional safeguards to ensure that 
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the constitution is respected and upheld by all institutions and all sections of society so that it is 
not arbitrarily abrogated or suspended as was done by leaders in the past.85 The measures 
suggested included building strong democratic institutions and writing safeguards in the new 
constitution to emphasise their sanctity.86 To ensure maximum scrutiny of any proposed 
amendments to the provision relating to the exercise of executive authority, presidential 
elections, removal from office of the president and the emergency powers of the presidency; the 
draft Constitution requires a Bill passed by a vote of not less than two-thirds of all members of 
Parliament and which has been ratified by two-thirds of all the district councils.87 
 
With regard to elections, the Commission noted that there were widespread concerns about past 
Constitutions failing to provide sufficient safeguards against manipulation of the electoral 
process by former leaders which allowed them to achieve their own ends rather than to reflect the 
choice of the electorate.88 For example, under the Republic Constitution, a president could 
dissolve Parliament almost at any time and call for fresh elections.89 This power was open to 
abuse and gave unfair advantage to a ruling government in that it allowed the president to call for 
elections at the convenience of the ruling government to the detriment of other political parties 
who may require sufficient notice and time to campaign in order to effectively contest elections. 
It also increased the power of the executive over the legislature which was at the mercy of the 
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president who could dissolve Parliament whenever he wished and, therefore, weakened the 
system of checks and balances between the two branches of the government.90 There was a 
consensus that fair electoral laws should be built into the new constitution to ensure that 
elections are the mechanism for smooth transfer of power from one administration to another.91 
Thus, the Commission recommended that elections should be conducted in such a way that the 
results would be respected and accepted by all parties and the people of Uganda.92 It also 
supported the people’s view that voting in national elections should be on the basis of universal 
adult suffrage.93 
 
The Commission reported that there was consensus for an impartial body to organise elections. 94 
The majority of Ugandans considered that the system that allowed a president to choose 
members of the Electoral Management Body was open to abuse by the incumbent 
government.95Among the proposals submitted to the Commission was that the electoral 
management body should be composed of the chief justice and other judges of the Supreme 
Court; be made of religious leaders and representatives of the United Nations and the 
Organisation of the African Unity (now the African Union), or other international or regional 
organisations; be elected by Parliament; be appointed by the president, subject to the approval of 
Parliament; and be composed of representatives of political parties or persons selected with the 
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involvement of political parties.96 The Constitution Commission noted that there was a genuine 
concern that the powers of the presidency to appoint persons to the Electoral Management Body 
could be used to appoint persons who were biased in favour of the ruling party.97 
 
It however did not agree that the Electoral Management Body should consist of members of the 
judiciary. It reasoned that members of the judiciary should be insulated from the arena of 
political decision, which it might be required to adjudicate on. As its work might require full-
time attendance, therefore, it might deprive the judiciary of its personnel.98 In dismissing the 
other proposals on the composition of the Electoral Management Body, the Constitution 
Commission argued that in a secular Uganda, it is not proper to involve religious leaders in 
organising elections, and that it would not be proper for an independent state to routinely subject 
its electoral process to external scrutiny of the international community.99 Thus, it recommended 
that the Electoral Management Body should consist of a chairperson and not less than two but 
not more than six other members appointed by the presidency with the approval of the National 
Council of State.100 It also proposed that the chairperson of the Electoral Management Body 
should be a justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the High Court or a person qualified to be 
appointed a justice or judge.101 It did not make recommendations on the qualification of the other 
members of the Electoral Management Body. 
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It has been claimed that the Commission reacted vociferously when opinions were given that 
differed from its ‘gospel sermons’.102 Further evidence that it was under the influence of the 
NRM government has been inferred from its report that recommended for a no-party system 
while allowing the Movement System of the NRM government a free reign. 103 A referendum 
conducted by the government in 2001 also confirmed the Commission’s reported position.104 
However, three years after, the Constitution Review Committee reported that Ugandans had a 
strong desire to return to multi-party politics.105 Indeed, in a second referendum, more Ugandans 
than those who participated in the 2001 referendum overwhelmingly voted to return to multi-
party politics in 2005.106 By this time, however, many Ugandans had bought into the Movement 
System of the NRM. It may therefore be stated that by criminalising other political polities while 
allowing its Movement System to operate, the NRM aimed at selling its political ideology to 
Ugandan in order to allow it to entrench and dominate power. 
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The Commission dismissed well-founded demands for reforms to the presidency and countered 
popular concerns of Ugandans with its preferences. The Commission’s Report acknowledged the 
problems Ugandans had suffered as a result of past executive excess, but it failed to address 
them. This indicates a reluctance to rethink the presidential authority which had previously been 
designed to entrench in power heads of states. On close analysis, what emerged from a 
seemingly participatory and consultative constitution-making process, are a not well legally-
reasoned Report and a draft Constitution that ignored the genuine concerns presented by 
Ugandans. The Commission did not make any notable recommendations that would provide 
sufficient constraints against presidential authority. For example, it endorsed the continuation of 
the executive presidency, which it reported was proposed by the majority of Ugandans without 
qualifying why it supported the proposal, but it dismissed almost all the views intended to 
circumscribe its powers and privileges with fallible reasoning. The Commission‘s Report also 
notes that there were widespread concerns about the manipulation of the electoral process by past 
leaders, yet it dismissed any attempt to insulate the Electoral Management Body from 
interference of the presidency. One of the reasons the Constitution Commission gave for 
maintaining an Electoral Management Body whose members would be appointed by a president 
was the undesirability of exposing the electoral process of a sovereign country to the external 
scrutiny of the international community.107 Yet election observation by the international 
community is a common occurrence in Uganda and many other countries. 
 
The Commission laid the foundations for establishing an uncircumscribed presidency in the 1995 
Constitutions and for the NRM’s transition from an interim government to a permanent holder of 
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political power. This was achieved by imbedding in the draft Constitutional a presidential model 
that disregards the aspirations of the people of Uganda, and which does not embody tenets of 
constitutionalism. In sum, the Constitution Commission’s contribution towards restraining the 
presidency was at best negligible. Its role cannot be described as a sincere attempt to transform 
the institution that was unlimited before 1995 into that which is subjected to the mandate of the 
people and that is subordinated to the constitution. 
 
4.2  The constitution-making environment 
 
4.2.1 Ban on political activities 
 
When the NRM seized power, it brought members of other political parties into its leadership 
coalition and used them to present itself as a broad-based ‘Movement System’ representing the 
interests of all Ugandans, and one which was opposed to sectarianism.108  Under the Movement 
System, political parties continued to exist but could not campaign in elections or field 
candidates directly. In July 1992, the interim legislature- the NRC, adopted a resolution 
suspending political activity. Just after that, the Constitution Commission released its report and 
the draft Constitution in which it proposed the continuation of the proscription of multi-partysim 
and the retention of the Movement System in order to avert the risks posed by the revival of 
political activities.109A year later in July 1993, the Constituent Assembly Statute110 was 
                                                                 
108 For example Paul Kawanga Ssemogere the former leader of the Democratic Party (DP) served as Minister of 
Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Public Service. He also held the post of Deputy Prime Minister in Museveni's 
NRM government.  
 
109 The draft Constitution (n 18), art 52(f) 
. 
110 Constituent Assembly Statute No.5 1993 (The Constituent Statute). 
 
 
117 
 
instituted, as recommended by the Constitution Commission, for the purposes of creating the 
Constituent Assembly that would provide the necessary legitimacy for adopting  a new 
constitution.111 The Statute also prohibited party candidates from running for elections for the 
Constituent Assembly that was established to adopt the new constitution.112 Candidates could 
only participate in campaign rallies or meetings organised by the government.113 No other rallies 
or any forms of public demonstration in support of or against a candidate were allowed.114 
Therefore, although on seizing power the NRM presented itself as tolerant to other political 
parties, during the constitution-making process, political parties could not mobilise freely. It was 
not impossible to obtain the free opinions of the people of Uganda on any constitutional issues 
other than through mediums devised and dictated by the NRM. Political parties could issue press 
releases but the law prohibited them from holding workshops, party congresses or 
conferences.115 Consequently, political parties the most basic pillars for democracy were unable 
to influence the constitution-making process. Meanwhile, it has been claimed that the NRM 
continued to use the media to assert their views.116 As Judy Geist points out, the underlying 
objective of the transition to a new constitution was: 
To deal as many blows to the old parties as possible. To prevent the emergence of a new leadership. To 
foster the incipient internal divisions presently hindering any constructive party development or 
rehabilitation, and generally to discredit the parties.117 
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The prohibition on political parties also suppressed the public debate on the new constitution in 
that public debates on contentious issues in the draft Constitution ran the risk of being perceived 
as representing a political ideology. By proscribing political party activities, the possibility of 
their development let alone their effectiveness towards challenging the NRM’s agenda 
diminished and so did the development of competitive politics, while the NRM under the guise 
of the Movement System continued to promote itself and to grow. The NRM justified the ban as 
based on the purported need to unify the country through building a no-party movement that 
would represent all interests.118 According to this thinking, to the NRM, most of the country’s 
past problems related to party politics. In the words of Joe Oloka-Onyago banning political 
parties was tantamount to a condemnation of future generations to the atonement of the sins of 
their forbears.119 
 
 The restriction on political activities was compounded by the intimidation of multiparty 
advocates.120 All meetings and discussions on the new constitution were to be conducted through 
the organs of the NRM–the Resistance Councils (RCs). It should be noted that the Republic 
Constitution which was the fundamental law of the land guaranteed freedom of association and 
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freedom of assembly.121 Human Rights Watch reported that Cecil Ogwal, one of the members of 
the leadership of the UPC tried to challenge the restrictions on political rallies by attempting to 
hold a series of rallies in northern Uganda.122 The police arrested sixteen of her followers and 
charged them with belonging to an illegal organisation.123 Thus in the case of Ogwal v DPP,124 the 
UPC sought an injunction to stop the government from interfering with its political activities. 
The petitioners alleged that the ban on political parties violated the constitutional rights to 
freedom of association and assembly125 and that the provisions governing campaigning adversely 
affected the right to free expression.126 The High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that 
the ban on party activities was a temporary measure which was necessary to prevent a revision of 
the political chaos of the past.127 Therefore, during the constitution-making process it was 
impossible for Ugandans to engage in political debates on the new constitution that did not 
conform to the NRM’s views. It may therefore be stated that the constitution-making 
environment was inimical to freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly, 
which are essential for a meaningful consultative and participatory constitution-making process 
in order to bestow popular legitimacy on a constitution.  
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4.2.2 Conflict in eastern and northern Uganda 
 
Some parts of northern and eastern Uganda were not accessible to members of the Constitution 
Commission during the time when the new constitution was being debated because the NRM 
was still engaged in an armed struggle with various rebel groups. The people at that time in these 
war- infested areas did not participate in the consultation exercise for the new constitution. As 
the government which was deposed by the NRM had its tribal roots in these parts of the country, 
the contribution of the people from eastern and northern Uganda towards forming the new 
democratic dispensation was either deliberately ignored or unfortunately not considered. This 
lays fertile grounds for the allegation that the constitution-making process was not fully 
participatory or inclusive, and the 1995 Constitution is a product of retributive and vindictive 
southerners. 
 
4.2.3 Non-Government Organisations involvement in civic education  
 
 The Commission’s Report notes that at least two non-government bodies, the Uganda Joint 
Christian Council (UJCC) and the National Organisation for Civic Education and Election 
Monitoring (NOCEEM), attempted to supplement the civic education activities of the 
Commission.128 However, the controlled nature of civic education during the constitution-
making process was highlighted by the difficulties these organisations experienced in carrying 
out their work. NOCEEM is described as an umbrella organisation of fourteen human rights, 
religious and media organisations aimed to provide civic education as well as monitoring 
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elections to the Constituent Assembly.129 On 26 January 1994, Interim President Museveni 
accused NOCEEM of being a partisan organisation.130 Soon after that, its accreditation was 
withdrawn.131 There was no reason given for the withdrawal. NOCEEM admitted that one of its 
members was a former UPC activist with a plaid political history.132 It has however been claimed 
that the complaints against NOCEEM were instigated by NRM officials who were trying to rig 
elections for the Constituent Assembly in order to delegitimise its non-partisan activities.133 
Although NOCEEM was later allowed to operate, the experience illustrated the limits of 
autonomy during the constitution-making process and the NRM’s intolerance of alternative 
views. 
 
4.3 From the establishment of the Constituent Assembly up to the point of  
promulgation of the 1995 Constitution 
 
4.3.1 The composition and the election of the Constituent Assembly  
 
The establishment and work of the Constituent Assembly were governed by the Constituent 
Assembly Statute.134 The rules for the election of members of the Assembly were also provided 
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for under the Statute.135 The Assembly was an important body in the constitution-making 
process. It was supposed to act as ‘the people’s check’ on the work of the Constitution 
Commission, which was a restricted group of people selected by the NRM government. In order 
to furnish the new constitution with popular legitimacy and to avoid allegations of exclusive 
constitution-making process that blighted past fundamental laws, the Constituent Assembly had 
to be independent from the NRM government and it had to consist of persons elected through the 
free will of Ugandans. The Assembly was to consider the draft Constitution clause by clause, as 
meticulously as possible, scrutinise, debate and approve or dismiss its provisions, introduce new 
ones and enact a new constitution.136 In relation to the presidency, the Assembly shared the 
common responsibilities with the Constitutional Commission of ensuring that the powers and 
privileges of the presidency are subjected to sufficient mechanisms and of incorporating the 
liberal views of Ugandans in the new constitution, in order to furnish it with legal and popular 
legitimacy respectively. For these reasons, the Assembly’s structure and work deserve closer 
scrutiny as they are important for understanding the office of the president as provided for in the 
1995 Constitution. The logic is that to understand the design of the office of the president and the 
Constitution as a whole; one needs to comprehend the motivations of its framers. 
 
The Constituent Assembly Statute displays bad craftsmanship and it is poor in content.137 Indeed, 
at the time of its passage, a constitutional law expert counselled the government to return it to the 
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National Assembly for the purpose of ironing out its imperfections.138 The Statute provided for a 
special selection of seventy-four delegates in addition to the two hundred and fourteen members 
directly elected from the districts.139 Out of the seventy-four delegates, ten were appointed by 
Interim President Museveni140 and another ten from the armed forces-the NRA; eight were 
appointed by the political parties the UPC, DP, UPM and CP;  two delegates were appointed by 
the National Organisation of Trade Unions; four were appointed by a National Youth Council; 
one was appointed by the National Union of Disabled Persons; and thirty-nine women delegates 
were elected from each District by an electoral college comprising all councillors at the RC level, 
within all the Districts and all members of the Sub-County Women's Councils within the District. 
141 It should be noted that the Interim President was the Commander-in-Chief of the NRA and, 
therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that he had a hand in appointing the delegates allocated to 
it. The Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Commissioner and the Clerk of the Assembly were 
also appointed by the Interim President.142 Membership of the Constituent Assembly was 
contested through direct elections in all the Districts.143 Members of the Assembly were to 
consult members of their constituencies for their views about the issues under discussion and not 
to rely on their own emotions.144 The structure of the Constituent Assembly was shrouded in 
controversy. The NRA, was allocated more delegates than the old political parties put together, 
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perhaps as an indication of its role as the determinant of the holder of political power. The 
allocation of delegates to the armed forces can be viewed as a continuing support of the allegory 
of its superiority over political parties in the political process. Its delegates were also aligned to 
the NRM political ideology and can be viewed as representatives of the NRM. 
 
At the same time, political parties were allocated positions,145 despite the ban on political 
activities.146 Consequently, the UPC refused to send its delegates in protest against the ban on 
political parties.147 The Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) - Museveni’s old party, did not send 
any delegates because it reasoned that its views were already represented by the NRM.148 
Therefore, similar to the selection of members of the Constitution Commission, the Constituent 
Statute allowed Interim President Museveni and his NRM organs to dominate the selection 
process for members of the Constituency Assembly. Twenty-two out of the seventy-four 
delegates, including the two allocated to the UPM, in addition to the Chairman and Deputy, 
Commissioner and Clerk of the Assembly were appointed by the NRM organs. The Statute did 
not state on what basis such persons were to be selected. At the same time, members of the NRM 
were free to contest for membership of the Assembly through direct elections in all the Districts. 
The Democratic Party (DP) insisted that political parties be consulted in view of the selection of 
the presidential nominees.149 However, no such consultation occurred. It is therefore reasonable 
to conclude that the interests that the NRM appointees represented were those of the appointing 
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authorities- Interim President Museveni and his NRM. The aim was to ensure that the resulting 
constitution provides for their wishes. 
 
Aili Trip contends that although the number of delegates to the Constituent Assembly who were 
institutionally beholden to the NRM did not form the majority, they represented a major block of 
NRM supporters who could be relied on to adopt a pro-NRM position.150 Critics argue that out of 
the 284 members of the Assembly, roughly 220 supported NRM politics.151 The facts are that 
198 members of the Constituent Assembly were either involved in the NRM armed struggle or 
have served under the NRM government.152 
 
Constitutional law experts in Uganda counselled that if the Assembly was to debate and enact a 
viable and objective constitution, it was important that the delegates elected to do so should be 
disqualified by law from standing as candidates for Parliament to be elected immediately 
following the promulgation of the new constitution.153  However, the idea was overwhelmingly 
rejected by the government.154 It has also been claimed that there was no fair distribution of 
members to the Assembly from different parts of the country.155 For example, Kalangala District 
with an estimated population of twenty thousand people was represented by three members, 
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while Apac with a similar population size was represented by one.156 This imbalanced 
representation in the Assembly also offered an unfair advantage to the NRM who had strong 
support in southern Uganda areas such as the Kalangala District as many of its leadership 
originated from southern Uganda, but it lacked support in the northern Districts such as Apac, 
which was a strong base for the government that it deposed. 
 
Elections for the Constituent Assembly took place in March 1994.157 They were meant to be non-
partisan and based on the merits of each individual candidate.158 Every registered voter who did 
not have a criminal record and who could afford the required nominators and financial backing 
was eligible to run.159 During candidate meetings, each candidate was individually introduced 
and allowed a ‘reasonable amount of time’, but in any case, not less than twenty minutes to 
address the meeting.160 Public rallies and any form of public demonstration in support of any 
candidate were proscribed, as was the holding of meetings other than the so-called candidate 
meetings.161 It was reasoned that to do otherwise, would be to invite the old political squabbles 
and draw away the people’s attention from the noble cause of making a constitution.162 
Notwithstanding these restrictions on political parties, it has been claimed that the reality on the 
ground was different. Many candidates identified themselves during the campaigns either with 
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the NRM or other parties and the electorate got to know who supported what and whom.163 The 
manner in which the Constituent Statute inhibited candidates from actively campaigning raised 
serious questions relating to freedom of expression and assembly. The press reported that a 
newspaper editor was arrested on charges of sedition for publishing an article in which he 
commented on the suitability for one the candidates of the Assembly.164 
 
The establishment of the Constituent Assembly became a political forum in which the NRM 
subdued other political forces involved in the struggle for power and positioned themselves for 
the ultimate prize of political dominance. As Nelson Kasfir observed: 
The elections also posed a challenge by adding a transitional stage in the struggle for power and the return to 
democracy… At stake was the question if the National Resistance Movement will be the dominant political 
force in years to come.165 
 
Mahmood Mamdani aptly notes that the basic thrust of the NRM’s move during the constitution- 
making process was calculated to gain political capital at the expense of other parties and 
guarantee the perpetuation of the Movement System of government.166 
 
Voter turnout in the Assembly elections was very high with as much as ninety-seven percent 
reported in some areas.167 However, the elections were marred by reports of vote buying, 
intimidation of candidates and the use of unfair tactics by NRM candidates.168 
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 In its entirety, the framework for the establishment of Constituent Assembly was tipped in 
favour of the NRM and fraught with potential for conflict. As a result, the establishment of the 
Assembly became a turning point, out of which the NRM dictated the contents of the new 
constitution and emerged as the de facto single ruling party. The NRM had intended to have its 
organs to serve as the Constituent Assembly,169 as Obote did in 1966.170 However, its intended 
mode of adopting the new constitution faced stiff resistance when the UPC questioned the 
representativeness of organs which consisted of NRM members who owed their positions to the 
contribution they had made to the armed struggle that brought Museveni to power.171 Although 
the NRM consequently dropped its stance in favour of a more representative Assembly, it used 
the Constituent Statute to tilt the playing field in its favour. There was not to be a fully 
representative Assembly, its composition was to be dominated by NRM sympathisers. The 
Constituent Statute which was passed by the NRM government ensured that the Assembly’s 
composition did not differ from that of the organs of the NRM. This also allowed the NRM to 
design a fundamental law that would entrench their power. 
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4.3.2 Assessing the work of the Constituent Assembly 
 
Several caucuses were formed during the Assembly debates. The main ones included the 
Buganda Caucus, the National Caucus for Democracy, the Women Caucus, and the NRM 
Caucus.172 The result of this was that instead of examining and considering the draft Constitution 
dispassionately, the Assembly was polarised along sharply divided political lines. George 
Kanyeihamba cites several examples of these. They include the rejection of an inexpensive and 
convenient motion that presidential and parliamentary elections should be conducted on the same 
day, which was rejected without after the NRM caucus held a private meeting and spoke against 
the motion for political expedience and advantage; and the establishment of the Movement as a 
political system of governance which was caucused wholesale amid the drowning of moderate 
and rational voices.173 
 
Deliberations on the draft Constitution commenced by way of a general debate, followed by a 
consideration stage and then a reconsideration stage.174 The general debate stage was intended to 
heal the wounds of the past, minimise mistrust, build confidence between delegates and lay the 
foundation for reconciliation, mutual respect, and consensus.175At this stage, the draft 
Constitution was divided into contentious and non-contentious provisions. Each member was 
allowed 30 minutes to comment on its provisions and to deliver a message from his or her 
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constituency.176 John-Jean Barya writes that during the debate stage, rational and sensible 
motions were rejected simply because they were perceived by the NRM as originating from 
groups that were deemed as opposition, in favour of those that the NRM caucus considered to be 
its own or its supporters, however divisive or inferior they were.177 The motions dismissed 
included creating the National Council of State to advise a president on the exercise of 
presidential powers.178 Another for an Electoral Management Body chaired by a justice of the 
Supreme Court appointed by a president from a group of persons nominated by all political 
parties was snubbed too.179 The Assembly also rejected the provision in the draft Constitution 
prohibiting cabinet ministers who are appointed by the presidency from becoming members of 
Parliament.180 The failure by the NRM diehards to discuss and come to a political compromise 
with other political forces on the design of the presidency and other contentious issues 
demonstrate their intent to adopt a constitution whose provisions would allow them to dominate 
power. It also highlights the extent at which they were willing to undermine the views of the 
majority of Ugandans that commented on the presidency during the public consultation stage 
despite, its promises to adopt a popular constitution. It is therefore not surprising that during the 
proceedings of the Assembly there were many walk-outs by dissenters.181 
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The Constituent Statute provided that with regard to decisions affecting the provisions or the 
draft Constitution or any amendment to those provisions, a motion would be carried only after it 
obtained the majority of not less than two-thirds of the delegates voting, subject to the 
requirements of the quorum.182 On the other hand, it would be lost if it was supported by less 
than the votes or the majority of the delegates voting.183 On any matter on which consensus 
could not be obtained, the Statute provided that a motion would be carried if it was supported by 
fifty or more delegates.184 It may well be that the purpose of these provisions with regard to 
decision-making, was to ensure that the substance of the new constitution was arrived at with the 
support of as many delegates as possible. The provisions could have also been tailored to protect 
the views of a substantial minority by giving them another chance, without bringing in the 
citizenry through consultation or referendum. It has been reported that some of the dissenting 
members of the Assembly opted to walk out during the decision-making stage too.185 
 
Under the rules, the enactment of the new constitution was to take place not earlier than seventy-
two hours from the date of the laying on the table of the final text.186 Upon enactment, the rules 
required that the approved constitution be certified by the Chairman, witnessed by the Deputy, 
the Commissioner and the Clerk to the Assembly and any delegate who wished to do so.187 
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Members of the Assembly were under no obligation to sign the text.188 This was a significant 
provision because withholding signature by a member, as eventually forty did189 was not 
detrimental to the validity of the new constitution.190 The rules required the chairman to notify 
Interim President Museveni immediately after enactment in writing through the Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs, so that he might fix a date for promulgation of the new constitution.191 
Under the Statute, the Interim President was required to fix by statutory instrument a date for the 
promulgation of the new constitution 192 and the day for this purpose was to be not more than 
sixty days after the day on which the Constituent Assembly enacted the Constitution.193 A 
reported one hundred and ninety-eight meetings of the Constituent Assembly were held.194 
 
The Constituent Assembly proceedings indicate that the majority of the decisions relating to the 
provisions of the 1995 Constitution were reached by consensus except those on the national 
language, land, federalism, and the political system which were supported by fifty or more 
delegates.195 The Statute directed that the Assembly complete its work within a period of four 
months.196 However, the deliberations took much longer and this timeframe turned out to be 
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inadequate. Extensions were sought from the government and seventeen months after it began its 
work, the Assembly approved the new constitution which was promulgated on 8 October 1995 as 
the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995.197 
 
5. The legitimacy of a Constitution 
 
Following the above analysis of the events that shaped the presidential model as established by 
1995 Constitution, it is important to discuss the two components which determine the scope, 
content and acceptability of modern constitutions, and which all constitutions must embrace 
namely, popular and legal legitimacy. These two elements are relevant to measure the legitimacy 
of the presidential model and the Constitution as a whole. They were lacking in the fundamental 
laws that Uganda adopted before 1995. This explains the misallocation of state powers and their 
subsequent misuse. Popular legitimacy is commonly referred to as ‘popular sovereignty’ while 
legal legitimacy if often described as ‘constitutionalism’. The two essential components must be 
built into a constitution during the constitution-making exercise. It may therefore be stated that 
the absence of one or both of the important elements renders a constitution a sham.198 They are 
also important for understanding the allocation of power in a constitution. Thus, they are vital for 
explaining presidential authority in the 1995 Constitution and by extension, the constitutionalism 
deficit in the Constitution as a whole. 
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Carl Schmitt posits that only a constitution created by the people is legitimate.199 Schmitt’s 
theory focuses on the link between the will of the people and the constitutional decision as the 
yard-stick for constitutional legitimacy.200 Thus a constitution is only legitimate when there is a 
direct link between the people as the originator and the constitution itself.201 Richard Fallon 
notes that the term constitutional legitimacy invites three concepts namely, legal, sociological 
and moral.202 First, the legal legitimacy of a constitution depends more on its sociological 
acceptance rather than on the (questionable) legality of its formal ratification.203 Therefore, for a 
constitution to acquire legal legitimacy, it should be founded on accepted principles that aim to 
address social problems and questions, especially those that relate to distribution of state powers 
in order to minimise its misuse.204  Second, for a constitution to be recognised as morally 
legitimate, it has to enjoy unanimous consent.205 In this regard, it may be stated that unanimous 
consent bestows popular legitimacy on a constitution.  Third, because a constitution invites 
disagreement about what it means and how it should be interpreted, many claims about the legal 
legitimacy of practices under the constitution rest on inherently uncertain foundations.206 He 
therefore concludes that any realistic discourse about constitutional legitimacy must therefore 
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reckons with snarled interconnections among its ability minimise misuse of state power, its 
sociological foundations, and the felt imperatives of practical exigency and moral right.207 
 
Randy Barnett takes a deferent approach to defining constitutional legitimacy. He contends that 
constitutional legitimacy is to establish why anyone should obey the command of a 
constitutionally-valid law.208 A law-making system is legitimate if there is a prima facie duty to 
obey the laws it makes.209 Neither ‘consent of the governed’ nor ‘benefits received’ justifies 
obedience.210 Rather, a prima facie duty of obedience exists either (a) if there is actual 
unanimous consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaker or, in the absence of consent, (b) if laws 
are made by procedures which assure that they are not unjust. In the absence of unanimous 
consent, Barnet propounds that a written constitution should be assessed as one component of a 
law-making system.211 To that extent, where a particular constitution establishes law-making 
procedures that adequately assure the justice of enacted laws, it is legitimate even it has not been 
consented to by the people.212 Barnet’s account of constitutional legitimacy does not assume any 
particular theory of justice, but rather is intermediate between the concept of justice and the 
concept of legal validity. Although Barnett and Fallon take a different approach to defining 
constitutional legitimacy, they advocate unanimous consent, either by the citizenry in the case of 
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Fallon,213 or by the citizenry to the jurisdiction of the lawmaker for Barnet,214 as an essential 
component that bestows popular legitimacy to a constitution. In the absence of unanimous 
consent, Barnett contends that just laws or just procedures for making laws bestow  legal validity 
(legitimacy)215 on a constitution and the laws which flow from it, while for Fallon, a 
constitution’s ability to minimise opportunities for any person to misuse state power confers 
legal legitimacy on it.216 
 
With this in mind, it is important to discuss in details the two important components which 
determine the legitimacy of modern constitutions. 
 
5.1  Popular legitimacy as an essential component of constitution-making 
 
Because people in pluralistic societies do not share the same values or interests, the legitimacy of 
their fundamental political institutions ultimately depends on some kind of consent among all 
those that who are subjected to such institutions. There is a long-standing tradition that conceives 
institutional legitimacy and political justice in terms of consent. This was established by the 
social contract theory as articulated in the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, John 
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau217 and much later by John Rawls.218 In the broadest terms, a 
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constitution conceived a social contract between the citizenry and the government, the legitimacy 
of the government depends on the consent of the citizenry.  For some such as Locke it seems to 
be the actual consent of the governed, 219 while for others as Rawls, a hypothetical consent on the 
basic institutions of society suffices.220 Notwithstanding these differences among various 
consent-based theories, legitimation based on consent appears to the optimal, if not the exclusive 
means of normative justification for constitutional legitimacy.  
 
The principle of popular legitimacy is the basis of all contemporary constitutions no matter how 
different the experiences and problems of the people for whom they are written.221 It is founded 
on the notion of popular rule. It is the starting point for constructing new legal and political 
orders.222 An attempt towards democratisation must rest on the assurance that the whole body of 
the citizenry should be included in processes that affect them, more so in the allocation of power 
over them.223 The essential requirement is that the citizenry taken as a whole, must be directly 
involved in governing themselves.224 The reason for this is to avert tyrannical regimes which 
refuse to submit to the popular will of the people. Thus, most constitutions begin by asserting 
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that they rise out of a participatory and consultative process; often stating that ‘We the 
people…..’225 This indicates that the constitution is an ‘expression of the people’ and as such it 
has acquired popular legitimacy.  
 
One of the biggest criticisms of independence constitutions in Africa, which may also be 
ascribed to the fundamental laws in Uganda before 1995, is that they were adopted without the 
involvement of the people they were meant to govern over.226 This allowed the founding fathers 
of African states to rule their citizens as subjects but not as citizens. This is because populace did 
not contribute to determining how they are governed. As a result, Africa’s leaders have generally 
lacked the legitimacy to govern because they have ruled under laws that were designed to serve 
them and not the citizens. Modern constitutionalism seeks to address this anomaly by requiring 
the meaningful involvement of the citizens in determining how they are governed. Popular 
legitimacy is also important for understanding the allocation of powers in a constitution. During 
constitution-making, the people decided how they are to be governed and who should exercise 
powers in terms of the constitution. While it is impossible to reach an entire agreement between 
the citizenry on each provision of a constitution, such agreement could be reached through 
suitable procedures in the act of making a constitution.  Herbst proposes the principle of 
collective autonomy in order to address the problem of traditional polity. He notes that the 
specific problems of decision-making in a multi-personal collective are part of collective 
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autonomy.227 To Herbst, a constitution is more legitimate if the more of those that agree to it are 
permanent subjects of power deriving from the constitution and the contentious decision are 
resolved through adopting liberal views which are aimed at addressing challenges facing the 
people for whom a constitution is written.228 In this regard, it may be stated where the liberal 
wishes of the people are not embodied in a constitution, such constitution is devoid of popular 
legitimacy.  
 
The principle of popular legitimacy which indicates governance according to wishes of the 
people identifies the people as the source of state power and provides legitimacy for its 
exercise.229 A constitution acquires popular legitimacy where the constitution-making process is 
both meaningfully consultative and participatory and when the liberal views of the people are 
incorporated into the constitution. 230 This occurs during the constitution-making process. The 
core components of popular legitimacy include transparent and fair constitution-making 
procedures, popular participation and the adoption of liberal views of the citizenry in a 
constitution. These factors confer factual legitimacy on a constitution. 
 
 Anyone may make a fundamental law. As often has been seen in Uganda, such fundamental 
laws reflect the maker’s wishes; the decrees of a dictator, the orders of a military junta, or the 
declarations of an oligarchy. However, such constitutions will not acquire popular legitimacy 
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because they are framed pursuant to a particular agenda. Consequently, they are devoid of the 
necessary wishes of the populace that can often be reflected through constitutionalism and which 
bestow legitimacy on a constitution; instead, there are the dictators, military junta and oligarch’s 
commands. They are more adhered to through coercion and therefore not sacrosanct. 
 
A constitution is the highest law of the land, which defines and limits the powers of the 
government and its various branches, vis-à-vis each other and the people and provides the 
foundation for a state based on the rule of law.231 Communities all over the world depend upon 
predetermined rules of conduct which have general acceptance and are enforceable. It therefore 
follows that the contents of a constitution provide an agreed framework for the operation of a 
state, guarantees rights and outlines mechanisms for their enforcement, as well as shaping the 
future of a nation. Popular support for a constitution gives it authority superior to other domestic 
laws. It also confers respect on a constitution, thereby protecting its sanctity and ensuring its 
longevity. Thus, constitutions should be built on the doctrine of popular legitimacy. 
 
Constitutions that are made by one person or the elite who wield political power are most likely 
not to be respected by the citizenry and often end up discarded when governments that imposed 
them on the people are out of power. Similar to Uganda, Niger’s experience illustrates this. Since 
1959, the country has adopted seven constitutions which were all written by the ruling elite 
without the involvement of the people and they were repealed after each government was 
removed from power.232 The absence of popular legitimacy for the Constitutions resulted in their 
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disparagement. For example, each government was overthrown by a military coup despite clear 
provisions in some of the fundamental laws which prohibited armed seizure of power.233 This 
may be because the people of Niger did not view the constitutions as made by them but made for 
them by the governments which lacked popular support. It is exactly for the same reasons that 
Ugandans have denigrated previous fundamental laws. Uganda’s and Niger’s experience indicate 
that the consensual nature of constitutions lowers the underlying risk of coups and constitution 
disparagement in the emerging political environment. 
 
The Roman dictum of ‘What concerns all must be decided by all’ is very relevant in constitution-
making. A constitution that has been achieved through popular participation commands respect 
and support, and political leaders are more likely to desist from illegally tampering with it as this 
would create a public uproar.234 The manner in which a constitution is made and approved may 
also safeguard its sanctity. Constitutions that emerge in the aftermath of conflicts are often as a 
result of negotiated settlements and competition between many forces. They come onto the 
public agenda when it is time to change to better political and legal systems. During constitution-
making exercises, people search for constitutions that will facilitate the resolution of past and 
modern problems of the state and of governance. Therefore, constitutions often reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
233 ibid 22. See Constitution of the Republic of Niger 1989, art 52(c); Constitution of the Republic of Niger 1992, art 
57(a); Constitution of the Republic of Niger 1996, art 55(b). 
 
234  For example attempts to repeal the presidential terms limits form the Constitution of the Republic of Benin 1990 
was fiercely resisted by the citizenry and the judiciary.  See Bruce Magnusson, ‘Testing Democracy in Benin’ in 
Richard Joseph (ed), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa  (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999) 203, 211; also in 
Burundi, attempts to amend the popular constitutions failed see Patrick Nduwimana, ‘Buruindi’s ruling apart fails in 
its first bid to change the constitution’ Reuters(on-line, 21 March 2014) http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/uk-
burundi-politics-idUKBREA2K1MO20140321 accessed 20 April 2014. 
 
 
 
142 
 
struggles of the people and provide foundations of renewed hope. It is therefore understandable 
that people insist upon processes of legitimising constitutions that are inclusive and democratic. 
When one group dominates the process, the constitution-making process fails to reach a genuine 
consensus among the citizenry. This concept has both philosophical and practical connotations. 
The practical element is satisfied through popular involvement while the philosophical element is 
fulfilled through addressing the challenges facing the state.  
 
 In conclusion, as Tobias Herbst notes, the exercise of sovereignty is only legitimate, if done 
within a constitutional framework and a constitution itself is only legitimate if it is given by the 
constitutional authority- the citizenry.235 I refer to this as popular legitimacy. 
 
 
5.2  Legal legitimacy as an essential ingredient of a constitution 
 
 On the other hand, a constitution acquires legal legitimacy when it embodies principles of 
constitutionalism. Charlton Roger writes that the modern political concept of constitutionalism 
establishes a constitution as the supreme law which integrates the way the citizens choose to be 
governed, democracy and a limited government.236 He contends that the legal legitimacy of a 
constitution derives from popular belief and acceptance that the actions of the government are 
legitimate because they abide by the law codified in a constitution which is founded on 
acceptable constitutional norms.237 Carl Friedrich observes that in dividing political power 
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among the organs of government, a constitution effectively restrains the actions of the 
government and, only this way, it is legally legitimate.238 Therefore, principles of 
constitutionalism that are aimed at defining and limiting the nature and parameters of the 
exercise of state powers bestow legal legitimacy on a constitution.  According to Herbst, 
minimising the abuse of state power and the protection of  freedom and individual rights have 
historically always been a central aim of a constitution239 For Herbts, it is still the central 
precondition for constitutional legitimacy.240 Therefore, the more the constitution can reach these 
aims, the more legitimate it is.  Gretchen Carpenter contends that where a constitution adheres to 
agreed principles such as the doctrine of separation of powers, the rule of law and it embodies 
fundamental democratic principles, it is seen as an effective guarantee of rights and liberties, and 
can be said to be a constitution born out of constitutionalism.241 Dante Gaytman writes that the 
idea behind constitutionalism is to design constitutions that should be capable of promoting 
respect for the rule of law, separation of powers and democracy, rather than just documents that 
are to be used by politicians to manipulate the people.242 Therefore, during constitution-making, 
efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law, minimise opportunities to misuse state power 
and to eradicate authoritarianism, legal legitimacy is a critical element for consideration. 
 
 I will now discuss the principles that embody constitutionalism in a constitution. 
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5.2.1 Liberal democracy 
 
While popular legitimacy seeks inclusiveness, this should not compromise substantive 
agreements on key constitutional principles or undermine the rights of minorities. Robert Dahl 
insists that ‘every advocate of democracy of whom I am aware of includes the idea of restraints 
on majorities’.243 In any society, there is always a risk that the majority will take advantage of 
the minority if they are not restrained. So, in order to prevent the majority from tyrannising the 
minority, a constitution must be designed to achieve the protection of the minority.244 Therefore, 
it is not democracy in the conception of views of the majority that must be written in a 
constitution but principles of liberal democracy that seeks to moderate the views of the majority 
for the protection of the minority. The added element which seeks to constrain adds liberalism to 
democracy. Liberal democracy in the constitution defined the character of state. The purpose of a 
constitution is seen as to limit the authority of the powerful such as the majority and the 
government for the protection of the minority It therefore emphasises separation of powers  and 
the rule of law which are necessary checks and balance for anyone exercising state power.    
 
A constitution may promote liberal democracy through ensuring that its mechanisms intended to 
protect minority rights are sufficiently fastened. For example, article 160 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Angola 1992 prohibits amendments of its provision guaranteeing fundamental 
rights, freedoms and guarantees to citizens; a state based on the rule of law and party political 
pluralism; separation of powers and the independence of courts. Similarly, article 241 of the 
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Constitution of Columbia 1991 empowers the Constitutional Court to review any proposed 
amendment to the Constitution even where such proposal is supported by the majority/ 
 
In some countries, constitution-making processes have been a subject of judicial supervision in 
order to ensure that the resulting fundamental law embodies principles of liberal democracy, 
among other aims. South Africa is one such example where the Constitutional Court played an 
important and unique role in the writing of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996.  The various political parties hotly contested the role of local governments in the post-
apartheid South Africa. The Democratic Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party wished for the 
powers of local governments to be provided for under the new constitution while the majority 
party- the African National Congress (ANC), sought that the new constitution should permit 
Parliament to pass law for the purpose of defining the powers of local governments.245 Principle 
XXV of the draft Constitution presented to the Constitutional Court in May 1996 did not convey 
an overall structural design or scheme for local governments and their functions. It also did not 
indicate how local government executives were to be appointed, how they were to make 
decisions and their formal legislative procedures, thus reflecting the interests of the ANC. 
Meanwhile, the ‘thirty-four Principles’246 required that a framework for local government 
powers, functions and structures shall be set out in the new constitution.247 The Constitutional 
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Court held that Principle XXV, as provided for under the draft Constitution, did not provide an 
adequate framework for the structures of local government and it ordered that the draft 
Constitution should be amended.248  The Court struck down the provision of the draft 
Constitution that was favoured by the majority ANC and, in doing so, it provided a legal 
safeguard against the majoritarian view, allowing for liberal democracy. 
 
5.2.2 Separation of powers 
 
A constitution embodies a social contract that limits the use of power by a government for the 
benefit of the citizens in exchange for their allegiance and support.249 The term constitutionalism 
represents this idea of limiting the use of state power to avoid its abuse, founded on the doctrine 
of separation of powers. It embodies the fundamental principles manifested in a constitution to 
prevent the concentration of power in one person, a body or one group. This traditional 
conception sees the separation of powers in terms of the executive, legislature and judiciary. 
Whichever of the three arms of government is given the power to exercise; there must be 
constitutional limit of that power and institutions which guarantee that power is exercised 
responsibly for the common good of the citizenry.250 A limited government that ensures the 
distribution of power is seen as an effective guarantor of the rights and liberties, a guarantee 
formally incorporated in a structured form in a constitution.251 Constitutionalism is a concept 
                                                                 
248 Certification of the constitution of South Africa 1996  (CT 23/96) [1996] ZACC26. 
 
249 Böckenförde, Hedling and Wahiu (n 221) v. 
 
250 Gatmaytan (n 205) 29. 
 
251 Gretchen Carpenter (n 204) 23. 
 
 
147 
 
whose main fixture is a clear defined mechanism that ensures that the limitation placed on any 
person who is exercising state power can be legally enforced.252 The concept of separation of 
power is born out of the pessimism about intentions of political leaders who, even though they 
might mean well, can act selfishly and abuse state power. The goal is to maximise the protection 
of the citizenry from one another and to minimise the opportunities for government to harm 
citizens.253 
 
The classical theories of the French and American Revolutions emphasises the essence of the 
principle of separation of power. In the American Revolution, the creation of the Constitution of 
the United States of America 1789 was firstly as a method to protect the people from public 
authority.254 The constitution stands at the top of legal hierarchy because it emerged from a 
constitutional convention, which separates it from legislation.255 By this way of separation of 
power, the individual rights of citizens should be saved from violation. A similar approach can 
be found in the works of Emanuel Sieyes, the paramount theorist of the French Revolution. 
Sieyes comprehends a constitution as a means to protect the declaration of the basic rights and 
through separation of power from the abuse of power too.256 Separation of powers aims at 
preventing tyranny. 
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5.2.3 The rule of law 
 
The rule of law is a cornerstone of contemporary constitutionalism.257 This can be demonstrated 
by its role in cementing transitions from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to constitutional 
democracy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.258 It is therefore an ideal worth striving for in the 
interests of good governance, and in an effort to eradicate autocratic rule. As Michel Rosenfeld 
aptly notes, in the absence of the rule of law, contemporary constitutionalism would be 
impossible.259 Beyond that, it is important to define the characteristics that the rule of law must 
possess in order to help sustain constitutionalism. According to Tom Bingham, the rule of law 
dictates that comprehensible and accessible written laws, whether constitutions or legislations, 
guide the courts, governments and everyone’s decisions and actions.260 There is also an 
additional requirement that the rule of law must conform to clearly defined and commonly 
accepted legal values.261 It may therefore be stated that the rule of law is not inferred from what a 
constitution provides, but from a constitution’s adherence to accepted legal norms.Moreover, the 
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rule of law must apply fairly and consistently to everyone, including government officials and 
everyone must have access to justice and the enforcement of the laws.262 Its essence is that all 
persons and authorities within a state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled 
to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect generally in the future and publicly 
administered in the courts.263A commonly accepted and practical, rather than theoretical, 
conception of the rule of law adds an element of justice to a constitution. So, in addition to the 
law being predictable, accessible and universally applicable, the rule of law requires a just legal 
system. Therefore, the rule of law demands more than merely adhering to a validly promulgated 
constitution. A constitution must encompass equality and human rights and must not 
discriminate unjustifiably among classes of people.264 Indeed, a constitution should have the 
force of law and thus its provisions limiting the powers of government and those devoted to the 
protection of fundamental rights may become part and parcel for the rule of law regime.265 Thus, 
constitutions express commitment to the rule of law by establishing their supremacy.266 The 
implied belief is that they embody accepted principles of the rule of law which are superior to 
other domestic laws. It is for the same reason why domestic law may be adjudged 
unconstitutional if it falls short of promoting and protecting equality, human rights and other 
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values enshrined by a constitution.267 Finally, in terms of institutional frameworks necessary for 
constitutionalism, the rule of law appears to rest on a paradox. With regards to protecting 
fundamental constitutional rights, the rule of law seems to be on the side of the citizenry; at least 
to the extent that constitutional law can be invoked by the citizenry against laws and policies of 
the state.268 In contrast, in terms of popular democracy and of implementation of the will of the 
majority through law, the rule of law seems to be decidedly on the side of the state and often 
against the citizenry.269 
 
5.2.4 Safeguards against arbitrary constitutional amendments 
 
The absence of sound safeguards on the ‘amendments’, ‘revisions’ or ‘alterations’ of a 
constitution makes it extremely difficult for a constitution to serve as the basis of and to promote 
constitutionalism.270 This is because constitutionalism is premised on defined mechanisms of 
ensuring limitations on a government, of which control over governments’ arbitrary amendment 
of a constitution is one. A clearly set out and higher standard for the amendment of the 
constitution than of ordinary legislation must be built into a constitution in order to discourage 
rash changes to the fundamental law. The logic is that if rights and founding values contained 
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therein are to be protected, they would need some security. However, in contrast, if governments 
are to be based upon the consent of the governed, constitutions should be alterable to allow for 
the people to reflect changes in value systems across the population. Constitutions perceived as 
reflection of the people’s struggle and hopes must naturally evolve to meet the new hopes of the 
societies that they are written for. They are not a final completed works, but ideal products of an 
open society and pluralism, as well as a subject to ongoing development. Therefore, the need to 
guarantee that durability of a fundamental law must also not make it unalterable at all. 
 
The paradox and the problem of amending founding values of a constitution in order to reflect 
the changes in value systems across societies are a subject of controversy in the United States of 
America. Charles Beard argues that the Constitution of the United States of America 1789 was 
based only on the avarice and greed of its authors and that economics was the sole reason that the 
country was formed.271 According to Beard, it was the economics of exclusion, greed and elitism 
that the framers embedded in the Constitution.272 In contrast, Forest McDonald posits that they 
are philosophical influences as well as the economic ones that guided the minds of the founders 
of the United States of America and their contemporaries.273 He contends that exclusion, elitism 
and avarice were not some of those principles and philosophies on which the United States of 
America Constitution was founded, but it was premised on the protection of the individual 
against the state.274 Although Beard and McDonald disagree on the founding values on which the 
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United States of America and its Constitution were built, the Supreme Courts’ decision in 
District of Columbia v Heller275 which declared that the right to use weapons for self-defence 
and to defend personal property as protected under the second amendment- a constitutional 
provision which is unamendable,  maybe viewed as affirming both their positions that the 
Constitution was founded on values that protect economic and property rights of individuals, and 
also the rights of the individual to defend themselves against the state. Although the decision in 
Heller may have shocked, saddened and outraged many who believe that the constitutional right 
to bear arms should be repealed in order to ensure that many Americans do not continue to die 
senselessly, according to Brain Doherty, the principle laid out by the Court in Heller, is perfectly 
natural to nearly any American of the founding era.276 Doherty contends that the right to bear 
arms has it is origin in the founding values of the American Constitution - the idea that the 
government would never dare become tyrannical, since the people as body would have the 
superior firepower to fight back.277 Therefore, although the right is a subject of disagreements, it 
may be stated that it is founded on unamendable founding values of the Constitution. It is 
important note that although they are commonly referred to as amendments; the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution of America 1789 are collectively known as the Bill of Rights.278 
They were proposed and added to the Constitution to assuage the fears of the anti-federalist who 
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were against the ratification of the Constitution.279 Therefore, they may be conceived as part of 
the original fundament law but not as a further amendment to it.  
 
 Notwithstanding the position in the United States of America, a constitution must go hand in 
hand with the progress of human mind and they should be alterable to address the challenges 
facing societies for which they are made. However, there must be a higher degree of 
acquiescence to constitutional amendments than is required to pass laws. To achieve this aim, 
Brazil has built into its constitution safeguards to ensure that constitutional revisions attain 
popular approval.280 At the same time, the rule of law, liberal democracy and separation of 
powers may be considered to be so entrenched in constitutionalism that their absence, or revision 
to remove them from a constitution, would render the resulting document legally illegitimate.281 
 
 A government which exercises state powers granted by the people must not sanction 
constitutional alterations not proposed by the people. It must also be wary of changes to the 
fundamental law that are not formally sanctioned by the majority. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau the 
most unambiguous of all proponents of democracy argued, the moment a people adopts 
representatives it is no longer free.282 This distrust of political leaders is based on a well-founded 
belief that politicians, even in representative democracies, may have a particular political agenda 
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that does not represent the views of the citizenry. Political leaders might therefore, be a source of 
tyranny unless additional stringent requirements are interposed to prevent them. Thus when it 
comes to amending its key provisions, the Constitutional Court of Benin affords higher 
consideration to the direct expression of the people over the decision of their representatives.283 
 
Some countries have opted to subject constitutional amendments to judicial scrutiny. Judicial 
activism has expanded this realm to ensure that even where supported by the majority, 
constitutions may not be altered so substantially as to erode core values of constitutionalism or 
founding principles of a constitution. For example, the Colombian Constitution grants its 
Constitutional Court the authority to review constitutional amendments only with regards to their 
procedure and not their substance.284 The provisions of the Constitution are divided into those 
that may be amended by Congress and the Constituent Assembly, and others that may be 
amended by Congress and the people through a referendum.285 This notwithstanding, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine according to which a procedural 
judicial review must include whether an amendment was issued by the competent 
authority.286According to the Court, the power to amend a constitution must be distinguished 
from the power to replace a constitution. The Court has the authority to examine whether 
constitutional amendments truly modify the constitution or completely replace it, and the latter 
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would be considered ultra vires.287 This thinking is inspired by two ideologies. First, that there 
are unamendable characteristics in a constitution and second that constitution alterations are 
subject to judicial review. 
 
 Courts are also deemed as competent to amend constitutions. The Supreme Court of the United 
States of America effectively amended the country’s Constitution when it ruled in Roe v Wade288 
that the right to privacy protects a woman’s right to an abortion. The right to privacy is not 
expressly provided for in the text of the Constitution. Likewise, the same Court effectively 
amended the Constitution when it struck down campaign finance limits on independent corporate 
speech.289 Constitutions in some countries authorise courts to review the constitutionality of laws 
and to interpret the constitution.290 Such judicial powers may be said to grant the courts power to 
‘look into’ a constitution, that is, to apply and interpret it. Although the courts are not often 
vested with the powers to repeal a provision of a constitution and often an Act of Parliament is 
required to affect the amendment, the implication of such a judicial review powers is the same as 
an actual powers to amendment because courts may declare a provision of the constitution to be 
in conflict with another other and, therefore, initiate the process of amending a constitution. 
 
It may therefore be stated that various jurisdictions have imposed stringent legal requirements 
when it comes to changing the constitution to ensure that the original ‘social contract’ between 
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the people and the state which was founded on popular and  legal legitimacy is not easily altered 
to satisfy the desires of a few. 
 
In the final analysis, the presence of principles of constitutionalism in a constitution denotes 
legal legitimacy of a constitution. Their absence, however, symbolises a lack of consensus based 
on constitutional norms. Therefore, a constitution should embody principles of constitutionalism 
that are aimed at minimising the opportunity of abusing state power for the protection of the 
citizenry. A constitution that is devoid of constitutionalism signifies misallocation of state 
powers and it likely to allow for its misuse. It is also indicative of a society that is governed 
according to the constitution as opposed to the rule of law.  A society under the rule of law is 
governed according to accepted legal norms of which constitutionalism is one. It is within the 
context and definition that I have discussed in this section that the terms constitutionalism and 
legal legitimacy are used in this study. 
 
6. Mini-conclusion 
 
 The constitution-making process took place against a backdrop of a number of NRM initiatives 
designed to ensure that its objectives of dominating and entrenching power were met. It was also 
stricken by the same fate which afflicted erstwhile fundamental laws, that is, it was 
commandeered by those who wielded political power during. 
 
The exercise provided the first opportunity for the majority of Ugandans who were excluded 
from the making of the past fundamental laws, to contribute towards developing the first ever 
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truly home-grown constitution and to rethink the allocation and use of state powers. It however 
cannot be claimed that the process of making the 1995 Constitution facilitated the meaningful 
contribution among the majority of Ugandans to enable them to determine how they are 
governed and to reconstruct the institution of the presidency. 
 
The presidency as designed by the framers of 1995 Constitution may be conceived as result of a 
fundamental law, whose provisions where dictated by an NRM government which was 
determined to fortify power. Efforts to achieve this aim can be traced to occurrences during the 
constitution-making process which favoured the NRM. The manner in which the bodies that 
framed and adopted the 1995 Constitution were constituted, the legal instrumentalities that were 
established for the purpose of adopting the new constitution and the disregard of the legitimate 
liberal wishes of Ugandans do not merit credit to the process of constitution-making, or the 
NRM’s role in ushering in a truly home-grown constitution founded on constitutionalism.  
 
It may also be said that the NRM did not act differently from the governments before it in that by 
coming to power through violence and unconstitutional means, they managed to establish a 
fundamental law whose provisions they dictated, to legitimise their exercise of state power and 
to entrench their rule.  As AkinolaAguda observes: 
Most governments that are founded upon wielding the gun, or upon palpable illegality….can hardly be 
expected to have much regard for legality and the rule of law… most principles or legality and the rule of law 
are ridden rough-shod as if they do not exist or as if they are obstacles to be crushed.291 
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In this context, having come to power through an armed struggle, the NRM could not be 
expected to preside over the process of making a constitution that is founded on norms of 
constitutionalism.   
 
Joe Oloka-Onyago aptly sums up the interim NRM government’s role in the transition. He writes 
that the NRM acted as both mother and midwife in the transition process and from the first point, 
the NRM or at least President Museveni, saw themselves as critical components of the post-
interim period.292 It should be noted that the Constituent Assembly is not always the final body 
that adopts a constitution. In a country with an unenviable record of exclusive constitution 
making, to be more transparent, the NRM government had the option of returning the 
Constitution which was approved by the Constituent Assembly to the people for a referendum 
before promulgation. In France, for instance, President Charles De Gaulle in 1958 put before the 
French people the final draft of the Constitution of France for approval. 293 
 
Aili Tripp sums the constitution-making exercise as follows: 
At no time was Uganda’s constitution-making process a neutral and open process, free of manipulation; the 
entire exercise was part of a broader political agenda of those in power who sought to use the new 
constitution to remain in power at all costs. From the outset, this limited what could be accomplished through 
the process of adopting a new constitution. Though the level of popular engagement in the process was 
unprecedented, that engagement had little impact on the substance of the constitution and may have lent 
unwarranted legitimacy to the more undemocratic aspects of the process and the resulting Constitution, 
giving the Movement (NRM) more time to entrench itself.294 
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James Rwanyarare observes that:  
President Museveni had a personal hand in the making of the constitution: First of all, he wanted to continue 
entrenching his movement system of government in power thereby fighting with all his mechanics to 
influence the constitutional debate proceedings. He was the architects of the whole thing.295 
 
Commenting on the criticisms of the role of the Constitution Commission during the exercise, 
the Chairman of the Constitution Commission argued that: 
Such criticisms are based on the mistaken understanding of the role of the Commission as a technical 
committee of experts and specialists charged with the task of collecting the views of the people, analysing 
them and engaging the government and the country in the process of making a new constitution. It is the 
people themselves who will write the final version of the constitution.296 
 
Benjamin Odoki’s belief that the people would write the final version of the new constitution 
conflicts with the manner in which the Constitution Commission that he chaired consistently 
disregarded the liberal wishes of the majority of Ugandans who commented on the presidency. It 
also cannot be said that the Constituent Assembly which adopted the final version of the 1995 
Constitution was constituted in such a way that would indicate that it was truly representative of 
the people. 
 
 A survey carried out by the Centre for Basic Research in Uganda concluded that there was 
strong support for establishing an Electoral Management Body whose members are nominated 
by all political parties in order to insulate it from the influence of a serving president and 
government; and also that there was strong opposition to putting that armed forces at the 
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command of the presidency.297 However, these controversial aspects did not make it into the 
draft Constitution. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that they were excluded because their 
inclusion would have limited the powers of the presidency and negated the NRM’s ability to 
control the electoral process and also restrict its access to the potent instrument of coercion, the 
armed forces. 
 
It may therefore be stated that the presidency as designed the framers of the 1995 Constitution is 
devoid of popular legitimacy because it is not founded on the legitimate liberal views of 
Ugandans. As Jule Lobel notes, it is the free involvement of the people in determining how they are 
governed and the representative nature of the bodies that adopt a constitution which are determinative of 
the popular legitimacy of a constitution.298 The design of the presidency also lacks legal legitimacy 
because it does not conform to the norms of constitutionalism that are aimed at circumscribing 
state power in order to avoid its abuse.299 
 
It is through a focused and diligent analysis of the events and legal instruments which shaped the 
constitution-making process that we can best understand influences behind the design of model 
of the presidency in the 1995 Constitution. It suffices to conclude that there was no real attempt 
by the framers of the 1995 Constitution to rethink and limit the power of the presidency, despite 
a history of self-grants of unlimited state power and its misuse. Like fundamental laws before it, 
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the 1995 Constitution may also be perceived as another law, this time authored under the 
leadership of President Museveni and his NRM government for their sustenance in power. 
 
In the following chapter, I will critically analyse the powers and privileges of the presidency as 
established by the 1995 Constitution of Uganda.
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Chapter Four 
 
Critical Analysis of the Model of Executive Presidency as Established By 
the 1995 Constitution of Uganda 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter critically analyses the model of the presidency created by the 1995 Constitution of 
Uganda. It focuses on the powers and the privileges assigned to the presidency under the 
Constitution and the manner in which they have been exercised. Several arguments form the 
contents of this chapter. It will be contended that the presidential excesses as were provided for 
in fundamental laws before 1995 re-emerged in the 1995 Constitution and thus, Constitution fails 
to tame the institution of the head of state whose powers and privileges originated from the 
fundamental laws that were designed without the involvement of the majority of Uganda and 
which were aimed at granting heads of state and governments, under whose influence they were 
written, permanent ownership of power. It will also be inferred that the 1995 Constitution creates 
a presidency with such enormous powers that it has become impossible to meaningfully subject 
the presidency to elections and to supervise the manner in which presidential authority is 
exercised.  Thus, the current occupier of the office of the president does not depend on the 
Uganda citizens’ votes for his power, and neither can his actions be sufficiently constrained.  
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 Furthermore, it will be argued that the constitutional constraints in the 1995 Constitution which 
masquerade as imposing checks and balances on the presidency in the exercise of its 
constitutional roles were purposely or negligently not secured effectively and in some cases they 
have been disregarded by President Museveni. It is therefore, the presidency’s control over the 
instruments of power and institutions of government and his flouting of the Constitution that 
President Museveni depends on for power. In this regard, the 1995 Constitution may be 
perceived as a fundamental lawn designed fortify President Musevin’s incumbency. 
 
 The chapter will also to demonstrate  that the allocation of some of the powers and privileges to 
the presidency as provided for by the 1995 Constitution are not always based on valid reasons.  It 
will also be argued that presidential authority must be exercised for the purposes envisioned and 
granted by citizenry. The chapter also aims to discuss how Constitutions and Courts in other 
jurisdictions have defined the scope of presidential authority.  
 
Section 2 sets out the principles for allocating and transferring political power found in the 1995 
Constitution, thereby providing a background to understanding the allocation of powers in the 
Constitution. Section 3 analyses the design of the presidency in the 1995 Constitution. It 
investigates the reasons for granting some of the powers and privileges to the presidency, and it 
proposes how presidential authority may be exercised. It also discusses how President Museveni 
has exercised the power and privileges of the presidency. Sections 3 also examines the 
designation of presidents in African Constitutions; firstly to demonstrate that the model of 
presidency found inthe1995 Constitution is fairly common in most African Constitutions,  and 
secondly to highlight the implications of such presidential models on democracy and good 
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governance in many parts of the continent. Section 4compares the designations of the presidency 
in the Constitution of Benin 1990 to the presidency provided under the 1995 Constitution of 
Uganda. The aim is to not only to draw lessons for Uganda on how to create a limited 
presidency, but also for other African countries. The concluding section reflects on the effects of 
the designation of the executive president and the smooth transfer of power in Uganda. 
 
2. Fundamental principles for allocating, exercising and transferring 
political power under the 1995 Constitution 
 
With two hundred and eighty-eight articles and seven schedules, the 1995 Constitution is one of 
the most voluminous in the world.1 In the Preamble, the framers of the Constitution recall the 
country’s history which has been characterised by political and constitution instability, making 
reference to the period after independence and the subsequent twenty-three years.2 They also 
recall the struggles of the people against the forces of tyranny, oppression and exploitation,3 
perhaps making reference to the devastation that colonialism and authoritarian leaders have had 
on the country since its border were drawn. The Preamble envisages a better future for Uganda 
by establishing a socio-economic and political order through a popular and durable national 
constitution based on the principles of peace, unity, equality, democracy, social justice, freedom 
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and progress.4 The Preamble declares that the National Objectives and Principles of State Policy 
enshrined in the Constitution are intended to guide all organs and agencies of the state, all 
citizens, organisations and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting the Constitution 
or any other law, and in taking and implementing any policy decisions for the establishment and 
promotion of a just, free and democratic society.5 In other words, the framers of the Constitution 
outline the principles that explain its purpose and the normative foundation that guides the 
understanding of the Constitution as a whole. These principles contribute to a sense of unity 
among the citizenry and an enhanced belief in and commitment to the Constitution. They attempt 
to foster a link to the history and governance of the country, provide justification and 
rationalisation for the values on which the Constitution is built, and establish a connection 
between the citizenry and the Constitution. They also provide guidance for the interpretation of 
the Constitution and the application of the laws that flow from it. 
 
The most important principle is one which encapsulates the principle of popular legitimacy. It 
states that it ‘all power belongs of the people6 who must be governed by their consent,7 through 
organs created therein, and whose personnel are elected or appointed in conformity with the rules 
and procedures laid down in it or other properly promulgated or enacted instruments and laws.’8 
The Constitution prohibits any person or groups from taking or retaining control of the 
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government of Uganda except in accordance with its provisions.9 A person who singly or in 
cooperation with others, by any violent or other unlawful means, suspends, overthrows, 
abrogates or amends the Constitution or any part of it or attempts to perpetrate any such act 
commits the offence of treason.10 All citizens of Uganda are empowered to and have the duty at 
all the times to defend the Constitution and in particular, to resist any person seeking to 
overthrow the constitutional order; and to do all in their power to restore the constitutional order 
after it has been suspended or overthrown, abrogated or amended contrary to its 
provisions.11These principles suggest a condemnation of coup d’états, any other form of 
unconstitutional change of government and self-grants or seizures of powers that are not founded 
on the will of the people. Any person or group of persons who resists the suspension, overthrow 
or abrogation of the Constitution commits no offence.12 The 1995 Constitution is the supreme 
law of the country and has binding force on all authorities and persons throughout Uganda and 
any other law or custom that is inconsistent with any of its provisions is void at any rate, to the 
extent of the inconsistency.13 
 
The duty imposed on the citizens to defend the Constitution and to be absolved of any penal 
consequences while doing so is a major innovation in Uganda’s constitutional history in that for 
the first time in Uganda, the fundamental law puts the people, who are the source of power, at 
the center of the Constitution and makes it clear that citizens by this fundamental law, are 
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required to stop at nothing in defence of the constitutional order. It is aimed at preserving the 
sanctity of the fundamental law, at reconstructing the nation that has been scarred by the scourge 
of unconstitutional rule and at promoting the principles and values on which Uganda is to be 
built and developed. It is also aimed at demanding the conscious fulfillment by the citizenry 
towards the realisation of the aspirations provide under the Constitution. The emphasis on the 
preservation of the 1995 Constitution is certainly justified given the rate at which Uganda’s post-
independence leaders have undermined and abrogated constitutional orders in order to acquire 
and entrench power. However, the duty to protect the Constitution is also susceptible to abuse by 
persons who may take it upon themselves to carry out acts such as an armed usurpation of power 
in the defence of the Constitution. Would such armed usurpation of power in the defence of the 
Constitution be justified given that the Constitution prohibits all unconstitutional changes of 
government? Only the citizenry may amend a constitutional order and authorise the exercise of 
state power. Courts and Parliament as constitutional organs may also amend a constitutional 
order where their actions are supported by the citizenry or for the protection of the minority.  
However, the dilemma in Uganda before 1995 has been that the independence of constitutional 
organs from the executive has not been assured. In such circumstances where the constitutional 
order is restored immediately after the unconstitutional change of government, the answer to this 
question seems to be yes. 
 
In relation to protecting the sanctity of the Constitution against arbitrary amendments or 
alterations, as it has been the practice of past heads of state and governments to abrogate and 
pass decrees that superseded the Republic Constitution; the 1995 Constitution prohibits any 
person or groups of persons from taking power except in a manner that is in accordance with its 
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provisions.14 It further states that the Constitution does not lose its force and effect even where 
its observance is interrupted by a government established by force or arms and as soon as the 
people recover their liberty, its observance shall be restored.15 
 
Articles 259 to 263 outline the different procedures for amending the various provisions of the 
Constitution.16 All amendments require an Act of Parliament.17 Some require the approval of 
District councils.18 Parliament is authorised19 to amend the most fundamental provisions 
including, but not limited to the sovereignty of the people as the source of power,20 the 
supremacy of the Constitution,21 the provision relating to prohibition of derogation from 
particular human rights and freedoms,22 the term limits on the presidency23 and the political 
system.24A referendum however, must be held for the purpose of changing a political system25 
and for extending the term of five years that a president may serve.26 
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Although many of these provisions appear as statements of aspirations without any 
accompanying mechanisms for their enforcement, and as such appear superfluous and simply 
used to add to the general verbiage of the document, they are indicative of ‘the spirit’ of the 1995 
Constitution as they set out an unambiguous commitment to the values which underpin it. The 
normative claims they make, the limitations they place on the exercise of power, and their 
expressions of how state power should be exercised are of legal significance. Their legal 
significance is similar to that of the principles of constitutionalism. Some of these values require 
additional specification before they impose a legal obligation. For instance, a commitment to 
defend the Constitution is enforced through more specific provisions in articles 50 (1) and 137 
(1) of the 1995 Constitution which allows the citizenry to bring constitutional petitions to 
challenge the constitutionality of acts and omissions of the state. This, however, is not to say that 
those values such as the one which provides that all power belongs to the people, that are not 
supported by accompanying enforcement provisions, have no legal effect because they provide 
clear guidance to courts on the interpretation and implementation of the Constitution.27Read 
together, they form the fundamental principles for allocating and transferring political power in 
the 1995 Constitution. 
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3. Model of executive presidency as provided for by the 1995 Constitution  
 
3.1 Desirability of maintaining an executive presidency 
 
Similar to the Republic Constitution, the 1995 Constitution retains the notion of a domineering 
executive presidency.28 This is injudicious given the role such past executive heads of state have 
played in undermining constitutionalism, democracy and human rights in the Uganda. However, 
according to the Constitution Commission, the change from an executive presidential 
institutional system was not the aspiration of the people of Uganda.29 Indeed, there have been 
few changes in the basic structure of constitutions in the last ten years when considering 
transitions between parliamentary institutional frameworks on the one hand and presidential or 
semi-presidential institutional frameworks on the other.30 
 
It may well be that in considering institutional systems changes, states have maintained 
institutional systems that they are familiar with as a case of ‘better the devil you know’ without a 
reasoned basis for their continuation. In regards to Uganda, this appears to have been the 
situation as the Constitution Committee’s report neglects to make the case for the continuation of 
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the executive presidential system.31 On the other hand, it has been argued that where executive 
presidential systems have been established in countries emerging from military dictatorship, a 
democracy of any kind stands a lesser chance.32 
 
Given the catastrophic experience Uganda has had at the hands of powerful executive heads of 
state, there is no reason why the country could not return to the system that it had immediately 
after independence when executive powers were shared between the presidency and 
parliament.33 It has been argued that African countries have unanimously opted for strong 
executive presidential systems, after independence, because a strong presidency is a guarantee of 
strong government and a symbol of national sovereignty.34 In contrast, evidence from South 
America suggests that executive presidential systems have been prone to executive versus 
legislative deadlocks and ineffective leadership, especially at the times when presidents are not 
supported by the majority in the legislature.35 
 
 In the case of Uganda, history indicates that there have been no legislative dead-locks but 
instead, the tendency has been for strong executive heads of state to undermine the legislators 
and to bully them into obedience, for examples as Obote did when he imposed the Interim 
Constitution on the country and also dictated the provisions of the Republic Constitution. It is 
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also evident that when the Republic Constitution was adopted, the propositions for designating a 
presidency which shared executive powers with the legislature, as was in the Independence 
Constitution, was dropped in favour of a powerful executive presidency in the Republic 
Constitution. The increment in powers to the presidency coincided with the contempt of 
constitutionalism and the beginning of dictatorship with disastrous consequences. 
 
As the Constitution Commission indicated that Ugandans opted for the continuation of an 
executive presidency,36 it was important for Ugandans and the bodies which framed the 1995 
Constitution to ensure that the presidency did not degenerate into a dictatorship. To achieve this 
aim, the executive presidency had to be bounded by provisions in the new constitution which 
would provide sufficient checks and balances on the exercise of presidential authority. In 
summary, it is not objectionable for Uganda to have an executive presidency; the problem is the 
bestowal of such enormous powers on the presidency that it slides into autocracy.  
 
I will now examine the effectiveness of the new measures designed to prevent a dictatorial 
presidency.  
 
3.2 Effectiveness of some of the new measures intended to limit the executive presidency 
 
The 1995 Constitution attempts to introduce some changes relating to institution of the 
presidency that were not found in erstwhile fundamental laws such as instigating direct elections 
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for the presidency.37 Of course it is appropriate that a president, who exercises enormous state 
powers, enjoys many state privileges and holds the highest office in the land should have the 
mandate of the people as a whole. It is also suitable that a president should be elected by the 
majority of the electorate. Thus, the Constitution provides that the president should acquire more 
than fifty-percent of the total votes cast in presidential elections.38 There is, however, a danger 
that direct elections for the presidency may encourage the belief that the mandate afforded to the 
president by the people permits the president to exercise constitutional roles without limits. This 
danger can only be overcome by constitutional safeguards against the misuse of presidential 
authority and the leadership style of a president. It should be remembered, as I have discussed in 
chapter two of this study, that Uganda’s heads of state have exhibited little self-restraint in the 
past. There are also several welcome stipulations in the 1995 Constitution regarding the 
qualifications for the office of the president. One of these is that a person under a death sentence 
or a term of imprisonment exceeding nine months imposed by any competent court without the 
option of a fine is excluded from running for the office of president.39 The Republic Constitution 
did not exclude a person serving a prison sentence from the presidential candidacy.40 
 
However, this prohibition does not appear to have any meaningful effect as it only excludes the 
presidential candidates who are serving such a sentence at the time of the presidential elections. 
Any person may contest the office of the president regardless of their criminal past. To weed out 
unworthy presidential candidates, the 1995 Constitution should have at least excluded persons 
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who have been convicted of crimes such as murder, corruption or rape as well as those who have 
been involved in attempts to acquire power through unconstitutional means. This restriction 
could, of course, be contested by the person it affects before the Constitutional Court to avoid 
malicious disqualification.  
 
There are also differences between the almost unlimited presidential authority under the 
Republic Constitution and the 1995 Constitution. For example, although a president in 
consultation with the cabinet may, by proclamation, declare a state of emergency,41 this power 
and the derogation from basic rights during a state of emergency are now closely controlled by 
Parliament and monitored by the Human Rights Commission.42 Furthermore, before assuming 
office, a president is required to take an oath to uphold, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution and the laws of Uganda, and to protect the welfare of the people of Uganda.43 This 
provision suggests an intention to subject the president to the Constitution, at least in principle. 
The 1995 Constitution also introduces the possibility of the removal of a president on grounds of 
abuse of office or willful violation of the oath of allegiance, the presidential oath or any 
provisions of the Constitution or misconduct or misbehaviour.44 
 
A written notice signed by not less than one-third of all members of Parliament setting out the 
grounds for impeachment is required to commence impeachment proceedings against a 
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president.45 The Speaker of Parliament is required within 24 hours after receiving the notice, to 
forward a copy to the president and the Chief Justice.46 The Chief Justice, within seven days after 
receiving the copy is mandated to constitute a tribunal comprising three Justices of the Supreme 
Court to investigate the allegation presented in the notice; and to report its findings to Parliament 
stating whether or not there is a prima facie case for the removal of a president.47 These 
impeachment provisions suggest that the judiciary and the legislature may dismiss a president for 
violations of the Constitution. The Constitution Commission opined that the impeachment 
process it proposed would be sufficient to ensure that a president who commits serious offences 
could be removed from office and, therefore, proposed immunity against legal proceedings for a 
president during the term of office.48 This measure has however not been sufficient to curb the 
actions of President Museveni against the abuse of the Constitution. The fact is that despite 
several attempts to impeach the President for acts which amount to flouting the provisions of  the 
Constitution, such as the appointment of General Aronda Nyakairima, a top official of the armed 
forces, as the Internal Affairs Minister49 and  the use of thirty million Pounds in British aid to 
purchase a presidential jet without  the approval of Parliament,50 to mention a couple of acts 
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amounting to abuse of office and misconduct,51 have failed to garner support because of the 
majority his party holds in Parliament.52 
 
Nevertheless, the concept of impeaching a president for infringing the Constitution and the 
presidential oath that compels the president to swear allegiance to the Constitution point towards 
an acknowledgement of the superiority of the Constitution over the presidency, at least on paper, 
and it represents a positive step towards in minimising the authority of a president. It also marks 
a departure from article 39(2) of the Republic Constitution which eroded the supremacy of the 
Constitution over the presidency by preventing the courts from declaring acts of a president the 
unconstitutional. 
 
The 1995 Constitution empowers Parliament to pass laws for the granting of benefits to former 
presidents.53 Thus, section 7 of Emoluments and Benefits of the President, Vice President and 
Prime Minister Act 2010 entitles former presidents to a monthly pay equivalent to sixty per cent 
of a serving president’s gross salary and four hundred and fifty million Ugandan Shillings 
(approximately one hundred thousand Pound Sterling at the time of writing) for a house purchase 
fund and, a car and driver among other benefits. This provision appears to be have been 
motivated by a desire to discourage leaders from holding on to power endlessly as has happened 
in the past. It would be foolhardy to assume though that a presidential retirement package could 
outweigh a serving president’s remuneration package and other financial benefits and privileges 
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52 In the serving ninth Parliament, two hundred and sixty-seven out of three hundred and eighty-two Members 
belong to the NRM. See Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.  
www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/members -of-parliament/members-of-parliament accessed 30 April 2015. 
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and encourage presidents to retire. Nevertheless, these provisions were not provided for in the 
Independence and Republic Constitutions. They appear to minimise the powers of the 
presidency, to ensure that the office holder continues to enjoy the support of the people and to 
respect the Constitution during their tenure. They can also be conceived as efforts to 
circumscribe the previously almost unchecked powers of the presidency. However, the reality is 
that they have been largely ineffective. 
 
3.3 Presidential immunity from legal proceedings 
 
The 1995 Constitution establishes a president who is not liable to any court proceedings during 
his or her tenure of office54 and who is above all other Ugandans.55 In this way, the hitherto 
authoritarian ideology of the Independence56 and Republic57 Constitutions and a colonial relic58 
that has in the past created imperial heads of state re-emerges in the new constitution. As I 
discussed in chapter two; sections 1 to 3 of this study, before Uganda acquired independence, the 
privilege of head of state immunity was enjoyed by the institution of the kabaka in Buganda and 
the colonial governor. However, there was no constitutional provision that provided for it 
although it could be deduced from the decisions rendered by the courts. As a constitutional 
privilege for a president, it was introduced by the Independence Constitution which was founded 
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on the principlesand philosophy of the British and whose provisions favoured the then rulers of 
Buganda.  Therefore it could be argued that in Uganda, the privilege of presidential immunity 
has its origin in pre-colonial governance system as was practiced in Kingdom of Buganda 
merged with the constitutional principles and philosophy of England. In England, it provided that 
the Crown cannot be prosecuted or proceeded against in either criminal or civil cases,59 while in 
Uganda it was based on the kabaka of Buganda’s despotism of ‘sovereign immunity’. It is 
founded on the assumption that ‘the king can do no wrong’ as the Latin maxim states, ‘rex non 
potest peccare’. Only God can judge an unjust king because the king’s right to rule derives from 
the will of God not from the citizenry. In England, the rule has its origin in the ancient common 
law, predicated on the principle that the king, being the fountainhead of justice, could not be 
sued in his own courts.60 
 
Where the source of authority and powers of government is not vested by a divine right in a 
ruler, but rests in the people who have adopted a constitution by creating a government with 
defined state powers, the source of state powers of the government becomes the constitution that 
created it. Thus, a head of a state and the government have no power other than that which is 
granted to them by the people under a constitution. The head of state cannot declare him or 
herself to be above the law if the people, who constitute the source of the state powers, demand 
                                                                 
59 Under the general rule at common law no proceeding, civil or criminal,  
was maintainable against the Sovereign in person, for, it was said, the courts, being the king’s own, could have no 
jurisdiction over him This position was altered by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which allowed criminal and 
civil proceeding to be brought against the Crown when it is acting as the government.  See Halsbury’s Law of 
England (4th edition 1997) Vol.11, para.1. 
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that they should be subjected to the law.61 It is important to recall that the majority of Ugandans 
who commented on the presidency were opposed to the inclusion of a provision in the 
constitution that provided a president with immunity from legal proceedings. The Constitution 
Committee’s report notes that: 
             Many people have questioned the rationale of the President’s immunity from prosecution [under the 
Constitution].  People argue that such provision have been misused by past presidents. The majority views 
submitted on this issue were opposed to the immunity. They argued that a President is like any other person 
and if he or she does commit a crime he or she should face the court of law like any other person. 62 
 
However, in rejecting the people’s demand for a legally accountable presidency, the 
Constitutional Committee reasoned that: 
            The immunity is meant to preserve the dignity of the office of the president. Although the consensus is that 
the President should not above the court proceedings, it is our considered view that the President should be 
above prosecution in any court of law. It would be absurd if the President who takes precedence over all 
people in the country is liable to court proceedings. The office of the president should have dignity, honour 
and respect from the people. However, the President who has committed serious mistakes could be removed 
from office by either a vote of no confidence or impeachment by Parliament. He could be taken to court 
when he is no longer the President. However, while the President should not be taken to court, in case of an 
offence committed by the office of the president (e.g. vehicle accident involving a presidential convoy), the 
victim should be in position to sue the Attorney-General. The Immunity of the President refers to the person 
as the President and not government institutions or property.63 
 
                                                                 
61 This may be inferred from the principle of popular legitimacy which indicates governance according to wishes of 
the people and identifies the people as the source of state power who provide legitimacy for its exercise. For a 
detailed discussion of the principle of popular legitimacy see chapter three, section 5.1 of this study. 
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During the Constitutional Assembly debates, some delegates argued that the people they were 
representing supported the provision grating a president immunity from prosecution or any court 
proceedings, while others insisted that the their constituents demanded that the presidency should 
be subjected to legal proceedings to ensure that the holder of the office conforms to the law. One 
delegate submitted that the people he represented were of the view that the president should be 
immune from ordinary prosecutions, but added that his people were in agreement that it is 
necessary to impinge the president when they fail to perform, disregard the Constitution or abuse 
the office.64 Another argued that the people he represented supported the provision of the draft 
Constitution grating the presidency immunity because they wanted to protect a president against 
legal harassment, however adequate provision should be put in place to ensure that a president is 
not above the law,65 while another stated that the people he represented did not support granting 
immunity against prosecution to the presidency, because they believed subjecting the presidency 
to legal proceedings was the only way to guarantee exemplary behavior by a president.66 It may 
therefore be deduced from the submissions made during the constitution-making exercise that 
Ugandans envisioned that the holder of the office of the president would respect the law or that 
constitutional provisions would be developed to ensure that a president does not break or 
disregard the law. Despite this, the Constituent Assembly Proceedings report notes that no 
amendments were proposed to the provision as provided under the draft Constitution and on that 
basis, the Assembly recommended that the provision as recommended by the Constitution 
Committee should be adopted without amendment.67 
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The stipulation that court proceedings may only be brought against former presidents68 
encourages serving presidents to want to hold on to power at all costs, possibly for life, in fear 
that legal proceedings for their transgressions may be brought against them when they leave 
office. Given the atrocities committed by former heads of state of Uganda during their tenures, 
and the manner in which power has been transferred from one head of state to another, only one 
out of the seven former heads of state has returned to live in the country after being exiled.69 
 
Following the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, the jurisprudence on presidential immunity 
indicates the failure to refer to the drafting history of the Constitution. It also points out that the 
privilege of presidential immunity serves no justifiable constitutional purpose, but it is aimed at 
putting the person who is the president above the law. In the case of Brigadier Henry Tumukunde 
v Attorney General and the Electoral Commission70 the petitioner, who was a representative of 
the armed forces in Parliament, argued, amongst other things, that President Museveni’s act of 
forcing him to resign from Parliament was unconstitutional. The respondent argued that the 
presidential immunity from legal proceedings under articles 98(4) & (5) of the 1995 Constitution 
prohibits the Court from investigating the matter as a president’s actions are unchallengeable 
before any court. In dismissing the petition, Justice Kavuma opined that: 
              The sum total of these provisions is clearly, in my view, to grant the President total immunity against court 
proceedings both criminal and civil arising out of his/her acts or omissions done or omitted to be done either 
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68 The 1995 Constitution (n 2), art 98(5). 
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before or during his/her term in office as President. Any person who wishes to challenge those acts or 
omissions of the President has to wait until the President has seized to be one […] This may appear a hard 
position but, that is what the Constitution says. If the framers of the Constitut ion had intended that the acts of 
an incumbent President should be challengeable in court, they would have clearly stated so given the fairly 
detailed manner in which the Constitution deals with the question of Presidential immunity in article 98.71 
 
Justice Kavuma further declared that: 
It would greatly undermine the rationale behind the article which is to cater for the peoples aspirations about 
the person and the office of the President. This is the preservation of the dignity of both the person and  the 
office of the President. It would be absurd if the President, who takes precedence over all people in the 
county is liable to or his/her acts are challenge in court proceedings. The office of the President and his/her 
acts should have dignity, honour and respect.72 
 
 Justice Kavuma failed to consider the drafting history of the provision which indicates that the 
majority of Ugandans did not wish to design a presidency under which the office-holder was 
above law. However, this desire was ignored by the framers of the 1995 Constitution. Like the 
framers of the 1995 Constitution, according to Justice Kavuma, to subject a serving president to 
court proceedings is to undermine the dignity, honour and to disrespect the person that is the 
president. 
 
In the later case of Professor Gilbert Balibaseka Bukenya v Attorney General,73 the appellant, a 
former vice-president, was prosecuted for corruption for some of his acts while he was 
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occupying the office. He petitioned the Constitutional Court and argued, among other things, that 
his prosecution was unconstitutional because the alleged corruption activities were committed in 
his capacity as vice-president acting on behalf , and on the instructions of President Museveni  
who is immune from prosecution under the provisions of article 98 (4) & (5) of the 1995 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court held unanimously that:  
             [T]he Constitution intended the ‘immunity’ under Article 98 (4) and (5) to be the exclusive   preserve of the 
Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Defence Forces and the 
fountain of honour. The irrefutable presumption here is that the legislature must have intended it that way. It 
thus emerges very clearly that the Vice Presidency is distinct inferior to the Presidency. It has no home in the 
immunity arena.74 
 
What emerges from this judgment is that the grant of immunity from legal proceedings to the 
presidency serves no justifiable constitutional purpose and it is intended to serve the person that 
is the president by declaring them above the law. The judgment indicates that although under 
articles 94 (4), 108 (3) (a) (b), 113 (3) of the 1995 Constitution  a president my assign executive 
power to ministers and the vice-president, acts or omissions committed during the exercise of 
such assigned powers attract legal liabilities for the assignees. However, where the holder of 
executive power commits similar acts or omission, a president is provided with immunity from 
legal proceedings. This interpretation of the provision granting immunity to the presidency 
supports the contention that the powers and privileges of the presidency in Uganda, have 
emerged out of fundamental laws designed to grant uncircumscribed authority to the head of 
state and governments. If the privilege of presidential immunity is intended to protect a president 
against legal harassment for his or her acts and omissions as it has been argued by proponents of 
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the provision,75 some of which may occur while a president is exercising executive powers, it 
must then follow that whoever the president assigns executive powers to, must also benefit from 
the immunity while exercising the assigned powers. To only protect a person that is the president 
is to suggest that the privilege of presidential immunity is a person benefit of a president which is 
not aimed at protecting a president against legal harassment in the exercise of constitutional 
power.  
 
The reasoning by the Constitutional Committee that it is absurd for a head of state to appear in 
court has been injurious to the protection of individual rights and the observation of due legal 
process in Uganda before. In the case of Rex v Yowasi K Pailo & 2 Others,76 the applicants 
sought a revision of a judgment in which they had been accused and convicted of making 
seditious comments against the Kabaka. The prosecutor, on behalf of the state, did not appear. 
However, the Court found nothing lacking in this procedure and simply held that the appellant 
could not rely on the absence of the supreme authority who is exempt from appearing before the 
Court as indicative that the state could not substantiate the allegations against the appellants. The 
Court also held that in a prosecution for exciting hatred and contempt against the institution of 
the kabaka, it is no justification to claim that they were actuated by feelings of patriotism and 
only sought to improve the conditions of the country. In recent times, in the case of Rtd. Col. Dr 
.Kizza Besigye v Electoral Commission & Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,77 a petition was brought to 
challenge the outcome of 2006 presidential election in which President Museveni emerged 
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victorious. The petitioner, who was the runner-up in the election, alleged, among other things, 
that electoral offences were committed by President Museveni personally and by his agents, with 
the President’s consent, or approval during the presidential election.78 He therefore sought a 
declaration annulling the election from the Supreme Court.79 However, President Museveni 
could not be summoned to appear before the Supreme Court to explain his actions because the 
Constitution shields a president with immunity from legal proceedings during the term of office. 
Therefore, President Museveni’s political competitors and the populace were unable to put to 
legally scrutinise the President’s conduct during the election. 
 
It may be expedient, to consider the effect that legal proceedings against a president may have on 
the smooth running of the government and the country at large.  While such considerations may 
necessitate creating a different legal process from that which applies to the general public to be 
applied to a president, blanket immunity from legal proceedings is not the solution, neither is the 
impeachment process proposed by the Constitution Committee effective. The decision to invoke 
legal proceeding should at least be at the discretion of the court where the independence of the 
court from the presidency is assured. 
 
 In the United States of America and in the United Kingdom, courts have pronounced themselves 
on the issue of presidential immunity in cases that I find valuable for the present discussion. In 
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the case of United States v Nixon,80 President Nixon refused to hand over crucial tapes relating to 
the ‘Watergate Saga’. The Supreme Court of the United States of America addressed the issue of 
presidential immunity from the proceedings. When ordering the President to hand over the tapes, 
Justice Sirica declared that: 
Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communication, 
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege of immunity from judicial 
proceedings under all circumstances.81 
 
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lord held in the case of Re Pinochet,82 that some crimes 
are just so heinous that nobody has any immunity from them and least of all, the head of state 
whose primary responsibility is to protect citizens.83 
 
The position in international law in relation to the immunity of a head of state, as Micaela Frulli 
observes, originates from the will to ensure respect for the principle of sovereign equality of 
states, a rationale that has progressively lost importance with respect to personal immunities.84 It 
may therefore be argued that the concept of the head of state’s immunity in international law was 
aimed at treating heads of states as equals, and to protect them from legal proceedings while they 
are acting in their official capacity at the international forum, but it was not intended at insulating 
heads of state from personal legal liability. International criminal justice strengthens further the 
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legal position that serving presidents cannot be availed of blanket immunity from heinous 
crimes.85 Whereas constitutions are vulnerable to manipulation by those who wield political 
power in the states where they are adopted as often has been in Uganda, principles of 
international criminal justice represent a global consensus on the standards of criminal 
responsibility to be attributed to individuals. Therefore, we can rely on the percepts of 
international law as forming commonly accepted legal standards. It may also be justifiable to 
protect the president by granting him or her immunity from legal proceedings relating to civil 
actions for slanderous or libelous utterances made in Parliament for example, while in the course 
of his or her role as the head of state. Similar protection is afforded to legislators in the 
Westminster System.86 This permits the demarcation of the president’s individual and official 
liability to legal proceedings accordingly, by allowing him or her to remain immune while acting 
in official capacity but not while acting as an individual. 
 
 Lessons can also be learnt from South Africa which has devised mechanisms to subject the 
conduct of any holder of public office, including the president, to scrutiny to ensure 
accountability, civil and criminal liability. Chapter 9 of the Constitution of South Africa 1996 
provides for the establishment of a number of state institutions to strengthen the country's 
constitutional democracy. These institutions which include the Auditor General, the Independent 
Electoral Commission and the Public Protector, have a constitutional obligation to carry out their 
duties in an impartial manner and without fear, favour or prejudice.87 The South African 
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Constitution further states that no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of 
these institutions.88 In the case of the presidency, this mechanism operates alongside the 
impeachment process.89 Section 89 of the South African Constitution empowers Parliament to 
dismiss a president for serious violation of the Constitution or law and for serious misconduct.  
 
Besides the impeachment process, the Public Protector is mandated among other things, to 
investigate and to report on any conduct in state affairs or in the public administration within any 
sphere of government,90 to report on that conduct91 and to take appropriate remedial action.92 The 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 makes it a criminal offence for anyone 
receiving a public salary to accept undue material benefits in exchange for a particular action.93 
These provisions make the president of South Africa liable to legal proceedings. It should be 
noted that under article 193(4) of the South African Constitution, the Public Protector is 
appointed by the president on the recommendation of Parliament, while under article 181(2) of 
the Constitution the office is independent and its subject only to the Constitution and the law. 
Thus, a president is restricted to appointing a Public Protector from persons recommended by 
Parliament.Articles181 (2) and 193(4) are aimed at minimising the influence of a president on 
the Public Protector. This is one of the measures in the South African Constitution which is 
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aimed at building constitutionalism by ensuring that institutions that are meant to check and 
balance presidential authority are not subordinate to the presidency. 
 
Pursuant to her constitutional powers, the Public Protector has investigated allegations of 
impropriety and unethical conduct relating to the refurbishments carried at President Zuma’s 
home in Nkandla using state funds, and she has concluded that the President unduly benefited 
from the non-security upgrades.94 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 does 
not provide a serving president with immunity from legal proceedings. As the Public Protector 
has the constitutional power to ‘take any appropriate remedial action’, could such action include 
invoking civil proceedings against the President to recover the misappropriated state funds? 
Also, could President Zuma be prosecuted under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act 2004? While the Public Protector has the constitutional authority to compel the 
President to pay back the state funds, and Parliament may impeach the President for violation of 
the law or the Constitution, where the President fails or refuses to pay back the money, the 
answer to both questions appears to be yes. 
 
The Constitution Commission in Uganda reasoned that subjecting a president to legal 
proceedings disrupt the running of government and the state, among other things.95There is 
however a greater threat to constitutional and general legal order when the law shields a serving 
president from legal proceedings than when it allows for legal liability of the president. It 
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encourages the idea that presidents are above the law and not subordinate to it. In Uganda, this 
has led to the disregard of the law and the abuse of power by former heads of state. Subjecting a 
president to legal proceeding relates to his personal capacity and not to his role as the president 
of the country. Where a serving president is facing legal proceedings and therefore cannot 
continue to perform presidential duties, a constitution should provide procedures for the 
president to be replaced with minimum disruption to the state’s constitutional order and the 
smooth functioning of the government. Most constitutions including that of Uganda provide for 
an acting president to step in96 and a mechanism for replacing the serving president permanently, 
for example as the result of death, resignation or impeachment.97 The idea that the person who 
holds the office of president should be shielded from legal proceedings because bringing legal 
proceedings against a president would violate the dignity, honour and respect for the presidency 
and disrupt the running of the government and the country, cannot justify encasing the president 
in impunity. It resonates with the concept of an indispensable president on whom the country 
depends for its existence and survival, and who is not constrained by the law. This has led to the 
creation of imperialist heads of state in the past. 
 
To conclude, it may be stated that granting the president immunity from legal proceedings is not 
founded in law, not justified with logic and it serves no meaningful purpose in a just and 
democratic society. Its purpose is to create an absolute president who is not legally accountable. 
                                                                 
96 The 1995 Constitution (n 2), art 108(3)(a). 
 
97 ibid art 109. 
 
 
 
191 
 
The Constitution Commission report98 does not make a strong argument for recommending its 
continuity given the history of disregard for the legal and constitutional order and the human 
rights violations committed by past heads of state. Most importantly, the people of Uganda 
expressed a desire to establish a constitutional system under which a president is subject to legal 
proceedings.99  
 
3.4 The president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces 
 
The 1995 Constitution designates a president who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces.100 Subjecting the armed forces to the command of the president is ill-advised given the 
historical role the armed forces have played as an instrument of repression and the final arbiter of 
political disagreements in Uganda. In this regard, the Constitution bestows on the presidency 
excessively disproportionate powers over the incumbent’s political competitors and the citizenry, 
by placing the armed forces, a potent and brutal weapon of political coercion and historically an 
instrument for accessing and retaining power, at the president’s disposal to call upon to settle 
political disputes and to retain power.    
 
Although the Constitution sets out one of the functions of the armed forces as to preserve and 
defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda,101 the historical role of the armed 
forces in Uganda indicates that it has been used more as a tool for unconstitutional change of 
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government and for arbitrating political conflicts rather than for maintaining the territorial 
sovereignty of the country.102 This has led to a widely held belief that any political organisation 
that does not have an army cannot hold power. The army has also been used as an oppressive 
instrument by governments against the people of Uganda in order to manipulate elections and to 
maintain in power corrupt and undemocratic governments. Furthermore, having an army that is 
affixed to the president and the political leadership that created it cannot be conducive to 
democracy. The National Resistance Army (NRA), which is the military wing of the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) which waged the armed conflict that brought President Museveni 
to power, is now the Uganda’s People Defence Force (UPDF) - the national army. Its top 
leadership is comprised of veterans of the guerrilla war which brought President Museveni to 
power. After President Museveni took power, there was no attempt to restructure the armed 
forces in order to make it a national army as opposed to one that was created by and which 
serves the President and the NRM.  A survey carried out by one of the country’s leading 
newspaper concluded that twenty-three of the highest-ranking positions in the armed forces are 
occupied by persons from the President’s tribe.103 This is despite the 1995 Constitution calling 
for the creation of a nonpartisan army, which is national in character, patriotic, professional and 
which is subordinate to civilian authority.104 Therefore,  like heads of state before him, President 
Museveni understand that he has to rely on members of his tribes in influential positions in the 
armed forces who are loyal to him to stay in power. Having an army whose high command is 
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made up of his tribe helps the President in several ways: it reduces discontent in the inner circle 
of the NRM power and it enhances loyalty, and most importantly it cements the President’s 
control over the instrument of power that is the armed forces. Furthermore, it creates a group of 
loyal high-raking army officers with a subjective interest in the President holding power.  In 
addition, under article 78(1)(C)of the 1995 Constitution, Parliament should consist of  members 
of the armed forces who are appointed  by the president. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that this provision is aimed at increasing the interest group of the presidency in the legislature. 
 
It would have been prudent to include a provision in the Constitution prohibiting persons who 
attempt to access state power through armed violence from acquiring public office. This would 
amount to a further rejection of armed seizures of power and of the involvement of the army in 
the country’s politics. Persons affected by the provision would of course have the right to 
challenge their political isolation before a court. 
 
Some counties such as the Central African Republic which have experienced military coups have 
constitutionally prohibited military rule and the involvement of the armed forces in politics.105 
Ideally, the armed forces respect the constitution that has been agreed upon by the people, and 
does not lend its weight to the promotion or the entrenchment of power of a particular leader or a 
government. It must also be committed to defending the sovereignty of the people according to 
the framework of the constitution and must therefore be prepared to serve under any government 
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that is freely and lawfully elected by the people. However, when his alleged plan to transfer the 
presidency to his son Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba was challenged, President Museveni was 
quoted as declaring that the armed forces would not permit destabilisation of the country and 
would not allow his authority to be challenged.106 In this context, according to the President, he 
does not only embody the power of the state but is also the incontrovertible component for the 
stability of the country. Therefore, challenging the President’s succession plans or his presidency 
is tantamount to destabilising the country. It may also be argued that President Museveni’s 
possession of the ultimate authority over the armed forces makes him reluctant to submit to the 
people or the Constitution and makes him reliant on the army for his power. Evidence of the 
President’s sole ownership of the institution of the army may be further deduced from its 
deployment in South Sudan in January 2014 without Parliament’s approval in contravention of 
the Constitution.107 
 
In conclusion, it should be recalled that the idea of placing the armed forces under the supreme 
authority of ahead of state is not an invention of Uganda’s post-colonial leaders. When the 
former colonial authorities created the army in Uganda and named it the King’s Rifle Army, its 
purpose was the preservation of colonial rule regardless of whether the challenger to the colonial 
rule had a legitimate claim as did the native population had when they sought participation in the 
affairs of its country.108 Since then, there has never been an alteration in the operation and public 
                                                                 
106 It has been reported that President Museveni would like to transfer the presidency to his son and that the he has 
declared that the armed forces would not allow anyone to challenge his succession plans. See Aloysious Kasoma, 
‘Museveni Should Explain the Army Takeover – UPC’ Independent (Kampala, 23 January 2013) 2. 
 
107 The 1995 Constitution (n 2), art 210 provides that Parliament’s approval should sought by the presiden t for any 
deployment of the armed forces  outside Uganda. 
 
108 Grace Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation: The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Uganda from 
Colonial rule to Independence 1894-1962 (Viking Press 1973) 201. 
 
 
195 
 
perception of the Army in Uganda. It is arguable that in Uganda the notion of subjecting the 
armed forces to the command of a head of state has mainly been aimed at allowing heads of state 
authority over the army, a force which they can call upon to quash any challenge to their power. 
To address this challenge, constitutional provisions should have been adopted to ensure that the 
army is insulated from the influence of the head of state or a government. One of the ways of 
achieving this is to ensure that the law provides for the qualifications of membership of the army 
and that its ethnic composition is proportionate to the various tribes of Uganda. This would 
minimise the opportunity of a head of state and government from distorting the ethnic structures 
of the army and from appointing high-ranking army officials that are favourable to a head of 
state and a government. 
 
3.5. The president’s powers to appoint and to dismiss top public officers 
 
The presidency’s dominance over the document that is the 1995 Constitution is further 
demonstrated by the president’s powers of appointment. A president exercises inordinate powers 
over all institutions of the civil service by way of appointments over employees in any 
government agency. In fact, the manner of governance of the entire country’s civil service , 
corruption and the distortion the ethnic composition of public bodies can be traced to the 
appointment power vested in the presidency. The absolutism of the presidency of Uganda may 
be identified by its total control over all state institutions granted by its constitutional role in 
appointing and dismissing almost all those who serve in the in high positions in the public 
service from the  top judicial officers,109 the Director of the Public Prosecution Service,110 the 
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Inspector General of the Government,111 the Auditor General,112 the Chairperson of the Human 
Rights Commission,113 the Head of the Public Service Commission114 and the Governor of the 
Central Bank,115 Cabinet Ministers,116 the Chairperson of the Education Service Commission,117 
the Chairperson and members of the Electoral Commission,118 the Inspector General of the 
Police,119 the Commissioner of Prisons120 and the District Commissioners121 to mention some, 
but not all of the heads of government departments.  
 
This trend has encouraged an increased focus on President Museveni’s personalisation of 
politics, as ‘a hope for economic survival’. Welfare and career prospects have been almost 
entirely vested in the person that is the president, particularly where holding public office is 
concerned as one must be indebted to President Museveni and be able to perform his wishes 
unquestioningly. These powers of appointment have also allowed President Museveni and his 
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appointees to dish out jobs in the public service as political rewards without any consideration 
for aptitude, and conversely to exclude and victimise real and perceived non-sympathisers from 
public office and public services. According to a recent survey conducted by one of the 
newspapers in Uganda, three hundred and ninety-seven out of eight hundred and twenty-six 
highest public civil service jobs are held by persons of the same tribe with President Museveni 
who are also supporters of his NRM party, while another three hundred and ninety-seven similar 
jobs are held by persons who are not of the same tribe with the President but who are supporters 
of his party.122 This has resulted into the creation of civil service composed of persons from the 
President’s tribe and NRM supporters. It should be noted that paragraph 5 Code of Conduct and 
Ethics for Uganda Public Service 2005 which sets out standards of behaviour for public officials, 
prohibits public officers from engaging in active politics, canvassing political support for 
candidates, participating in public political debates and from displaying party symbols. It is 
however difficult to envisage how such a measure can ensure impartiality, objectivity, 
transparency and to guarantee the integrity of public officers when they are performing their 
duties when the majority of them are aligned to the NRM. 
 
The presidency’s powers of appointment also undermine the creation of professional government 
department that could render the presidency and make the government accountable to the people. 
Moreover, they have created a public service that is beholden to President Museveni and his 
NRM but has constitutional and statutory duties of delivering services to all Ugandans of 
different political persuasion, including managing political contestation between the President 
and his political competitors. For example, the powers to appoint the Chairperson and members 
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of the Electoral Commission,123 an institution that is constitutionally vested with the 
responsibility of conducting elections124  from which the President have emerged victorious four 
times since the 1995 Constitution was promulgated, severely dents the integrity of the electoral 
process and consequently that legitimacy of the NRM’s government.  
 
 Apart from cabinet ministers who a presidentmay have a freehand in appointing because they 
constitute a president’s choice of persons to assist with the administration of the country, strong 
constitutional provisions should have been put in place to ensure that all recruitments and 
promotions in the public service are merit-based and that disciplinary measures are based on a 
breach of established disciplinary procedures but not the political whims or considerations of a 
president.125 The only limits to these powers of appointment are the ineffectual constitutional 
constraints that stipulate that such appointments must ‘acquire the approval of Parliament’ for 
example, in relation to the appointment of the Commissioner of Prisons126 and those that require 
that a president ‘acts on the advice’ of institutions such the Judicial Service Commission in 
appointing top judicial officers.127 In practice, attempts to deter the misuse of the presidency’s 
powers of appointment have not been able to guarantee non-partisan appointments. Parliament 
has endorsed most presidential appointments. Hansard notes that in 2012, out of the forty-three 
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presidential appointments, only two128 were vetoed by the Parliamentary Committee on 
Presidential Appointments for lack of integrity. 129 
 
The constitutional constraints against partisan presidential appointments are as a result of the 
Constituent Assembly’s substitution of the role of the National Council of State, as envisioned 
by the Constitution Commission, with institutions such as the Judicial Services Committee. As 
discussed in chapter three, section 4.1.3, in its draft Constitution, the Constitution Commission 
proposed the creation of the National Council of State to advise a president on public 
appointments and the exercise of other executive powers, et cetera.130 It reported that it was 
motivated by the fear expressed by Ugandans that previous heads of state had bullied institutions 
such as Parliament into submission.131 Similarly, the history of Uganda’s Parliament discussed in 
chapter two, section 4 demonstrates that it has not been a bastion for constitutional rights. 
However, the National Council of State which was proposed by the Constitution Commission 
was to comprise of cabinet ministers appointed by the president132 and was to be chaired by the 
president.133 Therefore the Constitution Commission’s proposal put the National Council of State 
and its operation in the hands of the presidency in a manner that is not dissimilar from the way 
the 1995 Constitution provides for presidential appointments in that they are approved by 
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institutions whose members are appointed by a president.134 Thus, subjecting presidential 
appointments to the scrutiny and approval of a National Council whose members are appointed 
by a president135 would have been equally inadequate in avoiding partisan appointments.  
 
The defined roles of the expert constitutional institutions, such as the Judicial Service 
Commission, and the democratic constitutional institutions, such Parliament, by the use of terms 
for example ‘acting on the advice’ or ‘acquire the approval of’ suggest that a president is bound 
to accept or follow the advice given, and the approval by the relevant institution must be given. 
This is because such constitutional constraints are founded on constitutionalism which aims to 
regulate the president’s powers of appointment. They are based on the idea of installing 
separation of powers in a constitution in order to limit executive excesses and abuse of the 
presidency’s powers of appointment. Their purpose is to control arbitrary appointments by a 
president. Such institutions are therefore supposed to be insulated from presidential influence in 
order for them to effectively perform their functions of ensuring that presidential authority is 
exercised for the purposes envisaged by the Constitution and in a manner that is consistent with 
the principles of constitutionalism. 
 
In the case of Karuhanga v Attorney General136 a constitutional petition was brought to challenge 
the re-appointment of Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki. The petitioner argued that President 
Museveni sought the advice of the Attorney General in re-appointing the Chief Justice and 
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ignored persons nominated by the Judicial Service Commission contrary to the Constitution. It 
was also submitted that there are no set procedures for a president to seek and to be granted 
advice on judicial appointments.137 Justice Odoki is reported to have reached the constitutionally 
imposed retirement age of seventy on the 23 of March 2013.138 The Constitution provides that 
the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, Justice of the Supreme Court and the Justice of 
Appeal shall vacate their offices on attaining the age of seventy years.139 The Court declared by a 
majority of four to one that no person may be appointed Chief Justice unless and until the 
Judicial Service has first given advice to the president and that no one can be appointed as Chief 
Justice after they have attained mandatory age of seventy years. However, the Court did not 
order that a procedure should be established under which a president should seek advice from the 
Judicial Service Commission neither did it address this matter. In this regard, an opportunity was 
missed was to comprehensively direct the Judicial Service Commission and the presidency on 
the procedure under which top judicial officers should be appointed. Odoki’s re-appointment as 
Chief Justice is another indication of the President Museveni’s contempt for the Constitution 
both in relation to disregarding the age limitation provided for by the Constitution and also in 
relation to the procedure that a president must follow when making appointments. 
 
 The constitutional structure for the appointment of heads of institutions of government has also 
hampered attempts to fight corruption in Uganda. Presidential appointees, members of the 
President’s ‘inner-circle’ and several politicians have been accused of grand corruption and 
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failure to comply with their legal obligation to disclose their wealth. Corruption is a direct threat 
to the rule of law and accountability as well as an illegal diversion of available resources from 
basic services that are needed to meet fundamental rights obligations.140 It undermines the 
government obligations to protect human rights by diverting money from essential government 
services such as health and education, causing consistent and dire underfunding of these 
sectors.141 Corruption also poses a threat to human rights in that it erodes accountability and 
results in impunity. According to Transparency International, Uganda ranks as the 127th country 
in the world with a corruption index of 2.5.142 The African Peer Review Mechanism Report 2007 
notes that Uganda loses approximately two hundred and sixty million US Dollars a year due to 
corruption and procurement malpractices.143 Uganda’s anti-corruption legal framework relating 
to government officers includes the Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court which has 
exclusive jurisdiction over offences under the Anti-Corruption Act 2009 and the also hears cases 
under the Penal Code Act 1950 and the Leadership Code Act 2002. Article 255 of the 1995 
Constitution mandates the office of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) to fight 
corruption and abuse of authority and of public office. Under section 9 of the Inspectorate of 
Government Act 2002, the IGG can only prosecute government officials. In addition, under 
article 118 (1) of the 1995 Constitution, Parliament  may by a resolution supported by more than 
half of all  its members of  pass a vote of censure against a minister on the grounds of abuse of 
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office or wilful violation of the oath of allegiance or oath of office; misconduct or misbehaviour; 
or  mismanagement; or  incompetence. 
 
In the case of Fox Odoi-Oywelowo and James Akampumiza v Attorney General144 the petitioner, 
a presidential advisor, was dismissed by the IGG for failure to make a financial declaration of his 
wealth as required by article 4 (2) of the Leadership Code Act 2002. He subsequently challenged 
his dismissal before the Constitutional Court which ruled that the Leadership Code Act does not 
apply to presidential appointees and only the appointing authority, a president, may dismiss the 
appointees. In the case of John-Ken Lukyamuzi v Attorney General and Another,145 the appellant, 
then the leader of the Conservative Party, was dismissed from Parliament by the IGG for failure 
to declare his financial information. He challenged his dismissal in the Constitutional Court. The 
Court ruled that the IGG cannot address violations of the Leadership Code Act because it is not 
the appropriate body to adjudicate cases for breaches and that this must occur in the Leadership 
Tribunal.146 Justice Engawu urged that: 
 It is important that the government establishes Leadership Tribunal urgently in order to enforce values of 
integrity and proper conduct in the leadership of this country, values which I consider to be critical in the 
pursuit of development, democracy, good governance and the promotion of the rule of law, and so that the 
Leadership Code of Conduct can be effectively enforced147 
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At the time of writing, the Leadership Tribunal has not been yet established. On 19 July 2005 the 
Access to Information Act of 2005 came into force. The purposes of this, as provide by under 
section 3 of the Act are to promote an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable 
government and to protect persons disclosing evidence of contravention of the law, 
maladministration or corruption in government bodies. Under section 5 of the Act, every citizen 
has a right of access to information and records in the possession of the state or any public body, 
except where the release of the information is likely to prejudice the security or sovereignty of 
the state or interfere with the right to the privacy of any other person. Hopefully, the Act will 
compel government institution to account to the public on how they use public resources and it 
will also provide a mechanism for making financial declarations made by politician available to 
the public. It has however been reported that the Attorney General has contended that the law 
cannot be applied to release asset declarations made by politicians to the public.148  This has not 
yet been tested in the courts. There would be no purpose for politicians to make declarations of 
their assets if those declarations cannot be made available to the public to whom the politicians 
are accountable. Guidance on this matter can be sought from the United Kingdom’s Supreme 
Court decision of R and Another v Attorney General.149 In this case the appellant, a journalist, 
requested disclosure of communications passing between various government departments and 
the Prince of Wales under section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which provides that 
‘any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled:- (a) to be informed 
in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the 
request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. The 
departments refused to disclose the letters on the ground that they considered that the letters were 
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exempt under section 40 (2) as they constituted personal data which do not fall within section 1 
of the Act. The department’s decision was upheld by the Information Tribunal in the case of Rob 
Evans v Information Commissioner and Ministry of Defence.150 After the decision of the 
Information Tribunal, there were judicial review proceedings in the Divisional Court with a 
subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal, and finally the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s 
decision was handed down by its President Lord Neuberger who opined that the right to privacy 
and the strong public interest in transparency makes the nature of the information which was 
requested by the appellant public information.151 His decision was grounded in the constitutional 
principles of the rule of law and separation of powers. He articulated them as follows at 
paragraph 52: 
             It is also fundamental to the rule of law that decisions and actions of the executives are, subject to necessary 
well established exceptions (such as declarations of war), and jealously scrutinised statutory exceptions 
reviewable by the court at the suit of interested citizen. 
 
Based on this decision, it may be stated the asset declarations by politicians in Uganda clearly 
fall within the ambit of public information that may be requested and provided under section 5 of 
the Access to Information Act 2005. 
 
In the case of Hon. Kutesa and Two Others v Attorney General,152 three Cabinet Ministers 
brought a constitutional petition challenging their prosecution for corruption by the office of the 
IGG. Section 3 of the Inspector General of Government Act2002 provides that the inspectorate is 
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headed by the Inspector General and two Deputy Inspectors, while section 4 provides that the 
Inspector General and the two deputies shall be appointed by the president with the approval of 
Parliament.  At the time of their prosecution in 2011, the second Deputy position was not filled 
since the office was established by the Constitution in 1995. Thus, the Ministers argued among 
others things, that the office of the IGG was not dully constituted and therefore it cannot 
prosecute or cause prosecution in corruption cases. The Constitutional Court ruled that the office 
of the IGG was not dully constituted and the three Ministers could not be prosecuted.153 The IGG 
appealed. At the time of writing, the appeal has not been heard because under article 131 (2) of 
the Constitution, when sitting as an appeal court in cases originating from the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court must consist of a full bench of eleven members. Currently, they are 
only eight members because the President has not appointed the other three.It should be noted 
that under article 223(4) of the 1995 Constitution, the Inspector General is appointed by a 
president for four years with the approval of Parliament. Parliament may reappoint the Inspector 
General for another four years under article 223(4) of the 1995 Constitution. This constitutional 
structure for re-appointment via parliamentary approval could potentially deter an Inspector 
General from prosecuting parliamentarians who could deny reappointment. 
 
In 2012, around thirteen million US Dollars in donor funds was reportedly embezzled from the 
office of the prime minister, a position a pointed by the president and where the appointee is also 
member of Parliament. Given the decisions rendered by the Courts on the amenability of 
presidential appointees for prosecution for corruption, and the President’s failure to appoint the 
second Deputy Inspector General of Government, no prosecutions followed.  Also President 
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Museveni is reported as stating that he will not run away from supporting his old friend, the then 
Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi154 Similarly, when  a former NRM Minister Mike Mukula was 
convicted of embezzlement by the Ant-Corruption Court,155 the President offered to pay the legal 
bill for the his  appeal156 and following which the conviction was overturned. It is difficult to 
imagine that the presiding judge could have upheld the former Minister’s conviction knowing 
that the appellant had the full support of the President. It is important to note here that one of the 
Ministers who was charged with corruption, and who was acquitted because the office of the 
IGG was not dully constituted,157 Mr. Sam Kutesa, at the time of writing is the President of sixty-
ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.  
 
In July 2013, Mariam Wangandya was appointed by President Museveni as the Second Deputy 
Inspector General of Government. The effect of this appointment in terms of the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in Hon. Kutesa and Two Others v Attorney,158 is that the office of the IGG 
became dully constituted. It remains to be seen if the appointment of Wangadya will kick start 
the processes of bringing to account politicians that are suspected of corruption. It suffices to 
conclude that fight against corruption in Uganda has been hindered by the constitutional 
structure for appointments, presidential patronage and the failure to develop constitutional 
institutions that can adequately constrain persons who exercise state powers. In this regard, the 
1995 Constitution failures in its envisioned task of providing institutional arrangements that 
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adequately constrain those who exercise state powers. President Museveni’s reluctance to 
appoint persons to positions that would ensure the full and effective operation of the anti-
corruption legal framework, such  as judges of the Supreme Court and the office of the IGG,  and 
his public support of his ‘inner-circle’ who have been accused of corruption, poses a challenge to 
fight against corruption. Furthermore, the failure by the President to make appointments to 
positions that would ensure the effective and full operation of the anti-corruption legal 
framework appears to be unconstitutional in that it has obstructed the fight against corruption. 
This is because the presidential authority may only be exercised for the purposes of promoting 
democracy, good governance and the rule of law which are all affected by the President’s failure 
to make the appointments. 
 
In various countries, courts have rendered decisions that seek to define scope of the executive’s 
constitutional powers of appointment. In the case of Reference re Supreme Court Act,159 the 
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of the legality of a politically questionable judicial 
appointment. The Court annulled Canada’s Prime Minister, Stephen Harper’s appointment of 
Justice Marc Nadon to the Supreme Court of Canada, declaring that it was void.160 Justice Marc 
Nadon had been sworn-in five months earlier. General qualifications for appointment appear in 
section 5 of the Supreme Court Act 1985. Section 5 refers to current and former judges and to a 
person who is or has been a lawyer of at least ten years standing at the Bar of a province. The 
controversy centered around section 6 of the Supreme Court Act of 1985 which provides that 
three justices are to be drawn from among the judges of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior 
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Court of the province of Quebec, or from the advocates of that province. Justice Nadon came 
instead from the Federal Court of Appeal. Although formerly a member of the Quebec Bar for 
more than ten years, he was no longer a member. In addition, the Court found that the Parliament 
of Canada’s ex-post amendments to the Supreme Court Act purporting to clarify that Justice 
Nadon was eligible were unconstitutional.161 The Court found that they amounted to a 
constitutional amendment requiring the unanimous consent of Parliament and all provinces. This 
judgment stands for the proposition that presidential appointments are reviewable by the court to 
ensure their constitutionality. 
 
In the case of Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and Others,162 the petitioner, the 
main opposition party, challenged the appointment of Mr. Menzi Slimane as the National 
Director of Public Prosecution by President Jacob Zuma arguing that the appointment was 
irrational and invalid.  Before his appointment, Mr. Silamane had given evidence to the Giniwala 
Commission of Enquiry in the conduct of the then National Director of Public Prosecution Mr. 
Vusi Pikoli. The Report of the Giniwala Commission criticised his evidence and recommended 
that disciplinary proceeding be instituted against Mr. Silimane by Public Service Commission. 
However, no such disciplinary proceedings were brought and President Zuma ignored the 
Giniwala Commission’s recommendations in the process of appointing Mr. Silimane.  
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa held that a president may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that conferred by the law and that the power must not be 
                                                                 
161 ibid [121] (McLachlin C.J). 
 
162 (CCT 122/11) [2012] ZACC 24. 
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misconstrued.163 The Court also ascertained that the presidency’s powers of appointment must be 
rationally related to the purpose for which they are conferred, otherwise the exercise of the 
power would be arbitrary and at odds with the Constitution.164 The Court declared that: 
  The Executive has a wide discretion in selecting the means to achieve its  constitutionally permissible 
objectives. Courts may not interfere with the means selected simply because they do not like them, or 
because there are other more appropriate means that  could have been selected. But, where the decision is 
challenged on the grounds of rationality, courts are obliged to examine the means selected to determine 
whether they are rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved. What must be stressed is that the 
purpose of the enquiry is to determine not whether there are other means that could have been used, but 
whether the means selected are rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved. And if, objectively 
speaking, they are not; they fall short of the standard demanded by the Constitution.165 
 
The Constitutional Court evaluated Mr. Simelane’s evidence at the Ginwala Enquiry and 
concluded that the evidence was contradictory and on face value, indicative of Mr Simelane’s 
dishonesty and that it raised serious questions about Mr. Simelane’s conscientiousness, integrity 
and credibility.166 The appointment of Mr. Silmane was set aside. This judgment indicates that 
the presidency’s powers of appointment must be exercised for the reasons granted by a 
constitution, which include appointing persons that would promote good governance, and that 
they must not be exercised irrationally. Further evidence of the latter can be found in the case of 
National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning et al167 in the United States of America in 
which Supreme Court held that President Obama violated the Constitution when he bypassed the 
                                                                 
163 ibid [27] (Yacoob ADCJ). 
 
164 ibid [21] (Yacoob ADCJ). 
 
165 ibid [30] (Yacoob ADCJ). 
 
166 ibid [35]. 
 
167 705 F. 3d 490 (12-1153) 26 June 2013. 
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Senate to appoint an official to the National Labour Relations Board during the period when the 
Senate was in recess in 
 
Judging by these cases, a president may not exercise appointment powers in conflict with the 
principles of constitutionalism and may not do so irrationally and without legal restrain. In 
relation to President Museveni’s appointment of Justice Odoki without the advice of the Judicial 
Service Commission, the appointment does not only appear unconstitutional but it also amounts 
to an unconstitutional amendment of the Constitution in relation to repealing the provision 
stipulating the retirement age of a chief justice.168 It would also be irrational if the appointment 
was based on factors other than competence and eligibility. 
 
With regards to the judicial appointments in Uganda, the presidency’s quest to control the 
judiciary can be traced to the case of Uganda v Commissioner of Prison ex parte Matovu,169 
which challenged executive authority that I discussed in chapter two, section 4. Soon after that 
case, the judiciary became indebted to the presidency for their positions in the subsequent 
Constitution.170 In retaining the president as the appointing authority of the top judicial officials, 
the 1995 Constitution endorses presidential benefaction of the judiciary and therefore, raises 
questions regarding the independence of the judiciary. It thus comes as no surprise that in a 
dissenting opinion, following the unsuccessful presidential electoral petition which sought to 
annul the election of President Museveni after the 2006 presidential election, Justice 
                                                                 
 
168 See (n 136). 
 
169 [1966] EALR 514. 
 
170 The Republic Constitution (n 40), art 76. 
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Kanyeihamba questioned the independence of the quorum from the President.171 This case will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
In the case of TSR Subramanian v Unions of India,172 the Supreme Court of India arguably 
provided the latest in a fascinating line of jurisprudence from a court attempting to insulate parts 
public servants from the domination of politicians. The petition was brought by eighty retired 
public servants who invoked article 32 of the Constitution of India 1949 which empowers the 
Supreme Court to issue directions or order or writs including habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, to enforce a 
constitutional remedy. The petitioners highlighted the necessity of various reforms for 
preservation of the integrity and the independence of public servants. They prayed that the Court 
to orders the government to implement three specific recommendations that had been put 
forward by a number of expert committees over the years that aimed at reforming the public 
service. These included to; (1) create an independent civil service boards at the center and in the 
states for promotions and transfers of bureaucrats; (2) provide fixed tenures of office for public 
servants, so as to give them some protection against indiscriminate or biased transfer by 
politicians; and (3) to require all civil servants to record all directions they receive from their 
administrative superiors, and also from political authorities or business interests.  
 
                                                                 
 
171 See (n 78). 
 
172 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 82 of 2011. 
 
 
 
213 
 
The two-member bench173 ruled in favour of the petitioners. The Court instructed the various 
states to constitute public service boards, comprising of the top bureaucrats, until such time as 
Parliament would pass an Act that would specify in greater detail the composition and powers of 
such boards.174 The Court also compelled the central and local governments to set out terms of 
tenure for different types of public servants within three months.175 Finally, the Court instructed 
that public servants must respond only to documented instructions. The logic is that any attempts 
to unduly influence civil servants would be backed by evidence.176 
 
In contrast, in the United States of America, the Democrats used a rare parliamentary move to 
change the rules so that federal judicial nominees and executive office appointments can advance 
to confirmation votes by a simple majority of senators, rather than the sixty-vote supermajority 
that has been the standard for nearly four decades.177 Since President Obama was elected, 
Republican senators have often blocked his nominees with no justification, preventing the 
Democrats from having a fair, functioning, and diverse judiciary.178 They have blocked nearly as 
many of President Obama’s nominees as all previous Senates had for all previous Presidents 
combined.179 The effect of the changes is that presidential nominees will now require a simple 
                                                                 
173 Justices Radhakrishnan and Ghose. 
 
174 See (n 171) [22] (Radhakrishnan, J). 
 
175 ibid [17] (Ghose J). 
 
176 ibid [29] (Radhakrishnan, J).  
 
177 Janet Hook and Kristina Peterson, ‘Democrats Rein in Senate Filibusters’ The Wall Street Journal 
( 21 November 2013)  
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majority of senators to be confirmed and so increases their chances of being confirmed by the 
senate. In this regard, under the new rules, the president has been granted an increment in the 
powers of appointment because persons nominated by a president are more likely to be 
confirmed by senators than the position was under the old rules.   
 
In principle, it is not constitutionally intolerable to confer powers of appointment of heads of 
government institutions on the presidency. It is however unconstitutional for a president to 
exercise such powers in a partisan manner, with the aim of allowing domination of public offices 
by persons favourable to a president and a government. This is liable to create a ‘winner-takes-
all; mentality. And in this regard, politics is viewed as a means to wealth and to unlimited state 
powers, and not as a practice intended to serve the country for its advancement. 
 
 States have generally allowed presidents the constitutional powers to appoint heads of 
government institutions. It is however desirable to align such powers with workable mechanisms 
that seek to control presidential appointments in a manner which would prevent abuse and would 
avoid the creation of a partisan civil service in order to make the president accountable to the 
people. This restricts a president to exercising the powers of appointment for the purposes for 
which they are granted by a constitution. In the case of Uganda, the legislature and other 
institutions such as the Judicial Service Commission appear to be designed to check presidential 
appointment powers but in reality, their constitutional powers to ‘approve’ or ‘advise’ the 
president have been disregarded by President Museveni and are therefore inept and they have no 
discernable impact. In some cases, there are no defined procedures to be followed when the 
president is exercising appointment powers. The President has also failed to exercise the powers 
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of appointment in order to fight corruption which is necessary to promote good governance, 
democracy and rule of law. The constitutional constraints against the misuse of the president’s 
power of appointments were either carelessly not fastened effectively, or they were deliberately 
unfastened. This may be deduced from the manner in which they allow a president to be 
supervised by constitutional bodies that are beholden to a presidency. This is symbolic of a 
constitution that endows the presidency with such excessive powers that all institutions that are 
supposed to ensure checks and balances on the powers of the presidency are subservient to the 
presidency.  It is also indicative of a fundamental law designed for the purpose of granting the 
person that is the president unlimited powers.  
 
Thus, the existence of a constitutional mechanism for checking and balancing executive 
excesses, including procedures for impeaching a president for disregarding of the Constitution, 
are ineffective. This denotes a constitution lacks actual constitutionalism; there is a pattern of 
weak institutionalisation and problems with the formal distribution of power between the 
presidency and other arms of government. It is impossible for a document such as the 1995 
Constitution to confer so much authority on the presidency and to confine its powers at the same 
time. The leadership style of President Museveni, his disregard for the constitutional constraints 
that seek to supervise the presidency, have led to the misuse of the presidential authority. The 
President has often encroached on the weak constitutional bodies which are not constitutionally 
empowered to fight back 
 
It suffices to conclude that the presidency established by the 1995 Constitution poses a challenge 
to democracy and constitutionalism which the post-1995 constitutional reforms sought to 
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construct. The Constitution does not provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that the presidency’s 
powers are sufficiently constrained in order to avoid their misuse. Presidential authority has been 
used to serve the President, his government and their supporters.  It is worth recalling that during 
the constitution-making process, the people of Uganda demanded that the exercise of executive 
powers in the areas of senior constitutional appointments, the prerogative of mercy and the 
command of the armed forces should be subject to effective checks and balances to avoid their 
misuse.180 From the above analysis of the way the powers and privileges of the presidency have 
been provided for by the 1995 Constitution and the manner in which they have been exercised 
and enjoyed, it may be stated that this demand was not met. 
 
As the model of executive president established by the 1995 Constitution is similar to those 
found in Constitutions of many states in Africa, I will now discuss how Constitutions in Africa 
generally designate executive presidents. The aims are to illustrate that many states in Africa are 
trapped in this constitutional model of executive presidential excesses and to also address a 
common problem that is affecting African states. 
 
4  Unpacking the African model of executive president 
 
There is no ideal model of a constitution that would be suitable for all countries, however, 
constitutions are often inspired by the need to change the political and social direction of a 
country, often in the aftermath of conflicts, and they are also frequently aimed at redressing the 
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ills and injustices of the past.181 For these reasons, they need to take into account the political 
history of the country; and most notably in Africa, where political leaders have generally 
demonstrated lack of the legitimacy needed to rule, constitutions need to effectively negotiate the 
relationship between governments and the citizenry, to ensure that the state powers exercised by 
leaders are derived from the latter, who can control or withdraw such powers when they are 
misused or abused. This would bestow legitimacy on the leaders because they could be perceived 
as exercising powers granted by the governed. A constitution should also serve as an instrument 
that ensures that the powers of the leaders are constrained by universally accepted principles of 
constitutionalism which I have discussed in section 5 of the previous chapter. 
 
 The establishment of the ‘Big African President’ with untrammeled constitutional powers stands 
in opposition to the concept of constitutionalism and it represents the biggest challenge to 
smooth democratic transition in post-colonial Africa. At least twenty-eight African countries’ 
Constitutions vest executive powers in a president or a prime minister,182 yet some of these 
Constitutions, including that of South Africa, which is widely acclaimed as being one of the most 
                                                                 
181 See for example the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Preamble. 
 
182 These are: Constitution of the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros 2001, art 12; Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999, art 130(2); Constitution of the Gabonese Republic1991, art 8;  Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania 1991, art 2; Constitution of the Republic of Angola 2010, art 108(1); Constitution of the 
Republic of Benin 1990, art 54; Constitution of the Republic of Botswana 1996, art 47; Constitution of the Republic 
of Congo 2001, art 56; Constitution of the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire 2000, art 41; Constitution of the Republic of 
Djibouti 1992, art 21; Constitution of the Republic of Gambia1996, art 76; Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana1992, art 58(1); Constitution of the Republic of Guinea 2010, title III; Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 
2010 art 131(1) (b); Constitution of the Republic of Liberia 1984, art 50; Constitution of  the Republic of Malawi 
1994, art 70; Constitution of the Republic of Mali 1992, art 29; Constitution of Rwanda 2003, art 97; Constitution of 
the Republic of Seychelles 1993, art 66(1);Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1991, art 53(1); Constitution 
of  the Republic of South Africa 1996, art 85(1);Constitution of the State of Eritrea 1997, art 39(2); Constitution of  
the Togolese Republic 1992, title IV; Constitution of the Tun isia Republic 2014, art 71; Constitution of  the 
Republic of Zambia 1991, art 33(2); Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe 2013, art 88(1); Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania 1977, art 34(4). 
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innovative in Africa, do not subject a president to direct elections by the citizenry.183 Thus, the 
exercise of state power by the presidents of these countries is not directly sanctioned by the 
popular will of the populace. Nearly three-quarters of Africa’s heads of state who left power in 
the 1960s and 1970s were ousted through a coup d’état, violent overthrow or assassination.184 
Arguably, this is because Constitutions in Africa make it impossible for the incumbent president 
to be removed from power through constitutional processes. Today, the ‘Big Men’ of Africa 
continue to tinker with their countries’ Constitutions in order to maintain their hold on power. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that those Presidents who have managed to manipulate 
Constitutions of their countries in their favour have held power the longest.185Another 
unsurprising fact is that the other category of long-serving Presidents in Africa managed to hold 
power because their country’s Constitution do not impose limits on the re-election of the head of 
state.186 
 
                                                                 
183 Under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, art 86(1) the president is elected by the National 
Assembly from among its members; also see the Constitution  of Mauritius 1968, art 28(2) (a) (i) which provides that 
a president is elected by the National Assembly.  
 
184 Dan Posner & Daniel Young, ‘The Institutionalisation of Political Power in Africa’ [2007] 18 Journal of 
Democracy 127, 131. 
 
185 Seven Presidents, most of the longest-serving leaders in their countries post-independence history and in Africa, 
secured constitutional amendments that allowed them to stand for more terms in office and all seven won the 
subsequent elections. These are Presidents Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso who was forced to resign  in 
November 2014 as a result of a popular uprising in his country following his second attempt to amend  his country’s 
Constitution to allow him to run for a fifth  term. He had been in power for 27 years; IdrissDeby of Chad who has 
held the reigns for 24 years; Omar Bongo of Gabon ruled his country for over 41 years until his death in October 
2011, Lansana Conte of Guinea held power from April 1984 until his death in December 2008; Sam Nujoma of 
Namibia held power from 1990to 2005; Gnassing Beeyadema of Togo held power from 1967 until his death in 
2005; Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has now been in power for 28 years. See Daniel Vencovsky, ‘Presidential Term 
Limits In Africa’ (Conflict Trends Issue No. 24, 2007) 4. 
 
186 These include Emperor King Haile Selassie, who was deposed from power in Ethiopia in 1974 after 44 years ; 
Muammer Gaddafi of Libya, who ruled for almost 42 years; Teodoro Obiang Nguema, Equatorial Guinea seized 
power in a coup on 3 August 1979. He has been in power since; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe the only remaining 
African leader to have been continuously in power since his country's independence. He became Prime Minister in 
April 1980 and President in 1987. He has held the office of the President for 27 years. ibid .5 
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The most significant innovation of post-colonial African leaders is the manner in which they 
have perpetuated their incumbency through constitutions. Arguably; civil wars, corruption, 
poverty, ethnic or religious tensions which have afflicted post-colonial Africa are as a result of 
Constitutions that have entrenched governments in power without the possibility of change 
through constitutional processes. Since the advent of independence in the 1960’s, more than one 
hundred and eighty presidents have held power in different African countries but less than 
twenty-percent of that number have relinquished power or retired voluntarily.187 
 
It is the void of constitutionalism, created as the result of bestowing excessive powers on 
presidents and their governments, which makes it impossible to transfer power through 
constitutional processes, the reason why Africans have resorted to waging wars to access 
political power. The paradox in Africa is that it is almost impossible for a change of government 
to occur through elections.188 Yet most African Constitutions provide that elections are the only 
legitimate way of transferring political power.189 However, elections serve no democratic 
                                                                 
 
187 These include Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; Leopold Senghor of Senegal;  Nelson Mandela of South Africa and 
Quitt Masire of Botswana who voluntarily relinquished power and paved the way for smooth transfers of political 
power.  
 
188 According to a recent study, from 1990 to 2012 opposition parties in African States were able to take power in 
only one of every twenty-eight elections. See Giovanni Carbon, Elections and leadership changes: How do 
political leaders take (and Leave) power in Africa (Consultancy Africa Intelligence 2014) 7. 
 
189 These are: Constitution of Burkina Faso 1991, art 37; Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005, 
art 5; Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995, art 8; Constitution of the Federal Islamic 
Republic of Comoros 2001, art 3; Constitution of Gabonese Republic1991, arts 3 and 4; Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania 1991, art 2; Constitution of the New Arab Republic of Egypt 2012, art 136;  Constitution of 
the Republic of Angola 2010, art 4(1); Constitution of the Republic of Benin 1990, arts 3-6; Constitution of the 
Republic of Burundi 2005, arts 7 and 8 ; Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1972, art 2; Constitution of the 
Republic of Cape Verde 1992, arts 4 and 111; Constitution of the Republic of Congo 2001, art 3; Constitution of 
the Republic of  Djibouti 1992, art 4; Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 2; Constitution of 
Guinea-Bissau 1984, art 2; Constitution of the Republic of  Kenya 2010, art1(2) read with art 81; Constitution of 
the Republic of Liberia1984, art 2; Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1994, art 6; Constitution of the Togolese 
Republic 1992, art 5; Constitution of the Tunisian Republic 2012, art 1 (3); Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 
1995, art 1. 
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purpose as they offer no prospect of change governments as the incumbent president is often 
constitutionally empowered to appoint heads of electoral management bodies.190 Also, there is 
usually no envisaged end to the tenure of office of some of the executive presidents whose only 
constitutional limit to power is age.191 Some Constitutions do not impose age restrictions on the 
presidency,192 thereby allowing presidents to govern for life. Constitutions in Africa generally 
allow the presidency command over the armed forces,193 which more often than not they have 
used as a weapon of coercion against political adversaries and citizenry, and as an instrument to 
arbitrate political disputes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
190 See Constitution of Burkina Faso1991, art 153; Constitution of Ghana 1992, art 43 read with art 70; Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Somalia 2012, art 89; Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, art 60; Constitution 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe 2013, art 91; Constitution of the Togolese Republic 1992, art 59; Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania 1977, art 74. 
 
191 See Constitution of  the Federal Republic of Somalia 2012, art 89; Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania 1991, art 28 states that the president of the Republic is eligible for re-election; Constitution of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 1996, art 74; Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1972, art 5(2) ; 
Constitution of the Republic of Djibouti 1992, art 23 read with art 24; Constitution of the Republic of  Mauritius 
1968, art 28(2)(a)(ii); Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, art 105(1) - (2); Constitution of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2013, art 29. 
 
192 See Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 34 read with art 35; Constitution of the Republic 
of Zimbabwe 2013, art 91. 
 
193 See Constitution of  Burkina Faso 1991, art 52; Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005, art 83; 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995, art 74(1) allows a prime minster who is vested 
with executive power, command of the armed forces; Constitution of the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros 
2001, art 12; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, art 130(2); Constitution of the Republic of 
Gabon 1991, art 22; Constitution of  the Republic of Angola 2010, art 108(1); Constitution of Burundi 2005, art 
110; Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1972, art 8(2); Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde 1980, art 
147(1) (a); Constitution of the Republic of Congo 2001, arts 77 and 78; Constitution of the Republic of  Cote 
D'Ivoire 2000, art 47; Constitution of the Republic of Djibouti 1992, art 32; Constitution of the Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 40; Constitution of the Republic of  Gambia1996, art 188(1); Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana 1992, art 57(1); Constitution of the Republic of Guinea 2010, art 47; Constitution of the 
Republic of Guinea-Bissau 1984, art 65; Constitution of the Republic of  Kenya 2010, art 131(1) (c); Constitution 
of the Republic Liberia 1984, art 50;  Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1994, art 78; Constitution of the 
Republic of Mali 1992, art 44; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003, art 110; Constitution of the Republic 
of Seychelles 1993, art 50; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1996, art 202(1); Constitution of the State 
of Eritrea 1997, art 39(1); Constitution of the Togolese Republic 1992, art 72; Constitution of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2013, art 89;  Constitution of the United Republic of  Tanzania 1977, art 33(2). 
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Presidents are above the law as they are not subjected to legal proceedings during their tenure of 
office.194As a result they can break the law, so can their supporters or allies, to whom a president 
can extend the powers of pardon and commutation deriving from the constitutionally vested 
unquestionable power of clemency.195 Constitutions declare the president as the most important 
person in the country or the first and most important citizen,196 which has often allowed 
presidents to rule their countries as if they are managing their personal property. A president may 
appoint and dismiss the entire civil service at will.197 Parliament, which is supposed to be one of 
the constitutional institutions for checking and balancing presidential authority, is beholden to a 
                                                                 
194 See Constitution of  Southern  Sudan 2011, art 103; Constitution of the Republic of Angola 2010, art 127; 
Constitution of the Republic of Congo 2001, art 87 the only exception is high treason; the Constitution of the 
Republic of Gambia 1996, art 69; Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 57 (4)-(6); Constitution of the 
Republic of Guinea 2010, art 37; Constitution of  the Republic of Kenya 2010, art 143(1) the immunity however 
does not extend to crimes for which the president may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and 
which prohibits such immunity; Constitution of  the Republic Liberia 1984, art 61; Constitution of the Republic of  
Malawi 1994, art 91; Constitution of the Republic of Namibia 1990, art 31; Constitution of the Republic of  
Rwanda 2003, art 115; Constitution of the Republic of  Sierra Leone  1991, art 48(4); Constitution of the State of 
Eritrea 1977, art 43 the only exception where a president is faced with impeachment; Constitution of the Republic 
of  Uganda 1995 art 98(5); Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 1991 art 43; Constitution of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe 2013 art 88; Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania1977, art 46. 
 
195  See Constitution of Islamic Republic of Mauritania 1991, art 37; Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, 
art 33; Constitution of the Republic of Liberia 1984, art 59; Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1994, art 89(2); 
Constitution of the Republic of Mali 1992, art 45; Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius 1991, art 75(2) requires 
the president to act on the advice of the Commission on the Prerogative of Mercy. Members of the Commission on 
Prerogative Mercy are appointed by the president; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003, art 111; 
Constitution of the Republic of  Sierra Leon 1991, art 63; Constitution of  the Republic of Zimbabwe 2013, art 121 
allows a president to exercise prerogative mercy after consultation with the Cabinet  appointed by the president; 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, art 45; Constitution of Uganda 1995, art 122 (1) creates an 
Advisory Committee on the Prerogative Mercy to advice a president on the exercise of pardon. The seven members 
of the Committee are appointed by the president. 
 
196  See Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 32; Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
1992, art 57(2); Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, art 98(2); Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe 
2013, art 27(2). 
 
197  See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia 2012, art 117; Constitution of the Republic of Angola 
2010, art 119; Constitution of the Republic of  Burundi 2005, art 111; Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 
1972, art 8(10); Constitution of the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire 2000, art 46; Constitution of the Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 39(g);  Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, art 134(c); Constitution of the 
Republic of Liberia 1984, art 56; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003, art 113; Constitution of Tunisian 
Republic 2014, art 78;  Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe 2013, art 74; Constitution of the United Republic 
of Tanzania 1977, art 56. 
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president who can disband it at whatever time of his or her choosing.198 The impeachment 
provisions are inadequate as a deterrent tool to ensure that a president complies with their 
constitutional and other legal obligations because of the of number of members of Parliament 
that is required to trigger the motion to impeach a president,199 who often enjoys majority 
support in a partisan Parliament. The presidency has the sole power to issue decrees.200 It may 
also initiate amendments to the constitution201 which could potentially allow a president to 
                                                                 
198 See Constitution of the Islamic Republic of  Mauritania 1991, art 31 allows the president to dissolve Parliament 
and call fresh elections at any time after consultation with the vice president and prime minister who  are both 
appointed by the president; the Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 66 permits a president 
to order the dissolution of the National Assembly and organise new elect ions at any time; Constitution of the 
Republic of Guinea 2010, art 96 allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly and call elections if there 
are persistent disagreements. A president is however only allowed to do so in the third year of the National 
Assembly’s four-year tenure; Constitution of the Republic of Mali 1992, art 42 allows the president in consultation 
with the pprime minister appointed by the president to dissolve the National Assembly and call for elections at any 
time; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003, art 133 allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly 
if there national interests, after consultation with the prime minister, both presidents of the Chambers of Parliament 
and  the president of the Supreme Court; Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles 1993, art 110 allows a president 
to dissolve the National Assembly for any reason which the president considers to be in the national interest after 
giving seven days’ notice to the Speaker; Constitution of the Republic of Togo 1992, art 68  allows the president to 
dissolve Parliament for any reason after consultation with the prime minister who is appointed by the president.  
 
199  See Constitution of the Federal Republic of  Nigeria 1999, art 143(2) requires half of the members of Parliament 
to approve a motion to initiate proceedings against the president; Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, art 
145 provides that one-third of members of the National Assembly are required to trigger impeachment proceedings 
against the president; Constitution of  the Republic of Malawi 1994, art 86 requires half of the members of the 
National Assembly to sign a motion initiating impeachment proceedings against a president; Constitution of the 
Republic of Seychelles 2011, art 54(1) provides that a motion proposing  impeachment proceedings against the 
president must be signed by half of the members of the National Assembly; Constitution of the Republic of  Sierra 
Leone 1991, art 51(1) mandates that not less than one-half of all the Members of Parliament must sign a motion 
alleging that a president has committed any violation of the Constitution or any gross misconduct in the 
performance of the functions of his office and specifying the particulars of the allegation, in order to trigger 
impeachment proceedings against a president. 
 
200 See Constitution of Burkina Faso 1991, art 58; Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005, art 
218(1); Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 1991, art 71; Constitution of the Republic of Angola 
2010, arts 125-126; Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon1972, art 8(8); Constitution of the Republic of  
Congo 2001, art 81; Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 41; Constitution of the Republic of 
Guinea 2010, art 46; Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau 1984, art 67 (11); Constitution of the Republic 
of Rwanda 2003, art 63. 
 
201 See Constitution of the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros 2001, art 42; Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania 1991, art 99; Constitution of the Republic of Angola 2010, art 233; Constitution of the Republic of 
Cameroon 1972, art 63(1); Constitution of the Republic of  Congo 2001, art 185;Constitution of the Republic of 
Djibouti 1992, art 91; Constitution of the Republic of Guinea 2010, art 152; Constitution of the Republic of 
Rwanda 2003, art 93; Constitution of the State of Eritrea 1997, art 59(1). 
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propose and to effect amendments to provisions relating to the presidency202 in order to fortify 
power. A president may also suspend the Constitution.203 This design of the presidency suffers 
from a constitutionalism deficit. It also breeds violent struggles for political power because there 
is not prospect of replacing the incumbent president and government through constitutional 
means. It also does not provide sufficient mechanisms for meaningfully tempering a president’s 
actions. Thus, most constitutions in Africa do not provide sufficient checks and balances on the 
presidency, despite the rhetoric suggesting that the exercise of executive power is subject to 
checks and balances by the legislature and the judiciary. Presidents and their governments rule 
under the constitution but not according to the norms of constitutionalism. In practice, the 
legislature and the judiciary are incapable of moderating presidential and governmental 
authority. Often, constitutions can be easily amended at the initiative of the president to allow the 
ruling regime to consolidate and advance its ambitions. Several state positions and the financial 
benefits that go along with such positions are dependent on the patronage of a president. Most 
prominent government positions and offices are occupied by persons who owe allegiance to the 
president who has the constitutional mandate to appoint and to dismiss the entire civil service 
almost at will.   
 
Civil servants misappropriate foreign aid and state funds without fear of being brought to 
account because they are only answerable to the president. The armed forces are made up of 
people of the same tribe as the president, who can be trusted, because a president has to depend 
                                                                 
202 See Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 102-103; Constitution of the Republic of  
Liberia 1986, art 93 allows for the amendment of the presidential term limits provided the amendment does not 
become effective during the term of office of the incumbent president. 
 
203 See Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 1991, art 42(d) allows the president to suspend the 
Constitution in the event of terrorist attacks or mutiny and sentence those involved according to the gravity of the 
situation. 
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on them for power. Constitutions in Africa, often, do not make provision that the armed forces 
must reflect the ethnic diversity of the country. Assets of the state are sold into the private 
ownership of the president’s family and supporters on instructions of the president. Public 
service jobs and lucrative state businesses opportunities are accessed only by the ruling 
government’s supporters. Presidential constitution excesses may also be responsible for creating 
two societies in African countries namely, the extremely wealthy who are supporters of the 
president and the ruling government, and the poor who are not. These are some of the possible 
effects of the domineering presidential systems found in Constitutions of most African countries. 
The other notable fact is that in those countries where the domineering executive presidential 
model exists, Constitutions have either been sponsored by the ruling governments or they have 
been dubiously amended so as to provide incremental powers to the presidency.204 Thus their 
popular and legal legitimacy are questionable. It is therefore not surprising that when the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) declared that it would investigate Presidents Omar al- Bashir 
and Uhuru Kenyatta of Sudan and Kenya respectively, for committing international crimes 
against their people, African heads of state have attempted to convince Africans that the ICC is a 
colonial tool seeking to re-establish colonialism.205 Consequently, they have moved to expand 
the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, to create a regional legal 
framework for international crimes under which heads of state, ministers and government 
officials are provided with immunity from prosecution.206  This is because, for many African 
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205 See Joel Kimathi, ‘ICC is a racist and imperialist court- UHURU says as he tells Bensouda to respect Kenya’s 
sovereignty’ Daily Post (Nairobi, 23 October 2013) 2. 
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leaders, constitutions have not imposed any legal limits to their powers. Therefore, their 
authority had not been questioned and they had not faced legal scrutiny before the ICC’s 
operations. 
 
Fed up with immovable African presidents and political dynasties, Africans across the continent 
are joining forces in the hope that they may ‘turn the page’ on leaders who have consolidated 
power through constitutions. For example, in Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore was driven out by 
his people in October 2014 after twenty seven years of rule; however, President Paul Biya of 
Cameroon and his Congolese counterpart Denis Sassou Nguesso have each accumulated more 
than thirty years in power.  Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe has been president for thirty-eight years; 
Angola’s José Eduardo dos Santos for thirty six; Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema 
Mbasogo for thirty three; and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni for twenty nine. At the time of 
writing, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Joseph Kabila is seeking to hang on to 
power at the end of his second term despite article 70 of the Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2011 providing that limiting the term of a president to five years renewable 
once, while President Pierre Nkurunziza’s of Burundi has defied a two-term constitutional limits 
on the re-election of the president imposed by article 96 of the Constitution of Burundi 2005 to 
run for a third term, although the Constitutional Court has ruled in the case of Décisionde Cour 
Constitutionnelle du Burundi validant la candidature du Président Pierre Nkurunziza ả un 
troisieme mandate présidentiel207that the President is eligible  for re-election. Also, President 
Kagame of Rwanda seems to be hinting that he might support a constitutional amendment that 
would allow him to run for a third term. When asked whether he would support the idea, he is 
reported to have responded that, ‘let’s wait and see what happens as we go- whatever will 
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happen, we'll have an explanation’.208 The election in Nigerian, in March 2015, and the 
subsequent peaceful power transition from the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan to his 
opponent General Muhammadu Buhari should have delighted Africans everywhere as Nigeria 
marked its first ever democratic change of power. The election highlighted just how unusual it is 
to vote an incumbent government out of power. 
 
The new wave of constitutional review that is currently sweeping across West Africa deserves a 
brief mentioning. At least six countries in the sub-region; Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Sierra Leone are currently reviewing their constitutions. Does this wave of 
constitutional reform signal a new era of recognition and acceptance of democratic processes in 
West Africa? Or does it merely reflect a trend of governments initiating constitutional reviews in 
order to surreptitiously attempt to subvert the democratic process through ‘legitimately-accepted’ 
means? 
 
I will now examine how Benin, which like Uganda has in the past experienced all forms of 
misrule, has developed constitutional mechanisms to control and moderate the powers of the 
institution of the presidency. I will also compare the constitutional mechanisms in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Benin 1990209 to those in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda in 
order to draw lessons for Uganda and many countries in Africa on creating a limited presidency. 
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5  Lessons from Benin 
 
5.1 Background to the constitutional reforms in Benin 
 
Like Uganda, Benin has between the period 1963 to 1989, experienced several coup d’états,210 
constitution abrogation,211 political instability,212 military rule, ethnicisation and personalisation 
of state power.213 Also similar to the Uganda, every head of state and government that came to 
power in Benin created a constitutional order that allowed them to consolidate state power.214 
Towards the end of President Mathieu Kérékou’s first regime, the country agreed to the idea of a 
first national conference as part of the so-called ‘third wave’ of democratisation.215 The 
renowned Conférence des Forces Vives de la Nation was held in February 1990. Liberal 
                                                                 
210 Between 1963 and 1972 the Benin experienced eight coups. See Monty Marshal and Benjamin Cole, ‘Conflicts 
Trends in Africa’ (Center for Systemic Peace Publications 2005) Annex B.  
  
211  Benin adopted ten fundamental laws which were all sponsored by different regimes that were in power. These 
are the Constitutions of 28 February 1959; 26 November 1960; 11 January 1964; the Charters of 1 September 1966; 
11 April 1968; the Ordinances of 26 December 1969; 7 May 1970; 18 November 1974; the Fundamental Law of 26 
August 1977 amended by the Constitutional Act of 6 March 1984 and the Constitutional Act of 13 August 1990, 
which served as a constitution for the transition to democracy. See Bruce Magnusson, ‘Testing Democracy in 
Benin’ in Richard Joseph (ed), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa  (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999) 203, 207. 
 
212 Benin had 11 governments  between 1963 and 1972 that all come to power after overthrowing the previous 
governments. The country also had the unusual phenomenon of a collegial presidency with three heads of s tate, 
known as ‘Presidential Triumvira’ experienced between 1970 and 1972.  See ibid 208.  
 
213 President General Mathieu Kérékou took power on October 1972 and ruled for 17 years. Almost all government 
positions were held by people of his tribe and he imposed a tight ban on freedoms. The regime actively abused the 
human rights of its citizens and transformed the country into a police state, sending the opposition  underground.  
See ibid 221. 
 
214 ibid 204. 
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Africa’ in Charles Fombad and Christian Murray (eds), Fostering Constitutionalism in Africa  (Pretoria University 
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democracy, the rule of law, separation of powers and human rights were at the heart of this new 
era of democratic revival, which the country sought.216 
 
In the pursuit of these objectives, the new constitution that emerged was as a result of a popular 
endeavour: a referendum.217 The debates on the adoption of the Constitution of Benin 1990 
focused on democratisation and the protection of fundamental rights due to the grave violations 
of the past. The new Constitution also addressed the problems of minimising excessive powers 
exercised by previous heads of state. As John Heilbrunn observes, the Constitution Commission 
was tasked with drafting a new constitution emphasising a strong rejection of dictatorship, one-
man power, and disrespect for the rule of law, which were the main features of the previous 
governments.218 
 
5.2 Checks and balances on the presidency under the Benin Constitution 1990 and the 
1995 Constitution of Uganda 
 
The Constitution of Benin 1990 opted for an executive presidential system embodying common 
features of modern constitutionalism. It is grounded in the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
the rule of law and liberal democracy which are reflected in many of its provisions. It designates 
a president as the holder of executive powers.219 Parliament may introduce Bills,220 and the 
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presidency is also able to propose Bills.221 A state of siege and of emergency may only be 
decreed by the presidency, ‘after the advice’ of Parliament.222 Any extension of the state of siege 
and that of emergency beyond fifteen days must be approved by Parliament.223 
 
The provisions regarding the declaration of a state of emergency differs from those under the 
1995 Constitution in two major ways that limit the wanton use of the emergency powers by a 
president. The 1995 Constitution provides that a president may in consultation with the cabinet, 
issue a proclamation declaring a state of emergency224 and this power is closely monitored by 
Parliament and the Human Rights Commission.225 
 
Firstly, the cabinet of Uganda consists of ministers who are appointed by a president with the 
approval of Parliament226 and who may also be dismissed by the president.227 The ministers may 
also be censured by Parliament.228 As I have demonstrated in section 3.5 of this chapter, the 
safeguards purporting to ensure scrutiny of the president’s powers of appointments are 
ineffective and so in practice, Parliament has no meaningful role in approving presidential 
appointments. The president has therefore, a freehand in appointing members of the cabinet.  The 
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cabinet appointed by a president cannot be relied upon to exercise an independent view from that 
of the appointing authority to which it owes allegiance. The other institutions established to 
monitor the declaration of a state of emergency namely, the Human Rights Commission and 
Parliament are also not insulated from presidential influence in that the Commission’s 
Chairperson and Commissioners are presidential appointees,229 and at the time of writing, 
President Museveni’s party enjoys the majority in Parliament.230 In the case of Benin, by 
mandating that a president can only authorise a state of emergency ‘after the advice’ of 
Parliament, although the president is not bound by such advice, the Constitution of Benin 
requires that the advice of a less partisan body – the Parliament of Benin, must be sought before 
a state of emergency is declared. This differs to the practice in Uganda where the president 
authority to declare a state of emergency is supervised by bodies which are indebted to a 
president. 
 
Second, the use of the term ‘after the advice ‘although it does not dissimilar in literal meaning 
from the term ‘in consultation’ which is used in the 1995 Constitution, acts as a constitutional 
requirement aimed at ensuring that the advice, albeit not the consent, of the National Assembly is 
sought before such a declaration is made. In the case of Benin, where such advice is not sought, 
the Constitutional Court of Benin is empowered to step in of its own accord in order to ensure 
that the presidency conforms to its constitutional obligation.231 The Constitutional Court of 
Uganda has no such powers. 
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In an effort to curtail another common practice by African leaders of misappropriating state 
assets, the Constitution of Benin 1990 provides that the president, whether in person or through 
an intermediary, is prohibited from purchasing or leasing state assets without the approval of the 
Constitutional Court under conditions prescribed by law.232 Similarly, a president is required to 
declare his personal wealth on commencing, and at the end of their presidency.233 The president 
may be impeached where it is proven that he or she authored, co-authored or was an accomplice 
in embezzlement, corruption, or illegal enrichment.234 There are no such constraints on the 
presidency of Uganda. It has been reported that President Museveni has embezzled state 
assets.235 Such a provision in the 1995 Constitution would have indicated, at least on paper, a 
constitutional intention for a president to adhere to the principles of good governance in order to 
manage the country’s resources responsibly for the benefit of all Ugandans. 
 
In a further expression of a clear demarcation of the powers of the three arms of government, the 
Constitution of Benin 1990 provides that judicial power is independent of legislative power and 
of presidential power, 236 and it is exercised by the courts and tribunals established in accordance 
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with the Constitution.237 Members of Parliament, also known as ‘deputies’ are elected by 
universal suffrage, for a four-year term and may be re-elected.238 The two main constitutional 
functions of Parliament, as expressed by the Constitution of Benin, are to make laws239 and to 
control government action.240 Parliament may refer the president to the High Court of Justice for 
impeachment proceedings,241 thus allowing controls over the presidency and subjecting that 
control to judicial scrutiny by the other arms of government. The notable difference from the 
1995 Constitution is the clearly stated role of Parliament242 and the judicial examination of the 
impeachment process by a judiciary that is not indebted to the presidency.243 
 
Unlike the 1995 Constitution, 244 Benin’s Constitution does not insulate a serving president from 
legal proceedings. In addition, where the president is indicted for high treason, insult to the 
National Assembly and any injury to honor and honesty, they may be suspended from duties and 
if convicted, may forfeit the office.245 Acts and omissions of deputies, including those of the 
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president carried out in the course of their constitutional duties enjoy ‘Parliamentary Immunity’ 
and as such they may not be investigated, arrested, detained, or prosecuted for opinions issued in 
the discharge of their state duties.246 
 
While members of Uganda’s Parliament are not prohibited from acquiring ministerial 
positions,247 in an added affirmation of separation of powers, the Constitution of Benin prohibits 
deputies from holding ministerial positions.248 Members of the cabinet may also not hold 
parliamentary positions.249 A deputy’s right to vote in Parliament is personal and he or she may 
only once in a term vote in support of their political party.250 These provisions would have been 
useful to control President Museveni’s flagrant quest for power in two significant ways. First, the 
President has used cabinet ministers, who are members of Parliament, to carry out his motions in 
Parliament, including the 2005 amendment to repeal the term limits on the re-election of a 
president.251 Second, the personal right to vote in Parliament would have prevented partisan 
approaches towards legislative matters and, therefore, would have insulated parliamentarians 
from being bullied by the President into implementing his wishes.  
 
Another illustration of the constitutional restraints on the exercise of the powers of the 
presidency may be viewed by the controls on the issuing of decrees.  The Constitution of Benin 
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empowers the presidency to issue decrees in exceptional measures required by the 
circumstances, however constitutional rights may not be suspended.252 In the case of DCC 27-
94,253 the Constitutional Court of Benin held that the power to issue decrees in exceptional 
measures constitutes a discretionary act of a president, an act of government which may not be 
subject to constitutionality checks except as to the forms in which it is exercised. The Court’s 
decision indicates that the presidency’s power to issue decrees may only be exercised within the 
forms prescribed by the Constitution. To avoid its abuse, two caveats are provided in the 
Constitution. First, Parliament is empowered to determine the period within which a president 
may issue decrees.254 Thus, the Court has pronounced in the case of DCC 96-023, that such 
powers may be exercised within the parameters of what Parliament permits.255 Second, the use of 
such powers must be aimed at quickly providing public and constitutional institutions the means 
to discharge their duties,256 thus defining the purposes for which a president may issue a decree.  
 
In the case of Uganda, a president is required to lay before Parliament, for approval, a 
declaration of state of emergency not later than fourteen days after the president has issued such 
a declaration; Parliament may extend such a declaration for nine days at a time; and Parliament 
or the president may, revoke such a declaration where the circumstances for which it was issued 
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have seized to exist.257 However, in reality, Parliament’s role in supervising these powers is 
negligible considering its record of subservience to the President Museveni and its 
ineffectiveness as an organ for checking presidential excesses, as well as the President’s 
contempt for Parliament and the Constitution.258 Also, the purposes for which the powers may be 
put to use is not defined by the 1995 Constitution, it is left at the discretion of a president and the 
cabinet259 they have appointed, and as such they are open to abuse. It is also important to note 
that under article 110 (3) of the 1995 Constitution, a declaration of a state of emergency issued 
by a president may only be scrutinised by Parliament not later than thirteen days of being issued. 
Therefore for a period of up to twelve days at most, before Parliament can examine the purpose 
for which the powers have been put to use, they are open for abuse 
 
The Constitution of Benin 1990 provides Parliament with various tools to bring the presidency to 
account. These include oral questions with or without debate, written questions, interpellations, 
and a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry.260 The interpellation control mechanisms, 
empowers Parliament to summon a president to appear before it to explain government actions, 
and a president is compelled to attend or instruct a minister to appear.261  In contrast, the 1995 
Constitution of Uganda mandates the president to deliver to Parliament an address on the state of 
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the nation at the beginning of each session of Parliament, and to address Parliament from time to 
time, on any matter of national importance.262 
 
5.3 The Constitutional Court’s supervision of a president 
 
The Constitution of Benin establishes a powerful Constitutional Court charged with examining 
the constitutionality of laws, guaranteeing fundamental human rights and public liberties, and 
also acts as the regulatory body for the functions of institutions and for the activities of public 
authorities.263 The Court has played a major role in checking and balancing presidential 
authority. For example, Bills which may be initiated by the presidency264 must obtain the legal 
opinion of the Court before they are introduced.265 Also, laws may only be promulgated after the 
Constitutional Court has declared them consistent with the Constitution.266 The Constitutional 
Court may on its own initiative carry out a review of any laws that are likely to infringe human 
rights.267 The Court is also vested with the powers to declare laws enforceable where the 
president fails to approve a law that has been passed by the National Assembly.268 A provision 
declared unconstitutional may not be promulgated or enforced.269 Decisions of the Constitutional 
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Court are not appealable270 and they are binding on public authorities and all civil, military, and 
jurisdictional authorities.271 The Court has pronounced its independence from the executive, for 
example in the case of DCC 01-018; it held that an order by the Minister of Justice to release a 
detainee constituted an interference with the judiciary and therefore a violation of the 
Constitution.272 Further illustration of the Court’s independence and competence over the 
executive can be found in the case of DCC 07-175.273 Justice Conceptia D. Ounsou who 
delivered the Court’s judgement quashed a presidential decree suspending the execution of a 
court order and declared it a violation of the Constitution, as it interfered with the independence 
of the judiciary. 274 
 
The Constitutional Court’s commitment to checking legislative and presidential powers and to 
protecting the sanctity of the Constitution is also demonstrated through its scrutiny of 
constitutional amendments. In the case of DCC 06-074, the Court dismissed attempts to amend 
the Constitution on the grounds that the fundamental law had been adopted by the people 
through a national consensus following the 1990 national conference and, therefore, cannot be 
altered by a minority.275 The logic is that constitutionalism at minimum requires that national 
consensus ought to preside over major amendments to the Constitution. As the Constitution was 
adopted following national consensus, its major provisions can only be amended the same way. 
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The case concerned an amendment effected by members of Parliament behind closed doors to 
extend their term of office from four to five years. The Court also rejected the economic 
arguments in the cases of DCC 05-139276 and of DCC 05-145277 as it considered them not 
constitutionally justified, and not a basis for extending the tenure of the presidency. The 
arguments were advanced to seek an amendment to the Constitution in order to extend the 
constitutional limits on the presidential terms towards the end of the last term of President 
Mathieu Kérékou’s second regime. 
 
The Constitutional Court also adjudicates all matters relating to the functioning of state organs 
such as the designation, appointments and dismissal of holders of public office, including the 
office of the president.278 It determines the constitutionality of laws including proposed laws 
before promulgation.279 Thus, the constitutionality of the laws may be reviewed a priori - before 
the Bill is enacted, and a posterior - when an existing law may be brought before the Court for 
constitutional scrutiny.280All acts, decisions and actions of the presidency, the legislature and the 
judiciary are reviewable by the Constitutional Court.281 The Court also has a mandate over all 
disputes arising from the relationship between branches of the state.282 It may therefore be stated 
that the Court’s powers to review the constitutionality of laws and the actions of the legislature, 
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judiciary and the executive are aimed at protecting and promoting the interest of the populace 
against misuse of state powers who would otherwise have to challenge such acts in the courts 
perhaps through private litigation. 
 
The mechanism through which Benin’s Constitutional Court reviews the exercise of state powers 
by the other arms of government, particularly the executive is a rare innovation in African 
constitutional designs. In the case of Uganda, the Constitutional Court’s role is limited to 
interpreting the Constitution.283 The Court has no mandate to initiate reviews of the 
constitutionality of proposed and enacted legislation or the 1995 Constitution in the interest of 
the people. Furthermore, the 1995 Constitution does not compel the presidency or the legislature 
to seek the approval of the Court on the constitutionality of proposed laws. Such powers in the 
1995 Constitution would have allowed the Constitution Court of Uganda to initiate reviews of 
the constitutionality of laws enacted under the NRM government which are aimed at 
criminalising and stifling political challenges and are also incompatible with human rights,284 as 
well as the amendment to the 1995 Constitution to remove limits on the re-election of the 
president285 before they were passed. 
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 The usefulness of granting the Constitutional Court of Uganda similar powers as exercised by 
the Constitution Court of Benin is highlighted by events that unfolded recently, which are 
reminiscent of Obote’s first government in the case ofGrace Stuart Ibingira and others v 
Uganda.286 In this instance, in the case of Muwanga Kivumbi v Attorney General,287the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda declared section 32 of the Police Act, Chapter 303 
unconstitutional. The provision allowed the Inspector General of Police to prohibit the convening 
of any assembly. However, the NRM government has enacted the Public Order and Management 
Act 2013 to restore the powers of the inspector general of police. The Act clearly imposes 
conditions which are inconsistent with the enjoyment of the freedom of assembly.288 Moreover, 
the 1995 Constitution prohibits Parliament from passing laws in order to alter the decision or 
judgment of any court.289 Enactment of such a law symbolises the authoritarian use of laws to 
stifle alternative political activities. It is also indicative the government’s disregard of the 
Constitution. Under the Constitution of Benin1990, the constitutionality and human rights 
compliance of the Public Order and Management Act would have been reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court both a priori and a posteriori. The constitutional prohibition from passing 
law for the purposes of defeating a decision of a court would certainly render the enactment of 
the Public Order and Management Act unconstitutional even before examining the human rights 
compliance of its provisions. 
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The other laudable novelty is the power of Benin’s Constitutional Court to enact laws that have 
been passed by Parliament but not approved by a president.290 It may be argued that the Court’s 
power to enact laws interferes with the legislative role of Parliament; however, as Parliament 
would have already passed the Bill, its enactment by the Court prevents a president from using 
the presidential power to veto the Bill unjustly as has sometimes been the case in Uganda.291 
 
The supervisory powers of the Constitutional Court also serve as a reminder to the president of 
Benin that presidential authority is under constant judicial scrutiny. Thus the Court acts as a 
deterrent to its misuse. 
 
5.4 The president’s power of appointment 
 
In relation to the appointments of top civil servants, as provided for by the 1995 Constitution, the 
Constitution of Benin also allows the presidency to appoint senior civil servants and senior army 
officers after an ‘advisory opinion’ from the National Assembly.292 The wording ‘after an 
advisory opinion’ indicates that the president may not appoint a civil servant before guidance is 
                                                                 
 
290 See (n 268). 
 
291 The 1995 Constitution (n 2), art 91 provides that the Bill of Parliament must be signed by the president within 
thirty days or be returned to Parliament to be amended or where the Bill is returned to Parliament for the third time 
and it receives the support of at least two-thirds of the members of Parliament. It shall become law without the 
president assenting to it. The Marriage and Divorce Bill 2009 was passed by Parliament but for four years President 
Museveni did not assent to it. After the bill was passed by Parliament and sent to the President, it was neither signed 
nor returned to Parliament for four years.  See The Ugandan Association of Women Lawyers, Women’s Rights in 
Uganda; Gaps between Policy and Practice (Uganda Association of Women Lawyers Publication 1 May 2013)11.  
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sought and given by the National Assembly.293 It also suggests that a president is not bound to 
follow the advice of the National Assembly but may not ignore such advice without a good 
reason. This may be inferred from the wording in other provisions such as ‘after the 
advice’294which suggests that the advice sought by the president is only meant to guide the 
president in the exercise of appointment powers. Notably, unlike in Uganda, when a president 
fails to seek the advice on the appointments or where the advisory opinion is ignored without 
good reason, the Constitutional Court of Benin has the power to intervene.295 
 
A president may also appoint top army officers as well as diplomats.296 He or she may only 
appoint three of the seven members of the Constitutional Court297 for a five-year term renewable 
once.298Apart from the three members of the Constitutional Court, all other presidential 
appointments must be made ‘after an advisory opinion’ of the National Assembly has been 
sought.299 The limitation on the number of members of the Constitutional Court that a president 
is allowed to appoint deserves noting, given the role of the Court in checking and balancing 
presidential authority.  It appears that the proviso is intended to ensure that the Constitutional 
                                                                 
293 For example the Constitution of the United State of America 1789, art 11(2)(2) empowers the president to 
nominate certain public official for appointment after which a president must seek the’ advice and consent’ of the 
Senate on the nominees before they are appointed.  
 
294 For example the president may appoint three of the seven members of the Constitutional Court after the advice 
from the president of the National Assembly. See The Constitution of Benin  1990 (n 209), art 56. 
 
295 See (n 231). 
 
296 See (n 292). 
 
297 The other four members of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the National Assembly; while the president 
of the Constitutional Court is appointed by his peers from magistrates and the jurist members of the Court for a term 
of five years. See the Constitution of Benin 1990 (n 209), arts 116 and 115 (1) respectively.  
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Court is not beholden to the presidency whose functions it is intended to supervise, amongst its 
other duties. This is symbolic of a constitution that embodies principles of constitutionalism in 
order to deter abuse of power.  
 
The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by article 126 which provides that judges, in the 
discharge of their duties, are subject only to the authority of the law and that a sitting judge may 
not be moved without following procedures provided by law.300 The procedure for removing 
judges and further safeguards are found in domestic legislation governing the recruitment, 
tenures, training, appointment and career management of the judiciary.301 In the case of DCC 06-
063, the Court declared that the posting of a judge without his consent was unconstitutional.302 
 
At the same time, the Court has protected the presidency’s role in the appointment of judges. It 
declared in the case of DCC 00-054, that an expressed account by a president is required to 
confirm the appointment of a judge.303  Under the Constitution of Benin, the presidential powers 
of appointment are moderated by constitutional restraints that ensure the constitutionally of 
appointments. In relation to judicial appointments, the inclusion of the provisions found in the 
Constitution of Benin 1990 in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda would have protected the 
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301 See Loi No 2001-37 du 27 août 2002, Portant Organisation Judiciaire en République du Bénin and Loi No 2001-
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integrity of the judiciary which has been questioned from within the judiciary.304 Furthermore, 
they would have ensured that the president exercises appointment powers for the purposes they 
were granted and as envisioned by the Constitution.  
 
5.5 Managing the army 
 
Given the military’s historical role in meddling in the country’s politics and in competing for 
political power illegally, the Constitution of Benin prohibits any attempt to overthrow a 
constitutional government by the personnel of the armed forces or of the public security and 
defines the act as a breach of duty and a crime against the nation and the state, punishable in 
accordance with the law.305 It also prohibits members of the armed forces from standing for 
public office 306 and from serving in the cabinet.307 Only retired members of the armed forces 
may participate in the elections for public office.308 In the case of EL 07-001,309 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the intervention of the military to support election management 
by transporting ballot papers compromised the integrity of the electoral process, it declared the 
                                                                 
304 Justice Kanyeimba questioned the independence of the judges from the President  Museveni following an 
electoral petition that sought to annul the presidential elections of 2006 from which  the President emerged 
victorious. See Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye v Electoral Commission &Yoweri Kaguta Museveni [2006] UGSC 24.  
 
305 The Constitution of Benin 1990 (n 209), art 65. 
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army’s participation in the electoral process unlawful and it affirmed the independence of the 
National Autonomous Electoral Commission.310 
 
Although the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces,311the Constitution of 
Benin provides that the composition, organisation and the operation of the Superior Council of 
the armed forces shall be established by law.312 Also, the declaration of war in which the army 
can be deployed is authorised by the National Assembly.313 In subjecting the army’s operation, 
composition and organisation to the law, the Constitution of Benin puts its responsibilities and 
structure in the arms of the legislature and thereby insulates it from the overall influence of the 
executive. In a clear expression of the rejection of illegal acquisition of power, a president who 
acquires power through unconstitutional means is prohibited from accessing the presidential 
pension.314 
 
5.6 What Uganda and other African countries can learn from Benin 
 
Pre-colonial traditions and cultures have been blamed for the bad governance systems in 
Africa.315 Some post-colonial despotic rulers have justified dictatorship and violations of their 
                                                                 
310 Also see the case of DCC 10-116of8 September 2010 in which the Court declared that any intervention of the 
Army in any public function must remain within constitutional parameters. 
 
311 The Constitution of Benin 1990 (n 209), art 62. 
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315 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Who ruled by the spear? Rethinking the form of governance in the Ndebele State’ 
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people’s rights on the basis of pre-colonial African traditions, cultures and histories because 
human rights and democracy were not organically built into pre-colonial African systems of 
governance.316 On the other hand, some scholars have argued that governance systems in post-
colonial African societies are a result of the colonial policies of divide and rule and the 
integration of diverse ethnic groups into a single nation.317 In the case of Uganda, the  dictatorial 
constitutional structures for exercising state powers indicate that post-colonial leaders have 
styled themselves in the images of the institutions of the kabaka318 and that of the colonial 
governor.319 The synthesis of these two systems of governance has given rise to the authoritarian 
presidential system found in fundamental laws.   
 
This means that leaders have hardly enjoyed the necessary legitimacy gained through plural 
democratic laws but have depended on authoritarian legalism320 as well as the gun for their 
power. In others words, they have ruled according to the laws that they have dictated and their 
military might but not by the rule of law. This mode of governance has been instrumental in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
316 ibid 79. 
 
317 Gardener Thompson, Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and its Legacy  (Fountain Publishers 2003) 27-
31; also see Samwiri Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda  (2nd edition, Fountain Publishers 2003) 38-44. 
 
318For example, in non-segmentary societies like the Buganda of Uganda, power and the right to use violence were 
vested in the king who could take any action he wished. The king’s subjects had no choice between ruling and being 
ruled; they were ruled. See Abdu Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda  1962-1985 (McGill Queens 
University Press 1994) 123. 
 
319 This is illustrated by the use of repressive in a similar manner like the colonial law governor. For example, 
whenever his authority has been challenged, President Museveni has invoked The Penal Code Act 1950 Chapter 120 
to fend of criticisms about his governance. S 39 (1) defines seditious intention as bringing into hatred or contempt or 
to exciting disaffection against the person of the President and the Government, as by law established, or the 
Constitution. Under s 40 (1) of the Act, a person acts with seditious intentions if s/he utters, prints, publishes, sells, 
offers for sale, distributes or reproduces any seditious publication. 
 
320 In a legal authoritarian s tate, laws serve the purpose of the political elite. The main purpose of the law is to 
protect and preserve political power. For a detailed discussion on legal authoritarianism see Tom Ginsburg and 
Alberto Simper, Constitution in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2014) 14-21. 
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keeping heads of state in power because it allows them to subjugate and terrorise the citizenry. 
As Ben Nwabueze aptly notes, in a number of African countries, Constitutions contain to a large 
extent, nothing but lofty declarations of objectives and descriptions of organs of government in 
terms that impart no enforceable restraint upon person that exercise state power.321 
 
Benin marks an exception. The model of presidency provided for by the Constitution of Benin is 
designed to be a ‘strong presidentialism.’ This is evidenced by the provisions of the Constitution 
that afford the presidency strong prerogatives to initiate laws322 and to appoint top public civil 
servants.323 A president is also allowed command of the armed forces324 and to appoint some of 
the top judicial officers.325 However, the strong presidency was constitutionally shackled to 
create a limited presidency. The Constitution of Benin illustrates that it is possible for a 
constitution to designate an accountable and constrainable executive president. It has, therefore, 
facilitated smooth transfers of political power326 and it has also brought stability to the country 
because its foundations were constructed on constitutionalism and the view of the populace. A 
purposefully empowered Constitutional Court has played a major role in supervising the 
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326 Since the Constitution of Benin was adopted in 1990 the position of the head of s tate has been transferred three 
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presidential elections under the umbrella of his newly formed political party the Renaissance Party of Benin (RB);  
Mathieu Kerekou the leader of Action Front for the Renewal of Development (FARD-Alafia)  was the winner of the 
2001 presidential election ; Yayi Boni was elected as an independent candidate in the 2006 presidential elections and 
was re-elected in 2011.  See African Elections Database http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html accessed 24 April 
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functions of the presidency. The Court has both strengthened and protected constitutionalism and 
positioned the country as a democratic model. The plague of authoritarian presidents, which has 
afflicted African Constitutions, was overcome by developing constitutional mechanisms for 
checking and balancing the presidential authority and which limit execute influence over state 
organs.  
 
An analysis of the designation of the office of the president as provided for in the Constitution of 
Benin reveals that the Constitution balances the distribution of powers by moderating executive 
presidentialism thereby avoiding a ‘presidential monarchy’ or ‘monocracy’. One of its many 
praiseworthy features of constitutionalism is the creative use of the ‘principes à valeur 
constitutionnelle’ which has prevented the legislators and the executive from extending their 
tenures without the approval of the citizenry.327 
 
It is fitting to conclude this section with a brief discussion of the events that made it possible to 
minimise the influence of the dominant actors during the constitution-making process in Benin 
and, therefore, insulated the process from the overriding influence of any person or group. The 
Constitution of Benin was promulgated following a genuine inclusive and participatory 
constitution-making exercise born out of a national desire to establish a new democratic order.328 
The citizenry initiated democratic awakening in February 1990, when they convened the first 
sovereign national conference that led to the reclaiming of constitutionalism and democracy in 
the country. Long-serving President Mathieu Kérékou’s seventeen-year tenure was ended 
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following political protests in 1989. 329Although Kérékou unsuccessfully contested the first 
presidential elections following the adoption of the Constitution in 1991 and he was elected as 
president in the third elections in 2001, before the first elections, he and his ruling Parti de la 
revolution populaire du Bénin (PRPB) were stripped of power in order to prevent the possibility 
of influencing the new rules for political competition prior to the elections and the debates on the 
new constitution.330 This way, Kérékou and his government were unable to exert their influence 
during the making of the Constitution of Benin 1990. 
 
Benin’s constitutional democracy has successfully endured for a quarter-century. Something 
which Uganda and many African states should aspire to. 
 
 
6. Reflections on the model of executive president in the 1995 Constitution  
 
 The designation of the president established by the 1995 Constitution makes it practically 
impossible to meaningfully limit the powers of the presidency. This is because all instruments of 
power and organs of the state are entrusted and subservient to the presidency, which is due to a 
Constitution that entrenches an authoritarian government through legal means.331 
 
A constitution is supposed to provide for differing mechanisms of exercising power through the 
operating cord of constitutionalism, founded on principles that are commonly agreed to, as 
discussed in chapter three, section 5 of this study. In measuring the model of the executive 
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president, as established by the 1995 Constitution, against universally accepted norms of 
constitutionalism, it can rightly be stated that it does not abide with the tenets of 
constitutionalism. This is because there are no effective constitutional constraints on the 
presidency. The presidency is also allowed domination of instruments of power. Thus, while the 
presidency’s powers are sanctioned by the Constitution, it cannot be claimed that they are 
certified by the norms of constitutionalism because it does not operate or rule within the 
normative framework of constitutionalism. It is exactly this model of presidency that defines 
presidents and governments that rule by law and not according to the rule of law.332  It is also 
under this model of executive president that previous heads of state used state powers to ravage 
Uganda before 1995. Constitutionalism mandates limitations on public officers that exercise state 
power. Norms of constitutionalism allow for limited power. It is quite conspicuous that the 
powers granted to the presidency by the 1995 Constitution are unlimited, serve to promote legal 
authoritarianism and they are incompatible with the intention of establishing a constitutional 
democracy. In this regard, it can be stated that the framers of the 1995 Constitution achieved 
their aim of creating an unlimited presidency, a president-for-life and a consolidated regime. The 
office of the president is thus, lacking in ‘constitutional reform validity’. The concept of 
constitutional reform validity that I refer to concerns the relationship between validity and 
‘efficacy’ of the constitutional reforms. The efficacy of a constitutional reform is determined by 
its capability to remedy Uganda’s history of one-man rule regimes, self-grants of unlimited state 
                                                                 
332 Drawing on empirical and theoretical insights from every major region of the world, Tom Gin sburg and Tamir 
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Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, Rule by Law; the Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University 
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powers and misuse of such powers, manipulation of state institutions and disregard of 
constitutions. Thus a constitutional reform is not valid if it is not efficacious in this regard. 
  
The model of presidency provided for by the 1995 Constitution also appears to offend the 
fundamental principles underlying the allocation of powers in the 1995 Constitution which I 
have endeavoured to set out at the beginning of this chapter, in that it invests state powers that 
belong to the people333 in the presidency, without any efficient mechanisms for limiting or 
recalling those powers. As power belongs to the people, the people must be able to limit or recall 
it where it is misused or abused. However, they cannot do so under the kind of presidential 
system that dominates all institutions that are meant to ensure checks and balances on the 
presidency on behalf of the people. Constitutional institutions that masquerade to provide checks 
and balances on executive excesses are inept in their functions because they are not sufficiently 
empowered.334 This has led the President to treat these institutions with contempt. Therefore, it 
cannot be claimed that the powers granted to the presidency can be withdrawn or limited through 
constitutional processes, including elections, as this study will argue in the next chapter. 
Reginald Dias provides an insight into what the failure by a legal system to build effective 
controls that prevent the abuse or misuse of state power tells us about governments, and how 
state power is the exercised in states, which I find very fitting for Uganda. He writes that: 
  Social justice in relation to power has to be considered in relation to the exercise of authority in a State. This 
is manifested largely through laws.  A legal system represents the linkage between law and the State among 
other things, and an important link is their validity.335 
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 Thus, Dias propounds two ways to prevent the abuse of power. One is to insert control into the 
criterion of validity and the other is it to curb the liberty to use power abusively.336 In other 
words, according to Dias, a legal system reflects the legitimacy of those that exercise state 
power. A sham legal system will buttress a sham government. One way of identifying such a 
legal system and, by implication, a sham government is to assess the validity of the laws and 
controls within the legal system designed to stem the abuse of power. The absence of effective 
controls for preventing abuse of sate power is an indicator not only of a sham government, but 
also of the misuse of authority in a state. 
 
 
7. Mini-conclusion 
 
Presidential authority under the 1995 has remained almost the same as it was before 1995. 
Indeed, the powers and privileges of the head of state are almost as they were exercised and 
enjoyed by the kings of Buganda and since the creation of the Uganda Protectorate in 1894, so 
has the ineptness of the various constitutional bodies to provide sufficient checks and balances 
on the head of state. The design of the presidency under the 1995 Constitution also emerged out 
of efforts to design a fundamental law which would provide President Museveni and his NRM 
government permanent ownership of power. 
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Also, the culture of constitution disparaging that led past heads of state to disregard and to 
abrogate provisions of the Republic Constitution that limited their powers has re-emerged in 
post-1995 Uganda. It is manifested in the way President Museveni has disregard provision of the 
constitution that attempt to limit presidential authority. The ascription of excessive powers to the 
presidency represents a failure to circumcise the previously uncirmcusribed presidential 
authority. While it may be necessary in some cases to grant a president sufficient powers to be 
able to act immediately in order to address urgent problems and to provide effective leadership, 
given the political culture, institutional traditions, perception by the population and the 
leadership styles in Uganda, the allocation of such powers to the presidency is unjustified. 
 
The 1995 Constitution establishes a presidency that embodies the power of the state. The 
entitlement to state powers power by the presidency has allowed the incumbent President to 
become a permanent holder of power through subsequent constitutional amendments,337and he 
has progressively become less accountable to the legislature, the judiciary and the people. The 
Constitution failed in its challenge of managing the tension between creating an empowered 
presidency, capable of taking decisive decisions and a limited one whose powers and privileges 
are effective circumscribed in order to avoid their abuse and misuse. The outcome of such a 
travesty of constitutional reforms is that an armed group that came to power through violence 
and unconstitutional means was constitutionally legitimised, granted unlimited state powers and 
imbedded in power without the possibility of being removed from it through constitutional 
processes. The Constitution falters in the task of striking a balance between the two dangers; that 
of the presidency becoming an autocracy, and of making presidential authority become so 
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limited as to lead to immobility and ineffectiveness. The dominant nature of the presidency over 
institutions of government in Uganda refutes the impression created by President Museveni’s 
interim government that it was on a steady path to strengthen democratic institutions in the 
country.338 The institutions have ended up being exploited for propaganda purposes; without 
being able to perform their duties independently of the executive. Therefore, the NRM’s motive 
for adopting a constitution that would maintain them in power in a ‘facade democratic 
dispensation’ has significant implications for Uganda’s political future. The personalisation of 
power has led to authoritarianism, patronage, corruption and has reversed Uganda’s projected 
democratic gains.  
 
The presidency’s dominance over state organs clearly deviates from the principles of 
constitutionalism and undermines any democratic tone in the Constitution. In Uganda, all 
government institutions and personnel are beholden to one person- President Museveni, who 
wields unfettered authority. Also, the slowness and the resistance of the process of 
democratisation are attributable to the constitutional presidential patrimonial logic. 
 
In the following chapter, I investigate the post-1995 constitutional and domestic legal framework 
that was established for electing the president of Uganda. 
                                                                 
338 On seizing power, President Museveni promised Ugandans that his NRM government would oversee the 
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Chapter Five 
 
 Presidential Elections in Post-1995 Uganda 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
One of the post-1995 constitutional reforms in Uganda is the introduction of direct presidential 
elections. The significance of this is that since the 1995 Constitution came into force, and for the 
first time in the country’s history, the majority of Ugandans can directly elect a president and 
more Ugandans are also eligible to contest for the presidency. In this regard, the post-1995 
constitutional and domestic legal framework for electing a president is important for assessing 
how the office of the president, which since 1894 the majority of Ugandans could not contest, is 
now decided and it also provides and understanding of how the president of Uganda is legally 
elected 
 
Throughout this chapter, focusing on the challenges emerging from presidential elections, I 
analyse the constitutional and legal framework under which the president of Uganda has been 
elected since 1995. The main objective is to determine the efficacy of the post-1995 constitutional 
and domestic legal framework in facilitating fair and transparent contestation for the presidency 
in order to avert the old violent struggles of political power. 
 
This chapter is made up of six sections inclusive of this introductory section. Section 2 explores 
the development of electoral laws under which the president of Uganda is elected. The aim is to 
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provide a comprehensive background to the laws that govern presidential elections. Section 3 sets 
out the constitutional and domestic legal framework under which a president of Uganda is 
elected. In section 4, a summary of the presidential elections since 1995 is provided. Section 5 
starts with a general discussion of the complaints about electoral laws in Uganda. The section 
also identifies and critically analyses the two main challenges to presidential elections which are 
a source of the most animated complaints by politicians, civil society and the general public in 
Uganda. Section 6 is the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
2.  Presidential elections laws in post-1995 Uganda 
 
2.1  The constitutional order for electing the president of Uganda 
 
The Constitution Commission which was created for the purposes of consulting Ugandans on the 
1995 Constitution and for drawing-up a draft Constitution, reported that there was an 
overwhelming desire among Ugandans to develop a new constitution containing fair and 
transparent electoral laws that would allow for the smooth transfer of political power and protect 
the sanctity of the constitution.1 It noted that: 
The people are demanding an end to sudden and violent changes of government and the consequent political, 
social and economic destabilisation that has caused so much suffering. They castigate the “fashion” “of going 
to the bush” to resolve political and constitutional conflicts which has resulted in terrible consequences to the 
ordinary people who get caught up in the conflicts. They demand an effective mechanism to be put in place to 
ensure orderly transfer of power so that the people’s lives are not unduly disturbed. The people have noted 
that one of the principal causes of instability is that past Constitutions have not been honoured; that “power 
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hungry politicians” faced with constitutional arrangements that did not fit or which limited their designs or 
interest simply suspended or totally abrogated them. The people are demanding safeguards to ensure that 
those who wield power recognize, respect and uphold the supremacy of the new Constitution.2 
 
The Constitution Commission observed that the major problem in Uganda has been that those in 
power have been reluctant to subject themselves to the electoral process.3 Therefore it endorsed 
the demands of the people namely, for leaders at all levels to be elected at known and regular 
intervals and for the electoral process to be designed and implemented in a way that minimises 
abuse so as to guard against electoral results being challenged by violent means on the basis that 
they are rigged.4 
 
In relation to the election of a president, who was not subject to direct elections under the 
Independence and the Republic Constitutions, the Constitution Commission noted that there was 
overwhelming support for the concept of a democratically elected president which emanated 
from the people’s experience of both colonial and independent Uganda.5 It observed that: 
The people want direct participation in the elections of their leader and also  prefer to have a president who 
commands a national following and not one whose support is based on a particular region, group, or force.6 
 
The Commission reported that: 
There has been concern about the lack of orderly succession of government. Even though past constitutions 
have made provisions for the tenure of office of government and the democratic mechanisms for handing 
power to a newly elected government, these have never been observed. Where leaders did not appear to be 
prepared to hand over power after free and fair elections, they have been violently resisted. The culture of 
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clinging on to political office was criticized in the many of the submissions we received. Even the extension 
of the term of office of the NRM by the NRC was condemned by some as undemocratic.7 
 
Thus, the Constitution Commission’s draft Constitution recommended that a president should be 
elected directly by universal suffrage.8 The minimum age of a president should be forty years but 
not more than seventy-five.9 The president should have attained a qualification of secondary 
education.10 She or he should be a citizen of Uganda by birth and should have been resident for 
12 months prior to the elections.11 In order to qualify as a presidential candidate, a person should 
have the support of one thousand qualified voters from each of the two-thirds of the districts of 
Uganda.12 A candidate in presidential election should be declared a winner if he or she has won 
the majority of votes cast.13 Where no candidate obtains the absolute majority, then a second run-
off election should be held in thirty days after the previous election.14 The candidates for the 
second run-off elections should be the two candidates who obtained the two highest results at the 
previous election.15 The Electoral Commission should declare the winner of the presidential 
elections within twenty-four hours of ascertaining the results.16 A person who challenges the 
                                                                 
 
7 ibid 320. 
 
8 The draft Constitution (n 1), art 105(a). 
 
9 ibid art 107(a). 
 
10 ibid art 106. 
 
11 ibid art 107(b). 
 
12 ibid art 108(a). 
 
13 ibid art 108(b).  
 
14 ibid art 108(c). 
 
15 ibid art 108(d).  
 
16 ibid art 109. 
 
 
 
259 
 
validity of presidential elections should be required to show that he or she has the support of at 
least five hundred voters.17 
 
In October 1995 when the new constitution was promulgated,18 rules for managing political 
competition and for transferring political power were instituted therein in an effort to ensure that 
future leaders are elected through the popular will of Ugandans, to replace the system of 
indirectly elected presidents found erstwhile fundamental laws. Under article 59(1) of the 1995 
Constitution; every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age and above has the right to vote; 
while article 59(3) provides that the state shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all citizens 
qualified to vote register and exercise the right to vote. The 1995 Constitution introduced 
presidential elections to be conducted through universal adult suffrage.19 In this regard, for the 
first time in Uganda, the Constitution established direct political contestation for the presidency 
by ensuring that the occupant is independently subjected to the electorate’s choice. This is as a 
result of the people of Uganda demanding direct participation in the elections of their president 
during the constitution-consulting exercise.20 Judging by the provisions of the 1995 Constitution 
that outline the criteria for presidential elections, which will be discussed in this chapter, most of 
the recommendations of the Constitution Committee were passed without modification by the 
Constituent Assembly. 
 
 
                                                                 
17 ibid art 110. 
 
18 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda1995 (The 1995 Constitution). 
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2.2  The 2005 amendment to the constitutional order for electing a president 
 
On 30 September 2005, the second Parliament of post-1995 Uganda repealed article 105(2) of 
the 1995 Constitution which afforded any person serving as the president a maximum of two 
five-year terms. The amendment was significant as it created unlimited terms for the office of the 
president and in doing so, paved the way for President Yoweri Museveni to run for more terms in 
office thus creating the possibility of a president-for-life. In order to enact the amendment, 
Parliament passed the Constitutional Amendment Act 2005 and the Constitutional Amendment 
Act No.2 2005. It has been reported that there were several petitions presented to Parliament, and 
submissions written by civil society organisations opposing the removal of presidential term 
limits from the 1995 Constitution.21 Members of the ruling government in the legislature and 
executive branches dominated the group that favoured repealing the term limits, while opposition 
groups in Parliament and civil society organisations were in the opposite camp.22 Both sides of 
the political divide traded opinions about the legality of the amendment.23 Surprisingly, questions 
about the legality of the amendment were not put before the Constitutional Court which is vested 
with the constitutional authority to interpret the provisions of the Constitution under Art 137(1) 
of the 1995 Constitution. The small number of NRM members of the second Parliament who 
opposed the amendment, are reported to have been threatened with denial of the party 
                                                                 
21 Godfrey Asiimwe and Christopher Muhozi, The State of Constitutional Development in Uganda for the Year 2005  
(East African Centre for Constitutional Development 2005) 8. 
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nomination and or well-financed campaigns for their opponents should they seek re-election.24 
For President Museveni, his comments accentuate his argument for repealing the term limits; he 
is quoted as saying, ‘Why should I sentence Uganda to suicide by handing over to (the) people 
we fought and defeated? It is dangerous, despite the fact that the Constitution allows them to run 
against me.’25 
 
Speculations about repealing the presidential term limits began as early as 2002, a year after 
President Museveni started his second and last term in office under the then existing 
constitutional provision. At his party’s national conference, the President called for an 
amendment of article 105(2) that restricted an incumbent’s presidency to two terms.26 
 
Before the constitutional amendments of 2005 were passed, Parliament remarkably stood up to 
the President, using its new constitutional powers to become the most independent in Ugandan 
history.27 It not only modified Bills proposed by the government but also censured several of the 
President’s ministers for misuse of public funds.28 It may be argued that the second Parliament’s 
efforts to limit governmental excesses prompted efforts to amend the 1995 Constitution so an 
already domineering presidency could increase its powers. 
 
                                                                 
24 Joel Barkan, ‘Uganda: An African Success Past Its Prime?’(Challenges and Change in Uganda Conference, 
Wilson International Centre for Scholars Washington, 2 June 2005). 
 
25 Beatrice Ngozi, The State of Constitutionalism in Uganda in 2003  (East African Centre for Constitutional 
Development 2003) 12. 
 
26 United States Agency for International Development , Democracy and Governance Assessment: Republic of 
Uganda (United States Agency for International Development 2005) para 1.34. 
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Six years after the adoption of the 1995 Constitution; President Museveni’s government 
appointed the Constitution Review Commission, which was established by the Commission of 
Inquiry (Constitutional Review) Legal Notice No. 1 2001 under the Commission of Inquiry Act 
Chapter 166, to review the fundamental features of the 1995 Constitution. The Constitution 
Review Commission received over one hundred proposals for amending the 1995 Constitution 
from the cabinet and the National Executive Committee (NEC) - the decision making body of the 
NRM.29 The NEC argued that the amendments were necessary to allow the smooth running of 
government because the President had routinely encountered difficulties, contradictions and 
inadequacies in implementing the provisions of the 1995 Constitution.30 In this regard, the 
proposals assumed significant importance since they were from political practitioners and in 
addition, it was reasoned that the proposals were necessary to address matters of national 
importance that had not been previously addressed when the 1995 Constitution was being 
debated and then adopted.31 
 
In relation to the presidency, the proposals included amendments to allow a president, not 
Parliament, to censure ministers; to restrict Parliament’s powers to only withholding the approval 
of presidential appointees on the grounds of past criminal acts only; and in cases where the 
president and Parliament failed to agree; the presidency should be given powers to dissolve 
Parliament; and to repeal the provision allowing proposed legislation passed by Parliament to 
                                                                 
 
29 Republic of Uganda, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review): Findings and 
Recommendations (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 2003) (Sempebwa’s Report) para 33.5. 
 
30 Ngozi (n 25) 23. 
 
31 Semakula Kiwanuka, ‘Strong Presidency Will Move Country Forward’ Monitor (Kampala, 6 November 2003) 3. 
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automatically become law if the presidency does not assent.32 The amendments were deemed 
necessary to ensure that legislature does not override the powers of the presidency.33 Repealing 
the two-term presidential limit was justified as removing a restriction on democratic choice34 
and, therefore, Ugandans should be allowed to exercise the democratic choice of electing the 
same person as many times as they wanted to. In their overall, the proposed amendments were 
aimed at granting more powers to the presidency and the government. 
 
The Constitution Review Commission recommended that the question of repealing the 
presidential term limits should be decided by a referendum.35 It noted that fifty-nine percent of 
the respondents were against the lifting of the term limits.36 Two of the Commissioners, 
including the Commission’s Chair wrote a minority report opposing the repealing of the 
provision limiting the presidential tenure to two terms.37 The media reported that the NRM 
government obtained an injunction that prevented a newspaper from publishing an article, 
detailing opposition to the government’s proposal of lifting term limits among members of the 
Constitution Review Commission.38 
 
                                                                 
32 Anne Mugisha and Richard Mutumba ‘Cabinet Presents Proposals’ New Vision (Kampala, 24 September 2003) 5. 
 
33 ibid. 
 
34 Kiwanuka (n 31). 
 
35 Sempebwa’s  Report (n 29), para7.95. 
 
36 ibid. 
 
37 ibid, Minority Position on the Issue of Orderly Succession to Government Annex I; Constitutional Review 
Commission Report Minority Position Annex II pp 262-266. 
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In July 2005, a referendum was held on the government’s proposals.39 It was boycotted by 
opposition parties because the contentious issue of repealing the presidential term limits was not 
included. 40 This may be because the 1995 Constitution states that the provision on the two-term 
limits can be amended provided it obtains the support of two-thirds of all members of 
Parliament.41 Therefore, the final decision was left to Parliament. Most of the proposed changes 
to the 1995 Constitution, including repealing of the two term limits on the tenure of the 
presidency, were passed by Parliament after the third reading of the Bill on 18 August 2005.42 
 
It is important to state here that when recommending that a person elected as a president should 
not hold office for more than two-terms of five years each, the Constitution Commission noted 
that: 
We have also reflected the view almost unanimously advocated for by the people that the tenure of office of the 
President should be constitutionally limited to put to an end to the phenomenon of self-styled life presidents. We 
have recommended a limit of two terms of five years each for any President .43 
 
Thus, upon adopting the 1995 Constitution, article 105(2) provided that a person shall not be 
elected to hold office as president for more than two terms. 
 
The Constitution Review Commission’s report also observed that the majority of respondents 
wished for the preservation of the two-term limits on the re-election of a president.44It found that 
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after seventeen years of NRM rule, changes in the circumstances have not brought a divergence 
of opinion on the matter.45 The Constitution Review Commission, however, reasoned that to 
critically examine the issue of the term limits, it could not merely recommend the retention or 
lifting of the term limits in the 1995 Constitution. Therefore, it proposed that the matter should 
be subjected to an exhaustive and comprehensive debate that would provide for a nationally 
acceptable solution.46 The recommendation was ignored by the government. With this analysis in 
mind, it may be said that the amendment was achieved against the wishes of the majority of 
Ugandans.  
 
In addition to the amendment being shrouded in the absence of popular legitimacy, it was also 
plagued by allegations of bribery. Severalmembers of the second Parliament are reported to have 
admitted to receiving money to vote in favour of the amendment to repeal the presidential terms 
limits as the NRM government did not have the required majority47 to implement the 
amendment.48 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
44 Sempebwa’s Report (n 29) para 7.96. 
 
45 ibid para 7.94. 
 
46 ibid. 
 
47 See Charles Mpagi ‘and others’, ‘I got Shs 5 Million for Kisanja – Buturo’ The Monitor (Kampala, 31 October 
2006) 2; also see Daniel Posner and Daniel Young, ‘The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa’ [2007]18 
Journal of Democracy 126, 130; Civil Society Coalition for the Restoration of the Presidential Term Limits, 
‘Together We Must’ (Civil Society Coalition for the Restoration of the Presidential Term Limits Publication No. 2, 
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2.3 Domestic presidential election laws, international and regional legal electoral 
obligations and political commitments in the conduct of elections 
 
Domestic laws have been appended to the 1995 Constitution for the purpose of administering 
presidential elections. These are further supplemented by Uganda’s willingness to be bound by 
regional and international treaties, and political commitments that are aimed at promoting free 
and fair elections. Domestic presidential electoral laws in Uganda have arisen out the 
Parliament’s powers to make laws.49At the time of writing, the domestic legal framework for 
conducting presidential elections is provided under the Electoral Commission Act 1997, as 
amended in 2010; the Political Parties and Organisations Act 2005 and the Presidential Elections 
Act 2000, as amended in 2010. 
 
With regard to international and regional obligations, and political commitments relating to 
elections, since the NRM seized power  in 1986, Uganda has ratified, signed or acceded to fifteen 
international and regional treaties, twelve non-treaty standards and nine political commitments50 
which provide for the legal protection and promotion of democratic electoral processes. These 
documents form standards that articulate legal obligations for conducting free and fair elections 
and for developing democratic institutions. The standards that emerge from these documents have 
brought extra international and regional legal obligations and commitments for democratic 
elections in an effort to supplement the constitutional and domestic electoral framework under 
                                                                 
49 The 1995 Constitution (n 18), art 79(1) empowers Parliament to make laws, while under art 104(9) Parliament is 
authorised to pass law for challenging presidential elections. 
 
50 European Union, Compendium of International Standards for Elections: Status of Ratification  (2nd edition, 
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which presidential elections are conducted in Uganda. Examples of these include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 196651 the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 2007.52 The legal implications of some of these treaties on 
presidential elections in Uganda will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
3. Constitutional and domestic legal framework for electing the president 
of Uganda 
 
The main constitutional and statutory provisions governing the election of the president of 
Uganda provide as follows: 
Article 103(1) of the 1995 Constitution stipulates that the election of a president shall be by 
universal adult suffrage through a secret ballot. The Constitution also provides that to be elected 
president, a presidential candidate requires more than fifty percent of the total valid votes cast in 
the presidential election.53 Where no candidate obtains the votes specified under article 103(4), a 
second election must be held within thirty days and the two candidates who obtained the highest 
number of votes shall be the only candidates.54 Following the amendment to the 1995 
Constitution in 2005 to repeal the two-term limits on the re-election of the president, a person 
may be elected president for more than two terms.55 A person is qualified to become president if 
                                                                 
51 Uganda acceded to the ICCPR on 21 June 1995. See United Nations, ‘Treaty  Collections’  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Publications.aspx?pathpub=Publication/NV/Page1_en.xml accessed 27 March 2015. 
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he or she is a citizen of Uganda of not less than thirty-five years of age and not more than seventy 
five and qualified to be a member of Parliament.56 Furthermore, a person is qualified to be a 
member of Parliament if he or she is a citizen of Uganda, a registered voter and has completed a 
minimum formal education of Advance Level Standard or equivalent.57 
 
The 1995 Constitution also creates an Electoral Commission entrusted with the responsibility of 
managing elections.58 Members of the Electoral Commission are appointed by a president with 
the approval of Parliament.59 Presidential, parliamentary and local government elections must be 
held within the first thirty days of the last ninety days before the expiration of the term of the 
president.60 
 
The Electoral Commission may declare that a presidential candidate has been elected unopposed 
where in a presidential election, only one candidate is nominated after the close of nomination.61 
To become a presidential candidate, a person must submit to the Electoral Commission a 
document confirming that the nomination has been supported by one hundred voters in each of at 
least two-thirds of the districts in Uganda.62 
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Article 103(9) of the 1995 Constitution empowers Parliament to prescribe a procedure for the 
elections and the assumption of office of the president, while article 104 sets out the procedure 
under which presidential elections may be challenged. An aggrieved presidential candidate may 
petition the Supreme Court for an order that a candidate declared by the Electoral Commission 
was not validly elected.63 Under article 104(9) of the 1995 Constitution, Parliament is authorised 
to pass laws for challenging the conduct of presidential elections, including the grounds for 
annulment and the rules of procedure. To give effect to articles 103(9) and 104(9), Parliament 
enacted the Presidential Elections Act 2000, as amended in 2005 and in 2010 and the Electoral 
Commission Act 1997, as amended in 2010.Section 59 of the Presidential Elections Act 2005 
provides grounds for challenging presidential elections. 
 
Under section 59(5) of the Presidential Elections Act, the Supreme Court may dismiss a petition 
challenging presidential elections, declare which candidate was validly elected or annul an 
election. Section 59(6) of the Act provides that the Supreme Court may issue a declaration 
annulling elections on three grounds: under section 59(6)(a), where it is satisfied that there has 
been noncompliance with the provisions contained in the same Act and the noncompliance 
affected the outcome of the election in a substantial manner; under Section 59(6)(b), where it is 
satisfied that the candidate was not qualified for the post of the president or was disqualified; or 
under section 59(6)(c), where it is satisfied that an offence was committed under the Act by the 
candidate in person or by the candidate’s agents with the knowledge or approval of the candidate. 
The said offences are listed under Parts IX and X of the Presidential Elections Act 2010. The 
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main ones include bribery, getting a prohibited person to vote, obstructing voters and publication 
of false statement as to illness, death or the withdrawal of another candidate. 
 
On hearing a petition challenging a presidential election and before coming to a decision, the 
Supreme Court has the discretion to order a recount of the votes cast if it deems it necessary and 
practical.64 The Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General is statutorily authorised to 
make rules for the conduct of petitions seeking to annul presidential elections.65 The rules are 
contained in the Presidential Elections Petitions Rules 2001 (SI No.13 2000). 
 
4.  Presidential elections since 1995 
 
After the general elections in 1980, there were no direct national elections in Uganda until 1994 
when the Constituent Assembly elections were held for the purposes of adopting the 1995 
Constitution.66 The 1980 general elections were conducted under the Republic Constitution and 
the National Assembly Elections Act of 1957. 
 
Upon its adoption, the 1995 Constitution introduced a one-party Movement System. Political 
parties were allowed to exist but not to engage into political activities.67 In doing so, this 
provision imported into the new constitution section 4.1 of Legal Notice No.1 of 1986established 
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by the NRM on seizing power, which outlawed and criminalised political parties while the 
Movement System of the NRM was allowed to operate. The Constitution also provided that a 
referendum on the choice of a political system in which the continuity of the Movement System 
would be decided every five years.68 The NRM interim government, under the leadership of 
President Museveni held power from 1986 and surrendered to elections in 1996, the year after 
the 1995 Constitution was adopted. The first presidential and parliamentary elections took place 
under the one-party Movement System. President Museveni was elected president for the first 
time. In 2000, the first referendum was held and the Movement System was retained. After the 
confirmation of the Movement System, Museveni was elected again as president in 2001. In the 
same year, Museveni’s government appointed the Constitution Review Commission. In its 
report, the Constitution Review Commission recommended the return of the multi-party political 
system, which meant the abolition of the one-party Movement System.69A second referendum in 
2005 brought about the removal of the one-party Movement System. Ugandans overwhelmingly 
voted for a multi-party politics.70 For the purposes of effecting the amendments to repeal the one-
party Movement System and the two term limits on the re-election of a president, among other 
provisions of the 1995 Constitution, the government passed the Constitutional Amendment Act 
2005 and the Constitutional Amendment Act No.2 2005. In the following years, opposition 
parties developed. President Museveni was elected again in 2006 and in 2011. At the time of 
writing President Museveni and his NRM government have been in power for more than twenty 
nine years of which ten years, from 1986 to 1996, they served as an interim government.  
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5.  Complaints about electoral laws 
 
Post-independence Uganda has not witnessed a single transfer of power from one elected head of 
state to another or from one elected government to another. As democracy involves the 
possibility of a change of government, it was hoped that under the new democratic dispensation, 
Ugandans would elect their leaders through credible electoral processes. The expectation was that 
the post-1995 constitutional reforms would, among other things,  facilitate fair and transparent 
political contestation, prevent leaders from undermining constitutional orders to hang on to power 
and bring to an end to violent struggles for political power. However, twenty nine years after the 
end of the armed conflict which brought the NRM to power, Uganda has been ruled by one 
President and his party who have emerged triumphant in four successive elections amidst 
widespread discontent with electoral laws. While President Museveni presents Uganda as a 
democracy, or at least as democratising, his opponents denounce his regime as ‘electoral 
authoritarian’.71 Democracy means much more than engaging in regular elections and as vital as 
they are, what happens before, during and after elections is equally important, as is the capacity 
of electoral laws to translate the will of the citizenry into genuine democratic choice. 
 
The main grievance is that the occurrence of elections in Uganda cannot deliver a change of 
government. This is because electoral laws are deficient in safeguarding fair political 
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contestation. According to a recent study, Africans now use the quality of elections as the main 
indicator of the development of democracy in their countries.72 In the case of Uganda, only fifty 
two percent of Ugandans surveyed in 2012, after the presidential and parliamentary elections, 
believed that their country is either a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems; 
compared to seventy-one percent of the people surveyed prior to the elections in 2011.73  The 
quality of the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections is cited as having adversely affected 
the citizenry’s perception of the country’s democratic development.74 
 
Critics argue that the post-1995 constitutional and domestic legal framework has not yielded 
electoral laws and institutions capable of protecting the ‘will of the people’.75 The contention is 
that electoral laws are not free from executive manipulation and they are incapable of promoting 
and safeguarding fair electoral contestation. Following an appraisal of the 2011 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, prominent scholars have concluded that a change of government in 
Uganda is unlikely to occur under the current constitutional and domestic legal framework.76 
Edwin Abuya has argued that electoral lawlessness continues to undermine the credibility of 
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elections in Uganda.77 Commenting on the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections, he 
concludes that the institutional and legal structures corroded the elections and he calls for specific 
reforms to be implemented in keeping with international legal standards on democracy.78 Other 
critics have asserted that the constitutional and domestic legal framework has been structured by 
the incumbent to hinder rather than promote smooth transfer of political power and, 
consequently, it is deficient in its capacity to fairly manage political competition.79 It has also 
been claimed that one of the main factors behind President Museveni’s unchallenged dominance, 
is that electoral laws have been manipulated in the President’s favour and as such, elections just 
confirm the basic status quo which exists in Uganda, not only as regards to President Museveni’s 
government grip on power but with a view to the general state of democracy.80 It has also been 
argued that President Museveni has managed to tighten his grip on power by manipulating 
electoral laws.81 
 
According to a study by Afrobarometer; an independent, non-partisan research project that 
measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa; eighty-nine per cent of 
Ugandans consider elections as the only acceptable way of selecting leaders.82 Yet the complaints 
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which have risen in post-1995 Uganda suggest that elections as a way of transferring political 
power have been put on trial and they have been condemned. At the end of his current tenure in 
2016, President Museveni government would have ruled Uganda for thirty years, which is longer 
than the terms of office of all Uganda’s post-independence heads of state put together. He would 
also be the seventh longest-serving leader ever in Africa’s post-colonial history.83 It should be 
noted that since 1986, there have been more than twenty groups seeking to overthrow President 
Museveni’s government.84 Violent struggles for political power may well be as a result of flawed 
electoral laws and constitutional structures that are designed to impede democratic transfers of 
power and, therefore, the old ways of accessing political power have been deemed the only means 
to deposed the President and his government. The discontent with electoral laws suggest that it is 
not through popular preference that President Museveni has to emerged victorious in all the four 
presidential elections following the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, but it is because of his 
manipulation of electoral laws. 
 
Two main factors seem to be the focus of discontent with presidential electoral laws. They form 
the basis of disgruntlement that electoral laws have been corroded to allow President Museveni to 
maintain his grip on power. They are: (1) the laws applied by the Supreme Court in adjudicating 
presidential electoral challenges following the 2001 and 2006 elections, and (2) the 2005 
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amendment of the 1995 Constitution to repeal the two term limits on the re-election of the 
president. These major and interrelated challenges relating to presidential electoral laws have 
been identified based on the complaints by politicians, civil society, lawyers, academia and the 
general public in Uganda as posing a challenge to a fair and transparent presidential electoral 
process in post-1995 Uganda. The concern is that these two significant factors, among others, 
have impeded the transfer of the office of the president. I will now critically analyse how these 
factors relating to presidential electoral laws pose a challenge to the fair and transparent 
contestation for the office of the president.  
 
5.1  Adjudication of presidential electoral challenges 
 
Electoral laws for resolving presidential electoral complaints in Uganda have been the cause of 
disgruntlements among politicians, dissatisfaction in the general public, and disagreement among 
judges in Uganda. Following the outcomes of the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections in which 
President Museveni emerged victorious, Mr Kiiza Besigye, who was then the leader of the main 
opposition party, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and a presidential candidate in both 
elections, sought declarations from the Supreme Court that President Museveni was not duly 
elected and, therefore, the elections should be annulled.85  President Museveni was declared by 
the Electoral Commission as the winner of the 2001 elections with sixty nine percent of the total 
valid votes cast.86 In the 2006 presidential election, he gained fifty nine percent of the total valid 
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votes cast.87 The petitioner, Besigye, was the runner-up in both presidential elections with thirty-
seven percent of the vote in the 200188 and twenty seven percent in 2006.89 The 2001 and 2006 
presidential electoral petitions sought to annul the outcome of the elections on almost identical 
grounds.  
 
In the 2001 presidential electoral petition, in the case of Col. Dr. Besigye Kiiza v Museveni 
Yoweri Kaguta and the Electoral Commission,90 the petitioner made many complaints against the 
two respondents and their agents and employees, for acts and omissions which he contended 
amounted to non-compliance with provisions of the Presidential Elections Act 2000 and the 
Electoral Commission Act 1997, and illegal practices and offences under the Acts. The main 
complaints against the second respondent, the Ugandan Electoral Commission, were that it failed 
to efficiently compile, maintain and up-date the national voters’ register, and voters’ roll for each 
constituency and for each polling station; and it failed to display copies of the voters’ roll for 
each parish or ward for the prescribed period of not less than 21 days.91 It allowed multiple 
voting and vote stuffing in many electoral districts in favour of President Museveni.92 It 
disenfranchised the petitioner’s voters by deleting their names from the voters register.93 It 
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91 ibid7; contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 19 and s 20. 
 
92 ibid 8; contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 32(1). 
 
93 ibid; contrary Presidential Elections Act 2000, ss 19(3) and 50. 
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increased the numbers of polling stations on the eve of polling day without sufficient notice to 
candidates except the President.94 It allowed or failed to prevent stuffing of ballot boxes and 
under-age voting.95 It chased away the petitioner’s polling agents or failed to ensure that they 
were not chased away from polling stations, and counting and tallying centers.96 It allowed or 
failed to prevent agents of the first respondent, to or from interfering with electioneering 
activities of the petitioner and his agents.97 It allowed armed people to be present at polling 
stations, falsified results, and failed to ensure that the election was conducted under conditions of 
freedom and fairness.98 
 
Against the first respondent, President Museveni, the petitioner alleged that the President 
personally or by his agents with his knowledge and consent or approval committed illegal 
practices and offences. These included publications of a false statement that the petitioner was 
suffering from AIDS,99 offering gifts to voters,100 appointing partisan senior military officers and 
partisan sections of the army to take charge of security during the elections,101 organising groups 
under the Presidential Protection Unit to use violence against persons not supporting the 
                                                                 
94 ibid 9; contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2000, ss12 (e) and (f) amounting to failing to take measures to ensure 
that the entire electoral process is conducted under conditions of freedom and fairness. 
 
95 ibid 10; contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 32(1). 
 
96 ibid 10; mounting to attempting and interfering with the free exercise of the franchise of voters contrary to 
Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 26(c). 
 
97 ibid 11, contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2000, ss12 (e) and (f) amounting to failing to take measures to 
ensure that the entire electoral process is conducted under conditions of freedom and fairness. 
 
98  ibid. 
 
99 ibid 13; amounting to using words or making statements that were malicious contrary to Presidential Elections Act 
2000, s 24(5)(b) ; amounting to defamatory and or insulting words contrary to Electoral Commission Act 1997, s 
23(3)(b). 
  
100 ibid 15, contrary to to Electoral Commission Act 1997.s 64. 
 
101 ibid 17, contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 43(2)(a). 
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President and threatening to cause death to the petitioner.102 The Supreme Court found 
unanimously that there were widespread violations of the Presidential Elections Act, and the 
Electoral Commission Act as a result of intimidation, voter buying and mismanagement of 
voters’ registers, publication of false statements and irregular voting.103 It also held that the 
second respondent did not comply with provisions of sections 28104 and 32(5)105 of the 
Presidential Elections Act.106 The Supreme Court also found that in many areas of the country, 
the principle of free and fair election was compromised.107 The Court uncovered evidence that in 
a significant number of polling stations there was cheating.108 However, by a majority of three to 
two, the Court concluded that the irregularities did not ‘substantially affect the outcome of the 
election’.109 Therefore, it could not annul the election under section 59(6)(a) of thePresidential 
Elections Act 2000.110 Also, by a majority of three to two, the Court held that no illegal practice or 
other offence under the Presidential Elections Act was proved to its satisfaction to have been 
committed in connection with the said election, by the first respondent personally or with his 
                                                                 
 
102 ibid. 
 
103 ibid [99] (Odoki C J). 
 
104 ibid [88] (Odoki C J); the section requires the Electoral Commission to publish in the Gazette 14 days prior to 
nomination of presidential candidates, a complete list of polling stations that will be used in the election. 
 
105 ibid [86] (Odoki C J); the subsection requires the Electoral Commission to provide every presidential candidate 
in the elections with an official copy of the voters register for use by his or her agents on polling day. 
 
106 ibid [110] (Odoki C J). 
 
107 ibid [129] (Odoki C J). 
 
108 ibid [101] (Odoki C J). 
 
109 ibid [156] (Odoki CJ). 
 
110 Under the Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 59(6)(a) the Supreme Court may issue a declaration annulling 
elections where it is satisfied that there has been noncompliance with the provisions contained in the same Act and 
the noncompliance affected the outcome of the election in a substantial manner. 
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knowledge and consent or approval by his agent.111 Thus, it could not invalidate the elections 
under section 59(6)(c) of thePresidential Elections Act 2000.112 The number of Supreme Court 
Judges that ruled in favour and those against annulling the election not only suggest that it was a 
‘close call’, but also indicates disagreements among the judges. 
 
Among the main complaints made by the petitioner, following the 2006 presidential elections in 
the case of Rtd Col Kizza Besigye v the Electoral Commission and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,113 
were that the elections were characterised by acts of intimidation, voter buying, lack of 
transparency, unfairness and violence and the commission of numerous offences and illegal 
practices by the incumbent contrary to the Presidential Elections Act and the Electoral 
Commissions Act.The petitioner’s allegations against the second respondent included illegal 
practices and offences committed by the President personally.114 It was alleged that President 
Museveni personally committed acts of bribery of the electorate personally or by his agents with 
his knowledge and consent or approval, before and during the elections, which interfered with 
the free exercise of the voters’ franchise.115 The petitioner also argued that section 59(6) of the 
Presidential Elections Act116 conflicts with article 104(1) of the Constitution.117 With regards to 
                                                                 
 
111 Presidential Election Petition No.1 2001 (n 90) [149] (Odoki CJ). 
 
112 Under the Presidential Elections Act 2000, s 59(6)(c) the Supreme Court may issue a declaration annulling 
elections where it is satisfied that an offence was committed under the Act by the candidate personally or with the 
candidates knowledge or approval by the candidate’s  agent. 
 
113 Presidential Petition No.1 of 2006 [2006] UGSC 24(Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006). 
 
114 ibid 9-12. 
 
115 ibid 11; contrary to Presidential Elections Act 2005, s 64. 
 
116 ibid 13; the section provides grounds under which a presidential election may be annulled.  
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the first respondent, the petitioner alleged breaches of the electoral laws in the 
disenfranchisement of voters due to their deletion from the voters’ register118 and failure to 
cancel the results of polling stations where gross electoral malpractices had occurred.119 
 
The petitioner complained of further malpractices allowed in the election by the first respondent 
such as multiple voting, vote stuffing, and failure to declare results in accordance with the law as 
well as the absence of freedom and fairness in the whole electoral process.120 Besigye therefore 
contended that because of the electoral malpractices that occurred before, during and after the 
elections, President Museveni was not duly elected as president. He sought a declaration 
annulling the election. 
 
 With regards to the allegations against the 1st respondent, the Supreme Court found unanimously 
that there was lack of compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Presidential 
Elections Act and the Electoral Commission Act in the conduct of the 2006 presidential 
elections.121 The Court held that the Electoral Commission disenfranchised voters by removing 
their names from the voters’ register, thus denying them the right to vote.122 The Court also 
unanimously found that the principle of free and fair elections was compromised by widespread 
bribery, intimidation and violence in some areas of the country and the principles of equal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
117 The provision allows an aggrieved presidential candidate to petition the Supreme Court for an order that the 
candidate declared by the Electoral Commission was not validly elected. 
 
118 Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2006 (n 113) 13; contrary to Electoral Commission Act 1997, s 19. 
 
119 ibid15; contrary to Electoral Commission Act 1997 s15 (1). 
 
120 ibid 17; amounting to attempting and to interfering with the free exercise of the franchise of voters contrary to 
Presidential Elections Act 2005, s 26(c). 
 
121 ibid [98] (Odoki CJ). 
 
122 ibid [61] (Odoki CJ). 
 
 
282 
 
suffrage, transparency and secrecy were infringed by multiple voting, vote stuffing and incorrect 
methods of ascertaining the results.123 By a majority decision of five to two, the Court found that 
no illegal practice or offence was proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been committed 
in connection with the said election either by President Museveni personally or by his agents 
with his knowledge or approval. Consequently, the Court declared that it could not annul the 
election on the basis of the violation of alleged violation of s 59 (6) (c) of the Presidential 
Elections Act.124 
 
With regard to whether or not the contraventions to the electoral law affected the outcome of the 
election in a substantial way, the Court held that the noncompliance with electoral laws did not 
‘substantially affect the outcome of the election’.125 On this issue, the Supreme Court ruled 
against the petitioner on a majority of four to three, suggesting again that there were 
disagreements among the judges. 
 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kanyeihamba found that there was sufficient evidence presented 
in the 2006 presidential electoral petition that could enable the Court to decide that the 
presidential election was so badly conducted, and that it was fatally affected by irregularities, 
malpractices and illegalities as to affect the final results in a substantive manner, and. therefore 
the result of the election ought not to be upheld by the Court.126 He decried that the Court, having 
                                                                 
 
123 ibid [122] (Odoki C J). 
 
124 ibid [129] (Odoki CJ). 
 
125 ibid [144] (Odoki CJ). 
 
126  ibid, Reasons for the findings and decision of Kanyeihamba J. 
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unanimously found that the alleged contraventions of the electoral laws occurred, they were 
bound to annul the election, and to find otherwise would be based purely on the conjecture and 
personal inclination of the judges.127 He contended that:  
Such an opinion would be grossly unfair to Ugandans because the 1stRespondent refused adamantly to 
produce the only evidence which could have helped the Petitioner, Respondents and this Court to prove and 
be satisfied that the allegations that were irregularities, malpractices and illegalities were justified or 
unjustified.128 
 
In other words, for Justice Kanyeihamba, where the Court finds that there were unjustified 
widespread contraventions of electoral laws that affect the quality of the election, the Court 
should annul the election. 
 
5.1.1 Commentaries on the Supreme Court’s  decisions 
 
The decisions of the Supreme Court have undermined confidence in electoral laws for 
adjudicating presidential electoral disputes. In the light of Justice Kanyeihamba’s dissenting 
opinion,129 the judgments have also raised concerns about the independence of Justices of the 
Supreme Court from the President.130 According to Timothy Kalyegira, regardless of efforts by 
the judiciary to maintain its independence from the executive, the Court was used as a very 
important tool of the NRM to maintain its control of the presidency.131 The Supreme Court’s 
                                                                 
127 ibid [19] (Kanyeihamba J). 
 
128 ibid [20] (Kanyeihamba J). 
 
129 See (n 126). 
 
130 The 1995 Constitution (n 18), art 142(1) provides that Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the 
president acting on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission and with the approval of Parliament.  
 
131 Timothy Kalyegira, ‘Besigye vs. Museveni-Part II’ Daily Monitor (Kampala, 21 February 2006) 1. 
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rulings have also exposed Uganda’s propensity towards returning to violent struggles for 
political power. Besigye has been reported as saying that he will no longer challenge the 
outcome of elections through the courts, and that President Museveni should be ousted from 
power by the use of force.132 
 
With regard to the 2006 presidential election petition, Arthur George Kamya suggested that the 
Court barked a little but nevertheless let the sleeping dogs lie in terms of the big decision; the 
annulment.133 He remarked that while this may have been controversial to some, it is the mark of 
a legally wise Court that understands the importance, extent and fragility of its institutional 
role.134A legislator and a member of the opposition party lamented that the Court made that 
ruling under fear of persecution from the state.135 He declared that the Judges insinuated that 
Besigye won but feared repercussions.136 
 
In a recent interview, Chief Justice Odoki who delivered the leading judgments in both 
presidential electoral petitions was asked if the Court made a political decision. He was quoted as 
saying, ‘Elections are a political decision, they are not legal decisions, and therefore the decision 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
132 Ismail Musa Ladu and Frederic Musisi, ‘Museveni must be Removed Forcefully -Besigye’ Daily Monitor 
(Kampala, 7 October 2011) 2. 
 
133 Arthur George Kamya, ‘Supreme Court Generally Got it Right on the Election Petition’ Daily Monitor (Kampala, 
13 April 2006) 3. 
 
134 ibid. 
 
135 Emma Mutaizibwa, ‘Political Implication of Supreme Court Ruling’ Monitor (Kampala, 12 April 2006) 3. 
 
136 ibid. 
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has political implications based on law.137 They are not about law; they are about choice of 
leaders and the governance of the country’.138 Chief Justice Odoki declined to comment on 
Justice Kanyeihamba’s dissenting opinion but admitted that President Museveni escaped 
narrowly.139 He also averred that ordering that the elections should be repeated, would not have 
guaranteed that future elections would be free and fair.140 
  
There was no legal challenge to the presidential election of 2011. It may well be that confidence 
in electoral laws for adjudicating presidential complaints was eroded following the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. The stances of the Supreme Court that even where it is finds that there were 
widespread violations of electoral laws, it will only annul presidential elections when the 
petitioner proves to the Court that the violation of electoral laws affected the outcome of the 
elections in a substantial way, or where violations of electoral laws were committed by the 
victorious candidate personally or with his or her approval or consent by the candidate’s agent, 
have been condemned as hindrances to democratic change and to the prospects of replacing 
President Museveni. These form some of the main reasons of discontent that electoral laws have 
obstructed rather than promoted smooth transfer of the office of the president. Judging on the 
basis of the commentaries on the Supreme Court’s decisions, there is little understanding, in 
Uganda, of the legal principles on which the Court’s decisions are based. 
 
                                                                 
137 Suleiman Kakaire, ‘Besigye Petitions: Museveni Got Narrowly- Odoki’ The Observer (Kampala, 31 March 2013) 
2. 
 
138 ibid. 
 
139 ibid. 
 
140 ibid. 
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 I will now investigate these legal principles not only to provide an understanding of them but 
also to offer an alternative interpretation of the principles, and to highlight the deficiencies in the 
law. The overall aim is to assess the efficacy of presidential electoral laws in facilitating fair 
contestation for the smooth transfer of political power. 
 
5.1.2 Legal principles for annulling elections under Section 59(6) of the Presidential 
Elections Act 2010 
 
The Court’s competence to inquire into any aspects of presidential elections in Uganda is an 
initiative of the 1995 Constitution141 as direct presidential elections in Uganda were introduced 
by it.142 The legislative intent of section 59(6)(c) of the Presidential Elections Act 2010143 
appears to address a need to prevent presidential candidates from committing electoral offences 
similar to those witnessed during the 1980 elections. As previously discussed in chapter two, 
sections 4 and 7, President Obote committed act s such as intimidation of voters and threatening 
to cause death to his political opponents. By so doing, he disenfranchised voters and 
disadvantaged his opponents in the 1980 elections, which worked out in his favour. Under the 
post-1995 presidential electoral legal framework, similar act are recognised as electoral offences 
and they have been statutorily prohibited by the Presidential Elections Act and the Electoral 
Commission Act as I noted earlier in this chapter.144 
                                                                 
141 The 1995 Constitution (n 18), art 104. 
 
142 ibid art 103. 
 
143 The section allows the Supreme Court to annul presidential elections where it is satisfied that the candidate 
declared the winner personally committed offences under the Act , or where offences under the Act were committed 
with his or her knowledge and consent. 
 
144 See section 3 of this chapter. 
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Regarding the 2001145 and 2006146 presidential election petitions, although the Supreme Court 
found violations of electoral laws, it held that the violations were not committed by President 
Museveni, or with his knowledge or approval  by his agent and thus it could not invalidate the 
elections on the basis of section 59(6)(c) of the Presidential Elections Act.This suggests that this 
provision imposes an obligation on presidential candidates to conduct themselves in a manner 
that does not defeat or violate electoral laws. Sub-section (c) also implies personal liability. 
Violations of electoral laws, even those from which a presidential candidate gains unfair 
electoral advantages do not engage the presidential candidate’s liability if they are not committed 
by the candidate or by his or her agent with the candidate’s knowledge or approval. Therefore, 
undersection 59(6)(c), the Supreme Court may only invalidate elections where a presidential 
candidate personally fails in his or her obligation in electoral conduct. 
 
 With regard to section 59(6)(b), which allows the Supreme Court to invalidate an election where 
the candidate declared as president following the outcome of an election was at the time of the 
election not qualified or was disqualified as a president candidate,147 the mischief that the 
provision is designed to remedy is to exclude presidential candidates who do not meet the 
constitutional criteria for the presidency.148 The purpose of this provision is to preserve the 
caliber of presidential candidates from which the electorate can choose, based on a constitutional 
imposed criterion. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
145 Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2001 (n 90). 
 
146 Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006 (n 113). 
 
147 The Presidential Elections Act 2005, art 59(6)(b). 
 
148 See (n 56); (n 57). 
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The most contentious ground under subsection 59(6)(a) of the Presidential Elections Act has its 
origin in international human rights law. At the international level, article 21(3) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948149 and article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966150 are the fountain treaties from which the legal 
principle that authority to govern shall be based on the will of the people as expressed in periodic 
and genuine elections flows. The concept of a popular government that emerges out of genuine 
elections is also common to regional treaties. In Africa, it is found under article 13(1) of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 1981.151 In the Americas, it is 
provided for under article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 1969152 
and in Europe the concept is found under article 3 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.153 Together, international and regional treaties 
                                                                 
 
149  Art 21(3) provides that ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government. This will be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’.    
 
150 Art 25 states that ‘Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in art 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country’. 
 
151 Art 13(1) provides that ‘Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law. (2) Every 
citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country’. 
 
152 Art 23 provides for right to participate in government: (1) Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and 
opportunities: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to 
vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret 
ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and (c) to have access, under g eneral conditions of 
equality, to the public service of his country. (2) The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities 
referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil a nd 
mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings. 
 
153 Art 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
provides that High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of legislature.  
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provide the sources of principles that capture the human aspiration to be governed through the 
genuine will of the people and underpin it as a legal obligation that states must observe. This 
concept that the authority to govern must be based on the genuine will of the people has been 
transported into the Constitutions of many states154 which have been negotiated between the 
people and their governments. The 1995 Constitution of Uganda also expresses that regular, free 
and fair elections constitute the basis of the authority of governments and the only legal way of 
transferring political power.155 Therefore, the concept that the authority to govern must be 
founded on the free will of the people has international, regional and domestic popular appeal. 
State conduct in relation to this human aspiration is also open to legal scrutiny. International, 
regional and domestic rules cumulate into universal legal principles which provide a basis for 
measuring if a state’s actions give effect to this human aspiration.   
 
These universal legal principles seek to promote and protect humanity’s yearning to be governed 
through consent. Starting with the UDHR and the ICCPR, and ending with domestic laws, there 
are well established universal legal principles for protecting and promoting the will of people 
which provide rules for conducting elections with integrity, protecting the political environment 
and citizen participation and the adjudicating electoral complaints. These principles act as a basis 
for measuring if domestic electoral laws,156 violates the accepted principles.157 They also form 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
154  African examples of these include Constitution of Angola 2010, art 4 (1); Constitution of Benin 1990, arts 3-6; 
Constitution of Burkina Faso 1991, art 37; Constitution of Burundi 2005, art s 7 and 8. 
 
155 The 1995 Constitution (n 18), art 1(4) provides that the people shall express their will and consent on who shall 
govern them and how they should be governed, through regular, free and fair elections of their representative or 
through a referenda. 
 
156 In the case of  Luis Felipe Bravo Mena v Mexico (10/7/93), Case 10.956 the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights held that international standards are applicable in any case in which the rights of individuals, political 
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the legal principles which are applied by the courts to protect the will of the people in the 
adjudication of electoral complaints. The danger, however, is regardless of how undemocratic or 
unfair electoral laws and systems in a country or jurisdiction are, legal norms for adjudicating 
electoral complaints are founded on the notion that outcomes of elections are pure and 
uncorrupted and should only be invalidated in exceptional circumstances.  
 
In many states, electoral laws indicate that where the validity of the election’s validity is 
challenged on the basis that irregularities, to succeed, the complainant must prove that the 
irregularities changed the outcome of the election in a substantial manner.158 This is because 
elections are meant to give voice to the will of the people and to give authority to governments to 
exercise power. Therefore, technical irregularities during elections should not affect the declared 
results unless they distort the will of the people and result in changing the outcome of elections. 
It thus follows that courts all over the world have frequently held that election outcomes should 
only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances; where evidence of illegality, dishonesty, 
unfairness, malfeasance or other misconduct is clear and most importantly; where such improper 
behaviour has distorted the will of the people.159 This ideology, which is intended to protect the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
or otherwise, are being infringed. The case related to various allegations of e lectoral irregularities which the 
government of Mexico argued were solely within the purview of domestic remedial organs. 
 
157  In the case of Zdanoka v Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 58278/00, Judgment of 16 March 2006, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that although a State will be afforded a margin of appreciation in implementing 
electoral laws, electoral laws must not depart from the accepted principles which give effect to the will of the 
people; also see D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, No. 57325/00. 
 
158  See Elections Act No. 24 of 2011, s 83of Kenya; Law on the Election of Members of Parliament 2002, art 100 
(2) of Macedonia; Presidential and Vice-President Election Act No.31, 1952 art 18 (b) of India. 
 
159 See Alhaji Mohamed D. Yusuf v Chief Olusegun A. Obasanjo & 56 ORS SC.122/2003, 2003(10) LEDLR 1, 
[2003] - Supreme Court of Nigeria; Anderson Kambela Mazoka and 3 Others v Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and 3 
Others, Presidential Petition No. SCZ/01/02/03/2002 - Supreme Court of Zambia; Andrews v Blackman, 59 So.769 
(La.1912) - Louisiana Supreme Court of USA; Mbowe v Eliufoo (1967) EA 240- Court of Appeal of Tanzania; 
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genuine will of the people, forms the basis for annulling elections under subsection 59(6)(a) of 
the Presidential Elections Act. It is therefore trite international law that absent electoral 
irregularities affecting the outcome of elections in a substantial manner, candidates, parties and 
the electorate that lose elections should accept electoral outcomes rather than routinely claim that 
the elections and the governments they produce are illegitimate. 
 
Aided by the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 2001160 and 2006161 presidential electoral 
petitions, we can conclude that they are three reasons that could form the basis of annulling 
presidential elections in Uganda. Ground one: under section 59(6)(c) of the Presidential Elections 
Act, that the victorious presidential candidate personally or through his agent with his knowledge 
or approval acted in a manner that defeated or violated electoral laws and thus failed in his or her 
obligation in electoral conduct. Ground two: under section 59(6)(b) of the Presidential Elections 
Act, where the person who has been declared president did not meet the eligibility conditions for 
the presidency. Ground three: under section 59(6)(a) of the Presidential Elections Act, that during 
the election, there were wide violations of electoral laws which affected the outcome of the 
election in a substantial manner. There are, however, several reasons that form the basis of 
criticising these principles for adjudicating presidential complaints and the decisions of the 
Supreme Court.  I will now turn to those reasons. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Morgan & Others v Simpsons [1974] 3 ALL E.R 722, [1975] QB 151- High Court of England; Solomon v Turquoise 
Ltd (2008), VUSC 64 - High Court of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
 
160 Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2001 (n 90). 
 
161 Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006 (n 113). 
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5.1.3 Deficiencies in section 59(6)(c) of the Presidential Elections Act 2010 
 
In the 2001162 and 2006163 presidential electoral petitions, despite the Supreme Court’s findings 
of widespread violations of electoral laws, it held that the violations were not personally 
committed by President Museveni or his knowledge or approval by his agent. It is however 
reasonable to conclude that the President acquired advantages in the elections as the result of the 
electoral offences which also disadvantaged his competitors. The overall effect of such electoral 
offences was that they distorted the will of the people. I have argued in the section above that 
legislative intent on the grounds of section 59(6)(c) of the Presidential Elections Act appears to 
be the need to prevent presidential candidates from committing electoral offences similar to 
those witnessed during the 1980 elections and to benefit from them. The fact is that President 
Museveni acquired electoral gains as a result of the violation of electoral laws. The law should 
allow for elections to be annulled, where a candidate gains advantage over his or her competitors 
as a result of widespread violations of electoral laws regardless of whether the electoral 
violations were committed by the candidate declared as president personally or with the 
knowledge or approval of the candidate by his or her agent. 
 
The reason for annulling the election should be that there were widespread electoral offences 
committed during the election, and owing to the offences, the victorious candidate gained unfair 
advantage over other competitors. This is because any unfair advantage gained as a result of 
                                                                 
 
162 Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2001 (n 90). 
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electoral offences such as voter bribe and intimidation distorts the will of the people and affects 
the outcome of elections. The will of the people cannot be said to be protected where widespread 
evidence of electoral violations that distort it are acknowledged but ignored by the Court simply 
because the violations were not committed by the victorious candidate or by his or her agents 
with the candidate’s knowledge or approval. Although perfect compliance with electoral laws in 
every instance is unlikely, and the Court should avoid nullifying an election based on minor 
violations of technical requirements, it should determine whether provisions of electoral laws are 
mandatory or directory. In the alternative, the Presidential Elections Act should expressly declare 
an offence to be mandatory if its violation is essential to the validity of an election. Mandatory 
provisions would include those that prohibit voter disenfranchisement, such as voter bribe and 
voter intimidation. Widespread violations of such provisions distort the will of the people and 
should form the basis of annulling an election regardless of whether or not they are committed by 
the victorious candidate, by his or her agent with the candidate’s knowledge or approval. 
Directory provisions would be those that require candidates to conduct themselves in a respectful 
manner towards each other, such as prohibit defamatory remarks among candidates. 
 
 It is also impossible to imagine how the incumbent presidential candidate in whom all the 
powers of the state are vested, as discussed in the last chapter, can fail to hide evidence of 
electoral offences that he or she committed or those committed by his or her agent with his or her 
knowledge or approval, in order for the Court to annul the elections on this ground. Moreover, in 
civil proceedings, such as electoral challenges, the burden of proof should lie with the petitioner 
to prove the allegations made against the respondent ‘on the balance of probabilities’.164 
                                                                 
164 See F.H. v McDougall (2008) S.C.J. No. 54. 
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However, the Supreme Court’s decisions indicate that the petitioner has to prove the allegations 
made against the respondent on a higher threshold that is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ to the 
satisfaction of the Court,165 which is the standard of evidence required to validate a criminal 
conviction.166 In this regard, subsection 59(6)(c) is deficient in preserving the will of the people 
and in facilitating fair competition for the presidency in that it allows the outcome of elections to 
stand, even where there is clear evidence that the candidate declared as president benefited from 
electoral violations, simply because the petitioner cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
candidate declared as president committed violations of electoral laws personally or that they 
were committed by his or her  agent with the candidate’s knowledge or approval. 
 
5.1.4 Interpretation of section 59(6)(a) of the Presidential Elections Act 2010 
 
In interpreting the phrase ‘affected the results of the election in a substantial manner’ under 
section 59(6)(a) of the Presidential Elections Act, the Supreme Court in the 2001 presidential 
election petition was guided by two authorities, namely, the cases of Mbowe v Eliufoo167 and Re 
Kensington North Parliamentary Election.168 In the former case Georges CJ defined the phrase 
‘affected the result’ in the following words: 
                                                                 
165 In the 2001 and 2006 presidential election petitions, the Supreme Court cited Mbowe v Eliufoo (1967) EA 240 as 
one of the leading authorities that the burden of proof lies with the petitioner in electoral petitions who must prove 
the allegation against the Respondent at standard required to validate a criminal conviction.  
 
166 Kristoffel Grechenig, Andreas Nicklisch and Christian Thoeni, ‘Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A 
Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions under Uncertainty’ [2010] 7(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies  847, 
862. 
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In my view the phrase “affected the result” the word “result” means not only the result in the sense that a 
certain candidate won and the other lost. The result may be said to be affected after making adjustment, the 
effect of proved irregularities the contest seems much clear closer than it appears to be when first determined. 
But when the winning majority is so large that even a substantial deduction still leaves the successful 
candidate a wide margin, then it cannot be affected by any noncompliance of the rules.169 
 
In the latter case, Justice Boyce reasoned that: 
Out of the total voting electorate of persons who recorded their votes, three or possibly four were shown by 
the evidence to have votes without having a mark placed against their names in the register and each of them 
voted only once. Even if one was to assume in favour of the Petitioner that some proportion of the reminder of 
111 persons, who we have not seen were in somewhat similar case, there does not seem to be a thread of 
evidence that there is any substantial noncompliance with the provision requiring a mark to be placed against 
the voters names in the register; and when the only evidence before the court is that three or possibly four 
people who are affected in that they recorded their votes without a mark placed against their names, each 
voted only once, one cannot possibly come to the conclus ion that although there was a breach of statutory 
rules, the breach could have had any effect on the result of the election. Even if all the 117 persons were 
similarly affected, it could not possibly have affected the result of the election; therefore, alt hough there was a 
breach in regard to the matter set out in para 3(1) of the petition, I should be prepared to say that there was a 
substantial compliance with the law in this respect governing elections and that omission to place a mark 
against the names did not affect the result.170 
 
In order to determine that the electoral malpractices did not affect the outcome of the elections in 
a substantial manner, the Courts in Mbowe171 and in Re Kensington172 took a similar approach. 
They quantified the number of votes which the petitioners alleged they were deprived of as the 
result of the electoral malpractices and deducted that number from the total votes cast in favour of 
the respondents in order to determine if ‘but for’ the malpractices, the petitioners would have won 
the election. Where the majority margin between the respondent and the petitioner was so wide 
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170 See (n 166) [115] (Boyce J). 
 
171 See (n 165). 
 
172 See (n 166). 
 
 
296 
 
that even allowing for the votes deprived of the petitioner as a result of the malpractices, the 
respondents would still have won the election; the Courts could not invalidate the election. 
Before I proceed, it is important to record here that the analysis of the elections in this section has 
been written numerically as opposed to the man8ner of writing found elsewhere in this study, so 
as to give the leader a quicker assessment of the crucial facts. In Mbowe173 there were 30,889 
voters on the register, of which 6,393 voted for the petitioner and the respondent was declared the 
winner with 20,213 votes. The majority margin between the respondent and the petitioner was 
13,820. 4,238 people did not vote. In these circumstances, even though the petitioner alleged 
intimidation of his voters by the respondent to the satisfaction of the Court, it could not invalidate 
the election because the majority margin between the respondent and the petitioner was so wide. 
Assuming that 4,238 did not vote because of intimidation and would all have cast their votes for 
the petitioner, the petitioner would still not have won the election. 
 
There is, however, a problem when it is not possible for the court to determine by quantification 
the number of voters that may have been affected by electoral malpractices such as voter bribe or 
intimidation.  In the 2001174and 2006175 presidential election petitions in Uganda, the Supreme 
Court found evidence of widespread voter bribing and intimidation. However, it was not possible 
for the Court to determine through quantification how many voters were bribed to vote for 
President Museveni, neither was it possible to quantify how many people did not vote because 
they were intimidated by the President’s supporters. However, the facts tell a different story. 
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According to the Uganda Electoral Commission report on the 2001 presidential elections, 
President Museveni acquired 5,123,360 votes; Kizza Besigye polled 2,055,795.176 The other 
presidential candidates polled as follows: Awori Aggrey - 103, 915; Bwengye Francis - 22,751; 
Karuhanga Chappa - 10,080; and Kibirige Mayanja Muhammad - 7,379.177 The total number of 
votes cast in the election was 7,389,691,178 and there were 10,775,836 on the voter register.179 
 
The majority margin between the President and the petitioner was 3,067,565. According to the 
evidence submitted to the Supreme Court by the Uganda Electoral Commission, the total number 
of invalid votes cast was 186,453.180 3,386,145 people did not vote and may have been prevented 
from doing so by the intimidation meted out by President Museveni’s supporters. The number of 
eligible voters that did not vote (3,386,145), even though their reasons for not voting could not be 
ascertained was more than the majority margin between President Museveni and the petitioner 
(3,067,565) without considering the invalid votes cast (186,453).  It is also not known how many 
people were bribed to vote for the President.  Do these facts suggest that the Supreme Court got it 
wrong?  Although it is not possible to accurately ascertain the reasons why 3,386,145 people did 
not vote, on analysis, the facts damage the credibility of the elections and the legitimacy of 
President Museveni’s presidency. It should be noted that in a country with an unviable record of 
electoral malpractices, if in doubt, the Supreme Court had the option of ordering a new election 
under 59(5) of the Presidential Elections Act 2010. 
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5.1.5  ‘Results of elections’ as a question of quality but not quantity  
 
The legitimacy of a democratic government is established, in large measure, by credible 
elections. Credible elections occur in an electoral environment in which the citizenry can 
participate without fear or obstruction; political parties, candidates and the media can operate 
freely; an independent judiciary functions fairly and expeditiously; electoral authorities operate 
impartially; and where electoral laws are adhered to and they do favour a particularly candidate. 
 
It is therefore, important that the law should seek to protect these factors in order to preserve the 
elections’ credibility or quality. In some jurisdictions, electoral laws seek to achieve this aim.181 
Courts have also sought to do the same. In the case of Valance v Rosier182 the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana held that: 
If the court finds that the proven frauds and irregularities were of such serious nature as to deprive the voters 
of the free expression of their will or as to make it impossible to determine the outcome of the election, it will 
decree the nullity of the entire election even though the contestant cannot prove that he would have been 
elected but for such fraud or irregularities.183 
 
This case stands for the proposition that where there are widespread violations of electoral laws 
which distort the will of people, and thereby affect the quality of the elections, the elections 
should be annulled.184 
                                                                 
181 Electoral Act 73 1998, s 56 (a) of South Africa allows the Electoral Commission or the Electoral Court to declare 
elections invalid where a serious irregularity has occurred concerning any aspect of an election;  Electoral Act 2010, 
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 Another example of where the Court invalidated an election because it was conducted so badly 
and, therefore, the credibility of the election could not be assured is in the Hackney Case, Gill v 
Reed and Holms.185 In this case, only two of the nineteen polling stations were closed and five 
thousand voters could not vote. The Court did not engage in the impossible exercise of 
determining which candidate would have benefited from the five thousand votes had they been 
cast but annulled the election on the basis that it was badly conducted in noncompliant with 
electoral laws. 
 
 In this context, the ‘result of an election’ is conceptualised as a question of quality that informs 
an election’s outcome. The result is perceived as the entire electoral process and is not limited to 
voting-the outcome of the elections, which cannot be guaranteed where the processes that deliver 
the outcome are corroded.  
 
I previously discussed in chapter two, section 4 of this study how Uganda’s only post-
independence attempt at conducting elections in 1980 was marred by electoral illegalities.  I also 
discussed how historically political power was held at all costs by unelected leaders before 1995. 
These factors, including the need to reverse the country’s history of political and constitutional 
instability, as indicated in the Preamble of the 1995 Constitution motivated the country’s desire to 
hold free and fair elections in order to be ruled by consent. These values are contained in 
principles of allocating and exercising the powers contained in article 1 of the 1995 Constitution 
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and the National Objective and Directive Principles of State Policy therein.186 In the 2006 
presidential electoral petition,187the Supreme Court found instances of ballot paper stuffing in at 
least twenty-two out of the sixty-nine districts, and over two thousand ballot papers were stuffed 
at one polling station and more than six hundred people voted at a sham polling station.188 It also 
found evidence of falsification of results by the Ugandan Electoral Commission, voter 
intimidation and voter bribe by persons associated with the President.189 These widespread 
electoral malpractices violated core constitutional values of allocating and exercising power in a 
substantial manner in the sense that they undermined the core constitutional principles on which 
the new democratic dispensation in Uganda was founded, and, in doing so, they affected the 
quality of elections as envisioned by the citizenry of Uganda and as provided for under the 1995 
Constitution. 
 
It maybe stated that where elections are conducted in noncompliance with electoral laws or in 
disregard of the core constitutional and democratic values, the quality of the elections is affected 
and so is the result of the elections affected in a substantial manner in the terms of section 
59(6)(a) of the Presidential Elections Act. Therefore, the elections should be annulled. In this 
regard, the interpretation of the results of the elections as meaning number of votes cast but not 
quality of the electoral process, which was employed by the Supreme Court fails to protect the 
                                                                 
186 During the constitution-making process, the Constitution Committee noted that Ugandans wished to see the end 
of manipulated elections and unelected leaders. There was consensus that fair electoral laws should built into the 
new constitution in order for elections to be the mechanism for the smooth transfer of power from one 
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quality of elections. In doing so, it does not facilitate fair contestation for the presidency and 
protect the will of the people. 
 
5.2 Amendment to the 1995 Constitution to repeal the two-term limits on the re-election  
of a president 
 
 Following the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections, civil society groups in Uganda 
identified the amendment of the Constitution of 1995 to repeal the two-term limits on the re-
election of the president as one of the outstanding controversial governance issues in post-1995 
Uganda.190 The Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda, a broad alliance that 
claims to bring together over six hundred like-minded civil society organisations and over eight 
thousand individuals to advocate electoral democracy in the country, identified the restoration of 
the presidential term limits in the Constitution, as the number one issue in its post-2011 citizens’ 
elections reform agenda.191 In April 2013, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative Uganda, a 
non-governmental human rights advocacy organisation, reported that members of the fourth post-
1995 Parliament served the Speaker of the Parliament of Uganda with a notice of intention to 
introduce a Private Member’s Bill, which sought to restore the presidential re-election limits in 
the Constitution.192 Johnnie Carson has argued that Uganda’s march toward full democracy has 
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been declared unglued by efforts to alter the country’s Constitution to allow President Museveni 
to run for more presidential terms.193 According  to study carried out by Afrobarometer, sixty-
seven percent of Ugandans surveyed in 2010 strongly felt that the 1995 Constitution should be re-
amended to limit a president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.194 
 
President Museveni’s quest to amend the 1995 Constitution is an illustration of a common plague 
that has characterised the rule of previous heads of state in Uganda, as well as other African 
leaders,195- an unwillingness to follow constitutional norms and to give up political power. The 
motivations behind such moves are wide-ranging. Several Presidents in resource-reliant 
developing countries have attempted to remold their country’s Constitutions for their own 
benefit, by removing presidential term limits on re-election, in order to have access to state 
resources.196 Given the discovery of oil in Uganda, it may be argued that President Museveni has 
followed the same trend so he can to access the revenue from the oil. For the purposes of this 
study, the amendment to repeal the presidential term limits is conceptualised as a challenge to the 
fair contestation for the presidency in that while elections envisage the possibility of the 
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alteration of power, repealing the Constitution to remove the presidential term limits has allowed 
President Museven to compete in presidential elections from which he has emerged victorious 
without the possibility of defeat. In this regard, the amendment is perceived as one of the 
provisions of the presidential electoral laws that poses a challenge to the transfer of power, and 
which has sustained the President’s grip on power. 
 
5.2.1 The effects of repealing the term limits on the re-election of the president of 
Uganda 
 
 A cleric, who is one of Uganda’s leading critics of the removal of 1995 Constitution’s 
presidential term limits, has contended that the amendment has created regime longevity which 
has undermined and patronised democratic institutions.197 Other opponents have argued that the 
amendment sets a bad precedent for future leaders who will always amend laws to suit their 
narrow and selfish interests.198 It has also been claimed that constitutional presidential term 
limits are necessary to ensure that the presidency does not become a lifetime position which 
could resemble a monarch, resulting in the realisation of one of the greatest fears of the current 
generation where a president would serve four or five times and after, bequeath the presidency to 
his or her child.199 Furthermore, it has been claimed, that an unlimited presidency hinders the 
grooming of new generations of potential presidential candidates. Faced with a strong president 
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who wants to continue to serve indefinitely, potential leaders may focus their energies 
elsewhere.200 
 
Indeed, the meteoric rise of President Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, through the 
military ranks to the rank of Brigadier has been one of the fastest in the country's armed forces, 
and to observers, it is symbolic of the President’s intention to groom his son to succeed him.201 
In a study of constitutional systems in Latin American states, Scot Mainwaring and Mathew 
Shugart have concluded that electoral laws which allow for unlimited tenures for the presidency, 
where the surrounding institutions such as Parliament and the judiciary are weak, create an 
atmosphere of disrespect for the rule of law by a president.202 
 
The amendment of the 1995 Constitution to repeal the presidential two-term limits has created a 
sitting President without limit to his tenure and by extension an entrenched regime in Uganda. In 
developing democracies, such as Uganda, constitutional limits on presidential re-election are 
essential to encourage fair competition and access to political power and to mitigate excessive 
use of executive powers. To encourage fair political competition, several countries in Africa 
limited presidential terms through Constitutions.203 Some countries have resisted attempts by 
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their leaders to repeal the presidential term limits for the same reason.204 Ideally, electoral laws 
should impose limits on the tenure of the executive to improve participatory politics and to 
provide a clear mechanism of transferring state powers, especially in Uganda, where heads of 
state have tried to hold power permanently. 
 
The removal of the two-term presidential limit has also exposed the flaws in the 1995 
Constitution and its susceptibility to executive manipulation, intended to entrench political 
power. In this context, it has undermined any tone of constitutionalism in the Constitution. As I 
have argued in chapter three, section 5 of this study, the absence of sound safeguards on the 
amendments of a constitution makes it extremely difficult for a constitution to promote 
constitutionalism.According to a survey conducted by Research World International Limited, 
almost fifty-six percent of Ugandans want President Museveni to leave power by the end of his 
current mandate in 2016.205 However, there are no signs yet that the incumbent wishes to loosen 
his grip on power after twenty-nine years and it has been reported that the President will contest 
the 2016 presidential elections.206 
 
Once in power, following the amendment, electoral laws in Uganda establish a presidency that 
has no limit on how long it can access power. The 1995 Constitution also provides the 
presidency with a monopoly over the organs for transferring and maintaining power such as the 
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electoral management body 207 and the armed forces.208 Furthermore, as I have argued above in 
this chapter, electoral laws have been structured and construed in a way that makes it impossible 
to vote out the incumbent out of office. It may therefore be stated the presidency depends on its 
constitutional dominance and not the electorate’s mandate to stay in power. 
 
Every five years, elections are conducted as provided for under the 1995 Constitution.209 
However, the electoral process does not determine the popularity of incumbent; it simply 
confirms the presidency’s control over the organs of power that has been granted by the 
Constitution. The will of the people in choosing whether to elect a politician provides one of the 
key forms of accountability in democracies. It is elections and the wish to be elected that 
encourages politicians to work for and to be accountable to the electorate. However, elections in 
Uganda do not provide an incentive for a president to work for the people. They are a façade for 
democracy. They pose no threat or prospects of taking away political power from the incumbent 
president.  
 
Limitless presidential term limits have resulted in the conception of state power as personal 
possession of the President who has no limit to it. It therefore comes as no surprise that President 
Museveni has sought to guard state power at all costs and to transfer it according to the person of 
his choice.210 It may also be argued that it has led him to disregard constitutional constraints on 
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the presidency and the wishes of the people of Uganda, as there is no threat that power could be 
withdrawn through constitutional processes. Consequently, the absence of this threat has created 
a dictatorship, disregard of the Constitution and a president-for-life. Elections have simply 
become a ritual intended to confirm the status quo that is the President and his government’s 
ownership of state power. The President’s ownership of power is further buttressed by colonial 
laws which outlaw criticism of the person that is a president211 thereby also creating an 
unaccountable presidency. One of the ways of moderating the dominance of the executive is by 
casting the design of the presidency in principles of constitutionalism. Also, seeking methods to 
encourage accountability to the people would improve confidence in democracy.  
 
Repealing the two-term presidential limit has also undermined the powers and the competence of 
Parliament as an arm of government for holding the executive accountable for its actions. By 
repealing the presidential term limits, the second Parliament of post-1995 Uganda succumbed to 
the President Museveni’s demand of granting him the presidency for life, and sent a message to 
the President and the people of Uganda that the President has no constitutional constraints and 
that he can alter the fundamental law to suit his ambitions. In this regard, like heads of state 
before him, President Museveni has exhibited his superiority over the 1995 Constitution. 
 
Semakula Kiwanuka, one of the main proponents of repealing the presidential term limits, wrote 
in 2003 that presidential term limits are undemocratic in the sense that they prevent the 
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development of durable and democratic institutions, limit the right of the people to choose 
leaders who may have served for more than the stipulated term limits, and are an unnecessary 
legal technicality which serves no purpose since a president could still be removed via the 
mechanism of periodic elections.212 Another adherent of unlimited presidential terms and an 
NRM Minister Amanya Mushega, writing much later, asserted that it is important that President 
Museveni continues with his development programs for the country as without him, they would 
not be achievable.213 He pointed to the fact that the President has been re-elected four times as 
symbolic of the peoples’ will for him to remain in power.214According to this perception, 
President Museveni and his presidency are seen as indispensable for Uganda’s development and 
its well-being.  
 
It was also argued by the Prime Minister at the time of the amendment- Apollo Nsibambi, that 
constitutional restrictions on the re-election of a president cannot prevent a dictatorship from 
emerging and, therefore, it was up to the people to decide.215 As long as a president renews his 
term of office in elections every five years, presidential term limits are irrelevant.216 The fact that 
several established democracies such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany do not 
impose term limits on the head of state was also cited as a justification for repealing article 
105(2) from the 1995 Constitution thus strengthening the argument that Ugandans should not 
foolishly make leaders ineligible for continued service, after completing two terms, if they would 
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still be the best choice for president.217 These countries, however, even in the absence of term 
limits, have developed solid systems that not only check their leaders' excesses but also ensure a 
periodic change of leadership, even if it is within the same ruling party. The position in Uganda 
is different. Having spent twenty-nine years in power, President Museveni's personality and 
dominance of state power through the 1995 Constitution overshadows all state institutions such 
as the armed forces, electoral management body, judiciary, police and the legislature. With his 
full access to the state resources and state machinery, President Museveni domination makes it 
impossible to challenge him. 
 
For proponents of limitless presidential terms, term limits are undemocratic because they restrict 
democratic choice. There are is no justifiable reason why the electorate should not continue to 
elect the same leader as many times as they would like to. When the electorate have had enough 
of their leader, they can announce their rejection of the leader through elections. This view 
perceives elections in Uganda as a trusted and uncorrupted way of transferring the political 
power. However, as this study has demonstrated, elections in Uganda are not enough to ensure 
that people have a choice and the Constitution makes provision for a president to whom all 
organs of power are beholden. Furthermore, limitless terms make it easier for incumbent 
candidates to corrupt and rig elections. Therefore, elections in Uganda do not provide a genuine 
and fair mechanism for the change of power. They also do not generate an accurate measure of a 
leader's popularity. Overall this means that the country needs to develop a mechanism of 
guaranteeing stability and continuity by ensuring smooth transition of power. Restoring 
presidential term limits in the 1995 Constitution can be a starting point. 
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To conclude, it is should be emphasised that in recommending that a president should serve a 
maximum of two terms, the Constitution Commission noted that Ugandans expressed a desire to 
put an end to the phenomenon of self-styled life presidents.218 The Constitution Review 
Commission found that eleven years after the report of the Constitution Commission, and most 
significantly at the time of the amendment, this desire had not changed among Ugandans.219 
 
5.2.2 The constitutionality of the constitutional amendment to repeal the term 
limits on the re-election of the president 
 
I have argued in chapter three, section 5 of this study that constitutionalism as a tool for ensuring 
limitations on government rests on defined control mechanisms, of which prohibition of arbitrary 
amendments of a constitution is one. It has widely been reported that repealing the presidential 
term limits from the Constitution was achieved through bribing legislators, as the government 
did not have the required majority to effect the constitutional amendment.220 Consequently, there 
is a dark stain on the integrity of Parliament as an institution whose constitutional role, among 
other duties, is to check presidential excesses. The traditional concept of separation of powers 
conceives division of powers in terms of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
Whichever of the three arms of government is given power to exercise; there must be 
constitutional limits to such powers. The arm of government to which power is granted must 
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exercise the power responsibly for the common good of the citizenry and within constitutional 
limits.221 The constitutional role of Parliament as an arm of government includes checking and 
balancing executive excesses and it achieved by protecting 1995 Constitution in order to promote 
the democratic governance of Uganda.222 I have also discussed in the previous chapter that the 
powers granted by a constitution may only be exercised for the purposes which they are granted 
and as envisioned by the Constitution.223 
 
Therefore, the constitutional role of Parliament is to act as the bastion of the Constitution and 
democratic rule, and to check and balance executive excess. In this regard, the powers granted to 
Parliament to amend the provision on the presidential term limits224 must only be exercised for 
the protection of constitutional values and democratic governance, which include preventing the 
misuse of presidential authority. One of the constitutional values as expressed by the people of 
Uganda during the constitution-making process is to put an end to the phenomenon of self-styled 
life presidents.225 With regard to its constitutional role to promote democratic governance, 
Parliament must ensure that it only endorses constitutional amendments that are democratic or 
those which are supported by the citizenry. Parliament’s constitutional role in checking and 
balancing executive excess is achieved through constraining presidential authority in order to 
prevent the presidency from degenerating into autocracy. However, by accepting financial 
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inducements in order to repeal the presidential term limits, the legislators disregarded their 
constitutional roles for financial gain.226 The constitutional mandate granted to Parliament to 
amend the provision on the term limits was not used for any of the purposes it was granted but it 
was utilised for consolidating powers of the executive and his government. As Dante Gatmaytan 
observes, constitutionalism cannot allow a constitution to be treated lightly through suspension, 
circumvention, or to be ignored by politicians.227 He also contends that a constitution can only be 
amended by procedures which are constitutional.228 There was no constitutionalism tone to the 
manner through which the limitless presidential terms were achieved. The amendment was also 
achieved through Parliament’s negligence of its constitutional roles. Furthermore, it was aimed at 
advancing the political ambitions of an individual and his government,229 and not through the 
approval and consent of the majority of Ugandans. 
 
The amendment to repeal the presidential term limits also undermined the sanctity of the 1995 
Constitution. Historically, as discussed in chapter two, section 3 Parliaments like other 
institutions of the state and fundamental laws, alike were hijacked by overbearing leaders who 
showed no respect for democratic institutions. This allowed successive heads of state to create 
fundamental laws that served to maintain their hold on power. In demanding to limit a president 
to two five year terms, the people of Uganda wished to create a presidency that is subordinate to 
the 1995 Constitution and not that which would commandeer the Constitution. An executive 
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constrained by the Constitution is a principal guarantee of constitutionalism. However, despite a 
history of heads of state bullying Parliaments into submission, the Constitution Commission 
recommended that one of the provisions underlying the values on which the new democratic 
dispensation in Uganda was to be built would be amended by Parliament.230 The Proceedings of 
the Constituent Assembly note that no modification was proposed to the provision as 
recommended by the Constitutional Committee. 231 
 
In this regard, the framers of the 1995 Constitution negligently or purposely failed to build 
sufficient safeguards into the Constitution to fend off arbitrary amendments. The 1995 
Constitution should have provided for such a core constitutional value could only be amended 
through a popular referendum. In allowing a Parliament that has historically been subservient to 
the executive to amend such a core constitutional value, the framers of the Constitution vested 
the authority of the citizenry, and the democratic and stability prospects of the country and in the 
hands of Parliament. Could it be claimed that the framers of the Constitution purposely 
unfastened the provision knowing that it will be easily amended to allow the President and the 
NRM permanent ownership of power?  Would Ugandans have rejected the 1995 Constitution if 
such a fundamental constitutional provision was not provided for by the Constitution when it was 
adopted?  Judging from the issues and occurrences that this study has explored which shaped the 
design of the presidency in the 1995 Constitution. These include the motivation of the framers of 
the Constitution, the apparent disregard of the views expressed by Ugandans who commented on 
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the presidency during the constitution-making and review processes, and the citizenry’s 
discontent with the removal of the term limits, the answer seems to be yes to both questions. 
 
The proviso that provides for Parliament to amend the presidential term limits232 also appears to 
violate and conflict with the most fundamental principles for allocating and exercising power as 
discussed in last chapter.233 The two most important principles provide that power belongs to the 
people234 and all authority in the state emanates from the people who shall express their will and 
consent on how they are governed.235 As such, any unlimited exercise of power must be 
authorised by the people. Moreover, as I have argued in chapter three236 any unlimited exercise 
of state power is unconstitutional because one of the aims constitutionalism is to limit the 
exercise of state powers in order to avert dictatorship.  It is for the people as a whole, and not 
Parliament to determine if a president may be re-elected indefinitely. While it may be argued that 
parliamentarians are representative of the people because they have been elected by the people, 
judging by the citizenry’s discontent with the amendment, and the financial inducement 
reportedly given by the NRM government to the legislators, it cannot be claimed that the 
amendment was approved by Parliament because it had the support of the majority of Ugandans.  
In principle, anamendment of a constitution is only justified to advance the broadly shared 
interests of the citizenry or in response to the nation’s exigencies at hand. It is even more suitable 
when the amendment is steered by the citizenry. As I have argued in chapter three, the absence 
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of sound safeguards against arbitrary constitutional amendments is symbolic of a constitution 
without constitutionalism.237 It may be argued that apart from the provisions that guarantee 
fundamental rights, no generation may bind future generations by making some provisions in a 
constitution unamendable. However, a constitution may only be altered for the benefit of the 
people and not to advance the political ambitions of any individual or any group. In a democracy, 
such crucial constitutional amendments should be effected through legal and transparent 
procedures where the free will of the people prevails.  Thus any unilateral amendment without 
the involvement of the people is unconstitutional.  
 
The constitution-making process that yielded the 1995 Constitution, may be perceived as an 
attempt by Uganda to develop a truly home-grown fundamental law through a consultative and 
participatory constitution-making process. Therefore, the 1995 Constitution belongs to the 
people as expressed therein.238 This implies that the people alone have the final say on such 
significant matters. It is within the citizenry’s right to seek the continuation of any 
leadership. However, as I have discussed above, the amendment was executed solely to advance 
the interest of a single person and his party.239 Amending or altering a constitution is not 
unconstitutional per se; it is the manner in which it is done, who demands it and for what 
purpose which confers or creates lack of constitutionalism validity on an amendment or 
alteration. In this regard, the validity of a constitutional amendment or alteration depends on if it 
is approved by constitutionalism but not as a constitution provides and it can only be approved 
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by constitutionalism if it achieved in a manner authorised by the citizenry through, for the benefit 
of the majority of the citizenry and in some cases for the protection or promotion of the rights of 
minority rights.240 
 
 To recapitulate, theprovision in the 1995 Constitution that authorises Parliament to amend the 
term limits on the re-election of the president 241 is deficient in two major ways. Firstly, it is not 
secured enough as to safeguard constitutionalism as it allows Parliament to amend such a core 
constitutional value and in doing so, makes it vulnerable to arbitrary amendment. As I have 
argued in this study, the absence of sound safeguards against arbitrary constitutional 
amendments is symbolic of a constitution without constitutionalism.242 Second, it violates and 
conflicts with the principles of allocating and exercising power which form part of the ‘spirit’ of 
the 1995 Constitution,243 by allowing a limited and easily manipulated Parliament, which has 
historically been subservient to the executive, to amend a core constitutional value.  As I have 
contended in this study, provisions of the 1995 Constitution must be read to give effect to the 
‘spirit’ of the Constitution244 and, therefore, any amendment to the Constitution that violates or 
conflicts with its ‘spirit’ is unconstitutional. 
 
                                                                 
240 For example the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 1789 was aimed at 
prohibiting the denial of the right to vote based on race, colour or previous condition of servitude. See Johnny 
Killian and George Costello (eds), ‘The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation’   
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992) 18. 
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 The constitutionality of the amendment to repeal the constitutional limits on the re-election of 
president from the 1995 Constitution may also be measured against the objectives and provisions 
of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 2007. The ACDEG 
may be perceived as an effort by the African Union to address arbitrary constitutional 
amendments to repeal presidential term limits which have afflicted the continent245 by 
delegitimising and outlawing such amendments. The Charter’s objectives include promoting 
adherence by each State Party to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect 
for human rights;246 enhancing adherence to the principle of the rule of law premised upon the 
respect for, and the supremacy of Constitutions and constitutional order in the political 
arrangements of the state parties; 247 and prohibiting, rejecting and condemning unconstitutional 
change of government in any member state as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and 
development.248 The ACDEG recognises any amendment or revision of a constitution or legal 
instrument, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government, as 
an unconstitutional change of government.249  Principles of democratic change require the people 
to be consulted in any proposed change and to authorise any change. Indeed, one of the 
principles the ACDEG encourages member states to observe is the effective participation of the 
citizens in democratic and development processes, and in governance of public affairs.250 
Therefore, the malpractice that the ACDEG defines as an unconstitutional change of government 
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is the practice of amending a constitution through undemocratic, obscured and manipulative 
processes without the popular involvement and approval of the people. The amendment to the 
1995 Constitution to repeal the term limits on the re-election of a president was achieved through 
undermining principles of democratic change not only because the people of Uganda demanded 
term limits on the re-election of the president in order to ensure orderly succession of power251 
and the end of self-styled president, 252 but also because the change was aimed at advancing the 
interests of President Museveni and his government.253Although ACDEG came into force254 after 
the amendment to repeal the presidential term limits from the 1995 Constitution was achieved, it 
provides guidance on the constitutionality of the amendment as it pronounces such an 
amendment which is achieved through undemocratic processes as an unconstitutional change of 
government. 
 
Therefore it may be stated that an amendment to a constitution in a manner that infringes on the 
principles of democratic change of government, as was achieved to repeal the presidential term 
limits from the 1995 Constitution, constitutes an illegal means of accessing or maintaining 
power. Also, the manner in which the amendment was achieved, not only violates the basic 
tenets of constitutionalism, but it also violates and conflicts with the principles of allocating and 
exercising power which form the ‘spirit’ of the Constitution. For these reasons, the amendment 
of the 1995 Constitution to repeal the term limits on the re-election of the president is 
unconstitutional. 
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5.2.3 Flexibility versus rigidity in constitutional amendments 
 
The challenge of creating a constitution that strikes a balance between flexibility and rigidity was 
the task of the framers of the 1995 Constitution. A constitution may be rigid and at the same time 
flexible in the way it provides for the amendments of its provisions and it may also prohibit 
amendments to some of its provisions. The Constitution of India 1949 is one such example. It 
provides that some of its core provisions are unamendable255 and it is rigid in its protection of 
some of its constitutional values to in order to ensure that there not easily amended by providing 
that strict requirements must be observed for their amendment.256 It is also flexible by allowing 
some its provisions to be amended through simple requirements.257 While constitutions are made 
for the people and they should be amended as and when people desire so as to fit the changing 
situations and aspirations, frequent or unpopular amendments undermine the sacredness of a 
constitution and often distort the ‘people’s contract’ with the state. A constitution viewed as a 
contract between the state and the people may therefore not be altered by the state without the 
input of the other party to the contract, the people. 
 
                                                                 
255 For example the Constitution of India 1949, art 368 (3) provides that its provision that req uires all laws to be 
consistent with fundamental right and which prohibits derogation of fundamental rights is not amendable.   
 
256 ibid art 368 (2) provides that an amendment to some the provisions such as those relating to the election of the 
president,  the extent of executive power and that of the power of the state,  the powers to amend the constitution,  
and the representation of the citizenry in parliament, to mention some, maybe be initiated only by the introduction of 
a Bill in either house of parliament; and when the Bill is passed in each house by a majority of the total membership 
of that house and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that house present and voting.  The 
amendment must also be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one half of the states by resolutions to that effect 
passed by those legislatures before being presented to the president to give his or her assent. 
 
257 ibid art 368.  These include provisions relating to the administration of the tribal areas, the powers and functions 
of administrative tribunals and the powers of the public service commission , to mention a few, which can be 
amended by a simple majority in both houses of parliament.  
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Any unilateral amendment of such contract becomes unconstitutional. I have argued in chapter 
two, section 3 of this study that Obote’s government had valid reasons for abrogating the 
Independence Constitution because it created inequalities among different tribes that formed the 
new Uganda. The Independence Constitution was also very rigid in that it did not allow for 
amendment of those provisions that nurtured inequalities.258 It was also negotiated between the 
local agitators for power and the British government, and in addition the involvement of the 
majority of Ugandans in determining how they were to be governed was ignored. Therefore, 
Independence Constitution was not a suitable for the purpose of governing over the many tribes 
that new independent Uganda was made of. However, the main discontent with the methods 
employed by Obote in abrogating the Independence Constitution and in replacing it with the 
Republic Constitution is that similar to the unenviable process of ‘constitution-bargaining’ 
between the African agitator for power and the British government from which the Independence 
Constitution emerged,   the involvement of the majority of Ugandans was ignored. On this 
premise, the framers of the 1995 Constitution should have been strived to build into the new 
constitution provisions that allow for its flexible amendment while also ensuring that it is rigid 
enough to prevent it from being manipulated against the will of the people. Also, they must have 
been guided to build into the Constitution principles that would allow the involvement of the 
majority of Ugandans on proposed alterations to core constitutional values in order to ensure that 
such alterations are authorised by the people, who could determine how they are governed.  One 
of the most important of these core constitutional values as expressed by Ugandans during the 
                                                                 
258 Uganda (Independence) Order-in-Council 1962 (The Independence Constitution), art 5 prohibited amendment of 
any provisions relating to its supremacy, federal states and districts. Therefore the provisions of the Independence 
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repealed.  
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making of the 1995 Constitution is the elimination of self-styled leaders.259 The other as 
provided under the Constitution is the peoples’ ownership of power.260  In this regard, any 
alteration to the 1995 Constitution intended to create permanent exercise of power must be 
authorised by the people. 
 
Before its tenth anniversary, disparity and cracks began to show in the durability of the 1995 
Constitution. Some of these could be attributed to the fact that the constitution-making process 
was commandeered by the NRM who were intent on creating a fundamental law to maintain 
their hold on power. Also they may be as result of the framers of the Constitution deliberately 
unfastening some of its core constitutional provision so that they can be easily amended to allow 
the NRM entrench power. This can be deduced from their disregard of the views that were 
expressed by Ugandans during the constitution-making process on core constitutional values that 
should be implemented through the provisions of the 1995 Constitution. Since independence, 
Uganda’s leaders have exhibited a culture of constitutional disdain, which has led to the 
disregard of provisions in the defunct Constitutions that limited their powers and in turn, the 
creation of fundamental laws that were used to consolidate power. Heads of state have also often 
bullied legislators into submission in order to tighten their grip on power. Moreover, as I have 
previously discussed in this study, there has been a tendency for heads of state in Uganda to 
extend their tenures beyond the periods initially mandated, and sometimes for life.261 
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In the draft Constitution, the Constitution Commission proposed that a president should hold 
office for a maximum of two five-year terms subject to amendments by Parliament.262 This 
proposal appears to be rigid and not overly stringent in that it restricts a president to serving two 
terms of five years each whereas the Constitutions of some countries provide up to seven263 or 
six264 years a term. While no constitutional commitment is ever perfectly protected from future 
modification, the history of self-grants of power by heads of state and of undermining 
constitutional provisions that limit their power should have persuaded the framers of the 1995 
Constitution to fasten core constitutional values with adequate procedures in order to avoid 
arbitrary amendments. The failure to secure the provisions of 1995 Constitution that provide for 
amendments to core constitutional values suggest an intention by the framers of the Constitution 
to create a fundamental law whose provisions are easily amendable by ruling government in 
order to allow it to hold on to power permanently, thus fueling the contention that they were 
intent on entrenching President Museveni and his NRM in power permanently.  
 
 There should be no way, save for armed usurpation or through the popular involvement of 
Ugandans, should the tenure of a president be extended. The unfastened provisos of the 
Constitution have provided a basis for consolidating dictatorship and electoral authoritarianism. 
They are also illustrative of the negligent extent to which the 1995 Constitution seeks to 
moderate executive power and to promote electoral democracy. In sum, the framers of the 
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Constitution had to build a flexible constitution that allows for amendments to its provisions in 
order to reflect society’s changing values but also ensure its rigidity on alterations on core 
constitutional values by mandating the involvement of the majority of Ugandans in their 
amendments.  However, they failed in this task. 
 
6.  Mini-conclusion 
 
An analysis of the post-1995 constitutional and domestic legal framework under which the 
president of Uganda is elected reveals one main conclusion; that is the legal framework is 
deficient in its ability to facilitate fair and transparent political contestation for the presidency. In 
part, this is because the 1995 Constitution is a fundamental law established for the purpose of 
permanently entrench President Museveni and his NRM in power and therefore its allows the 
presidency to dominate the instruments of power. Also, the constitutional and domestic legal 
framework under which a president of Uganda is elected has been constructed and construed to 
favour the incumbent and to disadvantage the competitors to the incumbent and the electorate. 
Moreover, presidential electoral laws have been construed without judicial activism which is 
necessary to address issues of electoral lawlessness pertaining to Uganda. In disregard of the 
majority wishes of the people of Uganda, the 1995 Constitution has been altered to consolidate 
President Museveni’s power and to hinder access to the presidency for any other person. The 
challenges of conducting credible of elections as witnessed in 1980 have likewise reemerged and 
are manifested in the way elections are conducted. Presidential elections in Uganda have failed 
to display the procedural fairness and substantive uncertainty that makes democratic elections 
normatively acceptable, and as such they have been unsuccessful in offering the prospects of 
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hope of transferring power.  Consequently, presidential elections in Uganda may be perceived as 
an institutional facade of democracy, aimed at concealing the harsh realities of authoritarian 
exercise of state powers. They are without a choice and not a symbol of President Museveni’s 
popularity or legitimacy, and they are unable to redeem democracy. They have become a ritual 
acclamation that affirms President Museveni’s grip on power. 
 
In sum, presidential electoral laws have obstructed rather than promoted smooth transfer and fair 
contestation of state power. This is the result of a constitutional and domestic legal framework 
designed to entrench President Museveni and the NRM in power without the possibility of 
change. Under the current constitutional and domestic legal framework it is not possible for 
President Museveni to be relieved of power through constitutional processes. Therefore, access 
to the office of the head of state continues to be denied to the majority of Ugandans by the post-
1995 constitutional and domestic legal framework, as it was by fundamental laws before 1995. 
 
Before discussing the findings of this study and making recommendations, it is necessary to make 
some concluding remarks in order to make an abridgement of the constitutional reforms which 
are taking place in Uganda at the time of witting this study. 
 
On 14 November 2014, the government of Uganda called for proposals for amending the 1995 
Constitution to be submitted to the Uganda Law Reform Commission for consideration.265 On the 
30th of April 2015, the government tabled the Constitution (Amendment) Bill No.11 2015 
providing a series of amendments to the Constitution ahead of the next general elections in 2016. 
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The government’s proposals include inserting article 247(a) in the 1995 Constitution in order to 
establish a Salaries and Remuneration Board (SRB); that will be charged with determining and 
harmonising the salaries, allowances and gratuity of state officers in the context of fairness across 
the board.266 Members of the SRB would be appointed by the president,267 thereby increasing the 
presidency’s domination of the appointment of top public servants. Clause 6 of the Bill seeks to 
amend article 144 in order to increase the retirement age of judges from seventy to seventy-five 
years in the case of justices of the Supreme Court, and from sixty to sixty-five for judges of the 
Court of Appeal 268 Clause 8 seeks to introduce article 148 (a), to provide the Judicial Services 
Commission with powers to appoint and remove certain members of the judiciary as may be 
prescribed by Parliament.269 Currently, the staff of the judiciary who are not judicial officers, are 
appointed by the Public Service Commission under article 172 (1) (b). The government is also 
proposing to amend article 60 (1) to change the name of the Electoral Commission to the 
Independent Electoral Commission, in order to recognise its independence and to enable 
Parliament to prescribe by law its composition.270 The Bill also provides for the amendment of 
article 60 (8) in order to specify grounds for the removal of members of the Electoral 
Commission. At the moment, a president may dismiss a member of the Electoral Commission 
under article 60(8) but no procedure is prescribed for the removal. This proposal is laudable as it 
appears to build constitutionalism in the presidency’s power to appoint and dismiss of members 
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of the Electoral Commission, as prevents arbitrary removals of the commissioners  by providing 
grounds for which they me dismissed. However, a commissioner would be referred to a tribunal 
appointed by the president before his or her dismissal, to determine if he or she should be 
dismissed.271 Also a president may dismiss member of the Electoral Commission for inability to 
perform his or her duties, misconduct or incompetence or if a commissioner is sentenced to death 
or imprisonment for more than nine months.272 Therefore, commissioners will still be indebted to 
the presidency for their positions. Finally, it should be noted the government’s proposals are 
silent on the restoration of the presidential two-term limits and the reforms to presidential 
electoral laws, long clamoured by civil society
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Chapter Six 
 Concluding Remarks, Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
1. Concluding remarks 
 
 Uganda’s post-1995 constitutional order, which is now celebrating its twentieth anniversary, is 
characterised by an abiding tension between President Museveni’s and his NRM government’s 
permanent ownership of power and a constitutional promise of democracy. The questions of 
political transition, democracy, exercise of state power and accountability are best answered 
through understanding the patrimonial logic and the structural constitutionalism deficit in the 
1995 Constitution. In Uganda, the head of state exercises inordinate powers. This is because 
fundamental laws have been established to entrench in power governments under whose 
leadership they are written. . 
 
2. Summary of finding 
 
The main findings of this study are centered on the research questions that I posed in chapter 
one. With respect to the main question whetherthe presidency as provided under the 1995 
Constitution is as a result of another fundamental law this time created under leadership of 
President Museveni and the NRM for the purpose of entrenching their power. The study found 
that the conceptual problem of constitutionalism in post-1995 Uganda is that the country is 
experiencing its reconstructed past when it was supposed to create a future better than its past.  
This is because exclusive constitution-making, incumbency perpetuation and misallocation of 
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state powers remerged in the manner that the 1995 Constitution. Starting with the constitutional 
arrangements established under the colonial epoch up to the present, presidential authority in 
Uganda have emerged out of fundamental laws created for the purpose of entrenching the power 
of the head of state and government under whose influence or leadership they were created. The 
meaningful involvement of the majority of Ugandans in adopting the laws that rule over them 
was ignored. Therefore, because of the reasons why they were established, fundamental laws did 
not provide sufficient constraints on heads of state and governments. This study finds that the 
1995 Constitution is such another fundamental law.   
 
The study illustrated in chapter three that the 1995 Constitution was debated for close to seven 
years in order to determine a democratic system of governance and policies that would ensure 
smooth transfer of power and to circumscribe the exercise of state power, among other aims. The 
implementation of these aims would then be provided for under the Constitution in the interest of 
the citizenry who are the source of state power. The study demonstrated that it was the aspiration 
of the majority of Ugandans to who commented on the presidency to build into the 
1995Constitution mechanisms for ensuring that presidential authority is carefully monitored in 
order to avoid their misuse or abuse, and that future president are accountable to the people. 
Ugandans also sought to ensure that future presidents are elected through free and fair elections 
that would translate into democratic choice. The 1995Constitution was meant to emerge out of 
the popular authority of the people of Uganda and to be cast in the principles of constitutionalism 
in order to achieve these aims. However, the constitution-making process was commandeered by 
President Museveni and his NRM party who were intent on creating a fundamental law that 
would enable them exercise unfettered state powers, and to entrench themselves in power 
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without the possibility of being removed through constitutional processes. Consequently, the 
constitution-making process did not yield the model of the presidency that Ugandans wished for. 
Efforts by citizenry to construct a new model of the presidency cast in constitutionalism were 
ignored by the framers of the 1995 Constitution. Therefore, this study found that the presidency 
as established by the 1995 Constitution lacks popular legitimacy because it was not founded on 
the wishes of the majority of Ugandans and it is devoid of legal legitimacy because it was not 
built on the basic tenets of constitutionalism. Indeed, this study found that there has been no 
actual shift from the designs of the presidency found in fundamental laws before 1995, under 
which the presidency exercised unfettered state powers.1 
 
In chapter four, this study established that the systems of checks and balances contained in the 
1995 Constitution are either just masquerades that pretend to limit the powers of the presidency 
or they are inept because they were negligently or deliberately not fastened effectively, and in 
some cases they have failed to function because of the leadership style of the President.  The 
study also illustrated that the design of the presidency provided for by the 1995 Constitution 
creates a presidency whose powers cannot be limited. 
 
In chapter four this study found that reconstructing presidential authority in order to avoid its 
misuse would have produced a limited presidential system grounded in constitutionalism and 
which is based on the legitimate wishes of the people of Uganda. It would also have facilitated 
smooth transfer of power; minimised corruption and tribalism; ensured democratic governance; 
                                                                 
1 For example most powers and privileges vested in the kings, colonial governors and the past heads of state by 
fundamental laws such as the command of the army, the appointment of top civil servants and the immunity from 
legal proceeding are bestowed on the presidency by the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. 
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facilitated political stability and fair political competition; and allowed all Ugandans equal access 
to the country’s resources, careers and economic prospects, among other things. This study also 
established that although constitutions in many African states designate the presidency in a 
similar manner, the powers and privileges of the presidency as provide for in these constitutions 
are not always based on valid reasons, neither are they founded on law or rooted in 
constitutionalism and they are often inspired by a desire to entrench power. In this regard, the 
affliction of poverty, corruption, civil wars and violent struggles for political power and 
patronage which are rampant on the African continent could be explained through understanding 
how Constitutions in Africa allocate powers to presidents and governments without the 
possibility of change through constitutional processes. Therefore, this study seeks to contribute 
to rethinking how Constitutions in Africa designate presidents. Furthermore, the study 
demonstrated that while President Museveni has exercised powers of the presidency almost 
without any actual restraint, courts in various countries have defined the scope of the powers of 
the presidency. Also, various countries have developed constitutional mechanisms to determine 
the parameters of the presidential authority. Therefore, a president may not exercise powers of 
the presidency for reasons other than those granted by a constitution, and without legal limits or 
irrationally.    
 
 The study found in chapter four that the powers and privileges of presidency as established by 
the 1995 Constitution have been used to encourage patronage and corruption, and to excluded 
the people of Uganda who are not aligned to the President and his party from accessing state 
jobs, among other things. They have also been used to impede democratic change and, therefore, 
there is a risk that Ugandans may turn to violent struggles for political power in order to remove 
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President Museveni and his NRM from power. Using the Constitution of the Republic of 
Benin1990 as an example; this study demonstrated that it is possible to establish an effective 
presidency for the smooth running of the country, while at the same time ensuring that the 
exercise of presidential authority is subject to continuous supervision so as to avoid its abuse. 
 
This study established in chapter five, that the unbounded provisions of the 1995 Constitution 
have made it possible for the NMR government to repeal the term limits on the re-election of a 
president, in disregard of the principles of constitutionalism and the wishes of the majority of 
Ugandans. The amendment of the 1995 Constitution to repeal the presidential term limits is also 
another example of President Museveni’s disregard of provisions of the Constitution that attempt 
to limit his access to power. Therefore, President Museveni, like heads of state in Uganda before 
him, has not submitted to provisions of the Constitution that seek to limit his power. Although 
the amendment to repeal the term limits was effected in a manner authorised by the Constitution, 
this study found that it conflicts with the principles of transferring and allocating power which 
underlie the 1995 Constitution, and the basic tenets of constitutionalism. It was also not 
supported by the majority of Ugandans and it amounts to an unconstitutional change of 
government under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 
2007. 
 
Despite the rhetoric in the 1995 Constitution which suggests that power belongs to the people, 2 
this study established that the ‘real power’ actually rests with President Museveni and his ruling 
government whose actions cannot be sufficiently be constrained, and who cannot be removed 
from power through constitutional processes.  For example, in chapters four and five, this study 
                                                                 
2 See (n 3). 
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demonstrated that the President cannot be removed from power for violation of the Constitution 
because of the feeble impeachment process, or through elections because presidential electoral 
laws are deficient in their ability to facilitate fair political contestation and the electoral process 
is incapable of translating the people’s votes into democratic choice. 
 
Following a detailed analysis of the constitutional and domestic legal framework under which the 
president of Uganda is elected in chapter five, this study found that presidential electoral laws 
have been constructed to favour the incumbent, and to disadvantage other presidential candidates. 
It also demonstrated that electoral laws have been construed without specific attention to issues 
pertaining to the way elections are conducted and occurrences during elections in Uganda, and in 
disregard of the principles underpinning the 1995 Constitution. Moreover, this study found that 
presidential electoral laws fail to mitigate the dominance which the incumbent president and 
government have over the electoral process. Electoral laws also stipulate conditions that are 
impossible for a challenger to the incumbent to satisfy. For example, the requirement that the 
challenger to the outcome of presidential elections must prove the allegations of electoral 
malpractice on the highest threshold that is ‘beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the 
Court’,3  which is the standard of evidence required to validate a criminal conviction, has made it 
impossible to challenge fraudulent elections. In this regard this study established that presidential 
elections do not offer a credible forum for determining President Museveni’s legitimacy. 
Therefore, the constitutional and domestic legal framework has hindered rather than facilitated 
                                                                 
3 In the cases of  Col. Dr .Besigye Kiiza v Museveni Yoweri Kaguta and the Electoral Commission , Election Petition 
No.1 of 200I [2001] UGSC3 (Presidential Election Petition No1 of 2001); Rtd Col Kizza Besigye v the Electoral 
Commission and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Presidential Petition No.1 of 2006 [2006] UGSC 24 (Presidential 
Election Petition No. 1 of 2006), the Supreme Court cited Mbowe v Eliufoo(1967) EA 240 as one of the leading 
authorities that the burden of proof lies with the petitioner in electoral petitions who must prove his allegation 
against the respondent at standard required to validate a criminal conviction.  
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fair competition for the presidency. The danger, however, is that Ugandans may revert to the old 
violent and unconstitutional ways of accessing power to depose President Museveni and his 
NRM government. 
 
The overall finding of this study is that the presidency established by the 1995 Constitution is as 
a result of a fundamental law written under the auspices of President Museveni and his NRM 
government with the aim of entrenching themselves in power. Therefore, the Constitution does 
not make any genuine attempt to circumscribe the powers of the presidency. The out of the 1995 
constitutional reforms travesty is that for the seventh time since independence in 1962, another 
government that came to power through violence and unconstitutional means has been 
legitimised by a fundamental law created to serve it. It may therefore be stated that since the 
boundaries of Uganda were drawn by the British in 1894, Uganda has not been able to 
promulgate a fundamental law and designated a presidency therein, which are founded on the 
basic principles of constitutionalism, and that have emerged out of the popular wishes of the 
people. Also, in the same period, Uganda has not been governed by a head of state and 
government that has been elected through electoral laws that translate will of the people into 
democratic choice. 
 
The powers and the privileges of the presidency lie at that the heart of effective government, yet 
the control of presidential authority in Uganda and many other countries in Africa remains one of 
the most difficult problems in constitutional frameworks. In the case of Uganda, the 1995 
Constitution represents the first attempt by the citizenry in Uganda by to reconstruct the 
institution of the president. However, the Constitution failed to take up the challenge of 
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providing sufficient constraints on the presidency. Also, an opportunity to rethink the reasons for 
granting powers and privileges that have been assigned by erstwhile fundamental laws to the 
presidency was missed. The recommendations that follow in the concluding section of this study 
are aimed at addressing these issues. They have also been submitted to the Uganda Law Reform 
Commission for consideration. 
 
3. Recommendations 
 
3.1 Promulgate a new constitution or review the provisions relating to the presidency in 
the 1995 Constitution and amend the Constitution 
 
Uganda needs to promulgate a new constitution emerging out of the aspirations of Ugandans to 
construct democratic institutions and mechanism for ensuring that persons and institutions that 
exercise state powers are subjected to effective controls. This may be achieved through casting 
the new constitution in the mould of the principles of constitutionalism. Further studies need to 
be carried out on how to establish effective constitutional institutions and to ensure that state 
powers are exercised within acceptable constitutional limits not only in Uganda, but also in many 
other African countries.  
 
In the case of Uganda, with regard to the presidency, a new constitution may be adopted to 
achieve these aims. Alternatively, provisions relating to the presidency in the 1995 Constitution 
could be reviewed and amended. However, amending the Constitution in order to reconstruct the 
presidency therein may amount to rewriting it because of the domineering nature of the 
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presidency in therein. Also, in relation to emending any of the major provisions relating to the 
presidency, the 1995 Constitution only allows the involvement of the citizenry in the provision 
relating to the length of the term that a president may serve4 which is five years. 5 All other 
provisions relating to the presidency may be amended by Parliament.6 Given its record of 
subservience to President Museveni, it is impossible to envisage how Parliament could agree to 
amend the Constitution with the aim of circumscribing the powers and privileges of the 
presidency. Similarly, it is impossible to imagine that President Museveni, to whom the country 
and the power of government have become personal possessions, would surrender to any attempt 
to limit his authority. Nevertheless, reviewing the 1995 Constitution in order to develop effective 
mechanisms for ensuring that those who exercise state powers are subject to effective checks and 
balances represents a more cost effective option. 
 
Ideally, the new constitutional reform exercise should be insulated from the overriding influence 
of a single person, government, or political party. This is because history has demonstrated that 
as a result of having been sponsored by ruling governments or dominant individuals, 
fundamental laws in Uganda have tended to allocate excessive powers to their sponsors. 
 
3.2 Conduct public debates on constitutional reforms 
 
In order for the constitutional reforms to acquire the support of the public, Ugandans should be 
educated through public debates about the motivations behind the fundamental laws under which 
                                                                 
4 The 1995 Constitution (n 3), arts 259(2) (f) and 261. 
 
5 ibid art 105 (1). 
 
6 ibid art 261. 
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the country has been ruled since its borders where drawn up. Civil society could take up the role 
of raising public awareness. Universities and other institutions of education could also provide 
courses on constitutional law with a specific focus on constitutionalism and constitution-making. 
Debates and courses on constitutional reforms could include how to develop mechanisms which 
insure that holders of public office do not abuse their authority. It is noted that the government is 
likely to invoke the Public Order and Management Act 20137 to prohibit public debates on 
constitutional reforms. However, any such attempts would present civil society with an 
opportunity to test the constitutionality of the Act before the Constitutional Court. 
 
3.3 Recommendations on the new design of a president 
 
In order to ensure that future presidents are not allocated inordinate powers and that they require 
the will of Ugandans to hold power, several recommendations are submitted for consideration. 
These recommendations may also be very relevant for other African countries trapped in a 
similar situation of presidential dominance. First, the traditional instruments of power such as the 
armed forces, the police force and the Electoral Commission, as well as the other arms of 
government, such as the judiciary and the legislature should be insulated from the domination of 
the presidency. For example, under the new presidential design, members of the Electoral 
Commission could be appointed by a president from a list of recommended nominees submitted 
to Parliament by all registered political parties, in order to protect the integrity of the electoral 
                                                                 
7  Section 5 (1) of the Act requires an organiser of a public meeting or his or her agent to give a notice of intention to 
hold a public meeting to an authorised officer at least three days but not more than fifteen days before the proposed 
public meeting. Under s 4(1) of the Act , a public meeting includes a gathering , assembly, procession or 
demonstration in a public place or premises held for the purposes of discussing , acting upon, petitioning or 
expressing a view on a matter of public interest. S 8 (1) allows the Inspector General of Police, any police officer 
above the rank of inspector or any other authorised officer to stop or prevent the holding of a public meeting.  
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process.  Second, a Constitutional Court with supervisory powers over the functions of all arms 
of government including the presidency, similar to the one in the Republic of Benin should be 
established. 
 
 Third, caveats that seek to provide checks and balances on presidential authority such as those 
that provide for the appointments of heads of public service bodies should be fastened 
sufficiently in order to ensure that democratic constitutional bodies, such as Parliament and 
expert constitutional bodies such as the Judicial Services Commission are empowered to perform 
their constitutional duties. This could be achieved in several ways. First, a president’s powers of 
appointment should be exercised ‘following the advice of’ an expert constitutional body to 
ensure that a president is bound by the advice of such bodies. For example, in relation to judicial 
appointments, a president may be constitutionally authorised to appoint two of the eleven justices 
of the Supreme Court who may not include the chief justice, and one of the seven members of 
the Constitutional Court who again may not be the head of the court. A president’s role in 
judicial appointments is justified by the mandate that the electorate have given him or her as the 
head of the administration of the country. However, such a mandate should not allow for the 
creation of a judiciary that is beholden to the president. The other justices of the Supreme Court 
and members of the Constitutional Court could be appointed by the Judicial Services 
Commission. To insulate expert constitutional bodies from the influence of a president, their 
members could be appointed by a president ‘following the advice of’ the Parliamentary 
Committee on Public Service Appointments which is made up of all political parties in 
Parliament, and on which every political party is equally represented. The term ‘following the 
advice’ denotes that such appointments may be made in adherence to the advice of the 
 
 
338 
 
Parliamentary Committee on Public Service Appointments. Therefore, it would be for the 
Parliamentary Committee to forward the names of the nominees to a president for appointment.  
Where a president finds that a candidate nominated by the Parliamentary Committee is not 
suitable for appointment, he or she may refer the matter to the Constitutional Court to determine.  
 
The new constitution should provide for the qualifications and other requirements for judicial 
appointments and for the membership of expert bodies such as the Judicial Services 
Commission. Persons nominated for the position of the chief justice should be approved by the 
Constitutional Court, while those nominated for the head of the Constitutional Court should be 
approved by the Supreme Court. 
 
Fourth, under the new designation of the president, the office holder should have the overall 
command of the armed forces; however its operations should be approved by a Parliamentary 
Committee on Security Agencies. As the leader of the administration of the country, whose 
responsibilities include protecting the citizens and the territorial integrity of the country, a 
president’s command of the armed forces is justified because of the nature of the national 
security issues and operations that the armed forces may be involved in. The Parliamentary 
Committee, which again is made up of all political parties in Parliament and on which every 
political party in Parliament is equally represented, should appoint the head of the armed forces. 
The constitution should provide for the qualifications and other requirements for the head of the 
armed forces. It should also provide that the ethnic composition of the armed forces must reflect 
the population of Uganda. This could be achieved through ensuring that the recruitment 
processes stipulates the number of persons who may be recruited into armed forces from the 
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different regions of the country. These procedures should also apply to the police and prison and 
other security services. Fifth, to void partisan approaches to issues of national importance, the 
constitution should provide that a member of Parliament may only once in a year be required to 
vote on any motion in Parliament in support of his or her party. 
 
Sixth, a president should not be provided with immunity from legal proceedings on account of 
acts or omission carried out as an individual. She or he may, however, be granted immunity for 
acts committed while acting in her or his capacity as a president. Acts and omissions carried out 
in the presidential capacity are those that relate to a president’s constitutional role. However a 
president should be impeached for acts carried out in the exercise of his constitutional role which 
violates the constitution and domestic law. A motion of intention to seek legal proceedings 
against a president should be filed with the Constitutional Court and it should be approved by the 
Court. Legal proceedings against a president may also be commenced in the Constitutional 
Court. Parliament, the Constitutional Court on its own motion and the citizenry may initiate 
impeachment proceedings against a president for acts amounting to violation of domestic law or 
the constitution.  
 
Impeachment proceedings against the president initiated by the Constitutional Court may be 
supported by at least three of the seven members of the Court and should be heard by the 
Supreme Court. A parliamentary motion seeking to impeach the president should be supported 
by half of the members of Parliament, while that of the citizenry should be supported by at least 
one-hundred thousand registered voters and both should be approved by the Constitution Court. 
Impeachment proceedings against a president initiated by Parliament and the citizenry may also 
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be heard by the Constitutional Court. A decision of the Constitutional Court not to impeach or to 
commence legal proceeding against a president maybe appealed by the citizenry or Parliament, 
whichever of the two initiated the proceedings, and the president to the Supreme Court. While 
decisions of the Supreme Court may not be appealable. A president may not be suspended from 
office while impeachment or legal proceedings are being investigated by the Constitutional Court 
or the Supreme Court unless either Court deems it necessary to do so in the interest of justice. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court to suspend the president may be appealed by the 
president to the Supreme Court. A president may also temporarily, on own accord; stand down 
pending the outcome of legal or impeachment proceedings. Where a president is suspended from 
office, or where he or she stands down temporarily, the constitution should provide for a 
procedure for an acting president to take over the office of the president. 
 
3.4 Adopt constitutional limits on the re-election of a president 
 
In order to facilitate fair competition for the presidency and to avoid incumbency perpetuation, 
the constitution could provide for a maximum of two term limits of five years each on the re-
election of a president. This is because a five year term renewable once allows a president 
sufficient time to carry out the mandate for which he or she has been elected. While answering 
the on-going calls by civil society in Uganda to restore the two-term limits in the 1995 
Constitution8 would improve political contestation among other things, it will not address the 
                                                                 
8 See Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda, ‘Beyond 2011: The Citizens Electoral Reform 
Agenda’ (Citizen’s Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda, 20 December 2011) 
www.ccedu.org.ug/downloads/CERA%20Handbook%20-%20pdf.pdf accessed 20  March2015; Civil Society 
Coalition for the Restoration of the Presidential Term Limits, ‘Together We Must’ (Civil Society Coalition for the 
Restoration of the Presidential Term Limit, 15 November 2012) 
http://ccgea.org/documents/Term%20Limits_Flyer_II[1].pdf accessed 13 April 2015; Foundation for Human Rights 
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overall domineering nature of the presidency. Under the new constitution, a proposal to repeal 
the term limits on the re-election of a president should be supported by two-thirds of the 
registered voters and approved by the Constitutional Court. 
 
3.5 Modify the principles for adjudicating presidential electoral complaints  
 
The international principles for adjudicating electoral complaints which assume that the results 
of elections all over the world reflect the true will of the people regardless of how electoral laws 
and systems are structured in different jurisdictions should be revised. For example, a civil but 
not a criminal standard of proof should be employed in the adjudication of complaints resulting 
from elections. Furthermore, electoral laws in Uganda should seek to protect the quality of 
elections in order to safeguard the outcome of the elections. One way of achieving this would be 
to allow for elections to be annulled where they have been conducted so badly, in violation of 
electoral laws. Correspondingly, section 59(6)(c) of the Presidential Elections Act 2005 should 
be amended to allow for elections to be invalidated where a person declared president gains 
unfair advantage in elections as a result of non-compliance with mandatory provisions of 
electoral laws such as those that prohibit voter bribe and voter intimidation. In these 
circumstances, elections should annulled even where the non-compliance with electoral laws was 
not committed by the victorious candidate or with the approval or knowledge of the candidate by 
his or her agent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Initiative, ‘Private Member’s Bill on the Restoration of Presidential Term Limits’ (Foundation for Human Rights 
Initiative Uganda 2013). 
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